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Physical products, from toasters and lawnmowers, to infant car seats and
toys, to meat and drugs, are routinely inspected and regulated for safety. Credit
products, like mortgage loans and credit cards, on the other hand, are left
largely unregulated, even though they can also be unsafe. Because financial
products are analyzed through a contract paradigm rather than a products
paradigm, consumers have been left with unsafe credit products. These dangerous products can lead to financial distress, bankruptcy, and foreclosure,
and, as evidenced by the recent subprime crisis, they can have devastating effects on communities and on the economy. In this Article, we use the physical
products analogy to build a case, supported by both theory and data, for com-
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prehensive safety regulation of consumer credit. We then examine the present
state of consumer credit regulation, explaining why the current regulatory regime has systematically failed to provide meaningful safety regulations. We
propose a fundamental restructuring of this regime, urging the creation of a
new federal regulator that will have both the authority and the incentives to police the safety of consumer credit products.
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INTRODUCTION
Safety regulation is everywhere. Toasters, lawnmowers, infant car
seats, toys, meat, drugs, and many other physical products are routinely inspected and regulated for safety. Indeed, regulation of such
products has become so firmly woven into the marketplace that it is
headline news when regulators fail to prevent a dangerous product
from making it into the hands of consumers. No one asks if such
items should be regulated; policy discussions center instead on
whether such regulation is adequate.
Consumer credit products also pose safety risks for customers.
Credit cards, subprime mortgages, and payday loans can lead to financial distress, bankruptcy, and foreclosure. Economic losses can be
imposed on innocent third parties, including neighbors of foreclosed
property, and widespread economic instability may affect economic
growth and job prospects for millions of families that never took on a
risky financial instrument. Financial harm is not the same as physical
harm, but it can be as real and as painful. Why are consumers protected from dangerous products and sharp business practices when
they purchase tangible consumer products, but left at the mercy of
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their creditors when they sign up for routine financial products like
1
mortgages and credit cards?
The difference between the two markets is regulation. Although
the “R-word” is considered an epithet in many circles, regulation supports a booming market in tangible consumer goods. Nearly every
product sold in America has passed basic safety regulations well in ad2
vance of being stocked on store shelves. Credit products, by comparison, are weakly regulated by a tattered patchwork of federal and
state laws that have failed to adapt to changing markets. Thanks to effective regulation, innovation in the market for physical products has
1

Our identification of financial consumer products as a subcategory of consumer
products mirrors the well-known argument about the collapse of the contract-product
distinction. See generally Douglas G. Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, 104 MICH. L. REV. 933
(2006) (analyzing boilerplate and fine print language as components and attributes of
products); Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 144–51, 155
(1970) (arguing in favor of recognizing the contract not merely as the result of a process, but as part of the product); Lewis A. Kornhauser, Comment, Unconscionability in
Standard Forms, 64 CAL. L. REV. 1151 (1976) (recommending a legislatively imposed
measure of unconscionability that looks to a contract’s resultant terms, not merely defects in the contracting process). The contract-product distinction also has been challenged in the consumer credit context. See John A. E. Pottow, Private Liability for Reckless Consumer Lending, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 405, 407-08 (2007) (proposing a products
liability approach to financial products). In this Article we focus on consumer credit
products, but most of our arguments and conclusions can be extended to other financial consumer products, including insurance and investment products.
2
See Robert S. Adler, Redesigning People Versus Redesigning Products: The Consumer
Product Safety Commission Addresses Product Misuse, 11 J.L. & POL. 79, 82-83 (1995)
(chronicling the rise of the regulation of consumer products in reaction to “substantial
numbers of unreasonably dangerous products circulated in virtually unregulated fashion throughout the country”); FTC, A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/
brfovrvw.shtm (last visited Oct. 1, 2008) (reviewing FTC regulatory authority over “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” which “cause[] or [are] likely to cause substantial
injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and
not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition” (quoting
15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2006)) (alterations in original) (emphasis omitted)); U.S. Consumer
Product
Safety
Commission,
CPSC
Home Page—About
Tab,
http://www.cpsc.gov/about/about.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2008) (“The U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission is charged with protecting the public from unreasonable risks of serious injury or death from more than 15,000 types of consumer
products under the agency’s jurisdiction. . . . The CPSC’s work to ensure the safety of
consumer products—such as toys, cribs, power tools, cigarette lighters, and household
chemicals—contributed significantly to the 30 percent decline in the rate of deaths
and injuries associated with consumer products over the past 30 years.”); U.S. Food
and Drug Administration, What FDA Regulates, http://www.fda.gov/comments/
regs.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2008) (“FDA is the federal agency responsible for ensuring that foods are safe, wholesome and sanitary; human and veterinary drugs, biological products, and medical devices are safe and effective; cosmetics are safe; and electronic products that emit radiation are safe.”).
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led to greater safety and more consumer-friendly features. By comparison, innovation in financial products has produced incomprehensible terms and sharp practices that hurt consumers and reduce social
welfare.
Credit has provided substantial value for millions of households,
permitting the purchase of homes that help families accumulate
wealth and cars that can expand job opportunities. Credit can also
provide a critical safety net, permitting families to borrow against a
better tomorrow if they suffer job layoffs, medical problems, or family
breakups today. Many financial products are offered on fair terms
that benefit both seller and customer.
For a growing number of families that are steered into overpriced
and misleading credit products, however, credit products benefit only
the lenders. For families that get tangled up with truly dangerous financial products, the results can be wiped-out savings, lost homes,
higher costs for car insurance, denial of jobs, troubled marriages,
3
bleak retirements, and broken lives.

3

On the effects of credit card debt, see, for example, RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING
AHEAD: THE GROWTH AND REGULATION OF PAYMENT CARD MARKETS ch. 15 (2006);
TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE
MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT ch. 4 (2000). On the effect of predatory lending
on military personnel, see, for example, DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING PRACTICES DIRECTED AT MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THEIR DEPENDENTS
39-42 (2006), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/issues/payday/reports/
page.jsp?itemID=29862306 [hereinafter DOD, REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING],
which recounts select profiles from 3393 case studies of service members trapped in
high-cost loans—the financial consequences of which were contributing factors to serious military disciplinary actions, including loss of promotion and separation from the
military, lawsuits, bankruptcy, divorce, and impact upon other financial circumstances,
such as exorbitant fees, necessitating further loans or home refinancing. On the effect
of subprime mortgage products, see, for example, JOINT ECON. COMM., 2007 JOINT
ECONOMIC REPORT 37-44 [hereinafter JEC REPORT], which concludes that a subprime
foreclosure results in “loss of a stable living place and significant portion of wealth,”
“create[s] possible tax liabilities,” and “reduces the homeowner’s credit rating, creating barriers to future home purchases and even rentals.” See also Editorial, Losing
Homes and Neighborhoods, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2007, at A20 (noting that “more than
500,000 . . . subprime borrowers have lost their homes to foreclosures” and that “some
[of these families] may never recover”). On the effects of payday loans, see, for example, Erik Eckholm, Seductively Easy, ‘Payday Loans’ Often Snowball, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23,
2006, at A1, which asserts that impoverished populations, minorities, and military personnel are targeted by predatory lending and trapped by payday loans they cannot repay. On the effects of credit cards, see, for example, Moon Ihlwan, Falling Madly in
Love With Plastic: Is Korea’s Credit-Card Binge a Disaster Waiting to Happen?, BUS. WK.
(INT’L ED.), May 13, 2002, at 57, depicting students who have resorted to criminal behavior to pay off their credit card debt; Clarissa Segovia, Watch Out for the Black Hole of
Credit Card Debt, ONLINE FORTY-NINER, Aug. 30, 2004, http://www.csulb.edu/~d49er/
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In this Article we argue for parity of treatment between ordinary
physical products and financial products that are sold to consumers.
Credit products should be thought of as products, like toasters and
4
lawnmowers, and their sale should meet minimum safety standards.
We harness both theory and data to demonstrate that sellers of credit
products have learned to exploit the lack of information and cognitive
limitations of consumers in ways that put consumers’ economic security at risk, turning them into far more dangerous products than they
need to be. We argue that consumers are no better equipped to protect themselves from many common credit products than they were
from poorly wired toasters or badly designed lawnmowers that started
fires or sliced off fingers before the safety of these physical products
was regulated. We also argue that the current legal structure, a loose
amalgam of common law, statutory prohibitions, and regulatoryagency oversight, is structurally incapable of providing effective protection. We propose the creation of a single regulatory body that will
be responsible for evaluating the safety of consumer credit products
and policing any features that are designed to trick, trap, or otherwise
fool the consumers who use them.
Despite the benefits that it provides, the market for consumer financial products suffers from deficiencies that prevent even intense
competition from maximizing both consumer and social welfare.
5
Rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding, a careful examination of
the market for financial products illustrates the need for systemic

archives/2004/fall/news/volLVno2-debt.shtml, noting that students have committed
suicide from the pressures of credit card debt. And on the effects of indebtedness
generally, see, for example, Melissa B. Jacoby, Does Indebtedness Influence Health? A Preliminary Inquiry, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 560, 561 (2002), which surveys studies that suggest a causal link between indebtedness and health problems and concludes that
“[i]ndebtedness may trigger stress that worsens health, or indebtedness may limit an
individual’s ability to seek preventative medical care and make health-maximizing
choices generally.”
4
This does not mean that the minimum standard should be set by regulation. For
example, in some cases regulation that mandates disclosure of product attributes,
and/or a standardized, government or nongovernment, ranking of product safety will
induce sellers to offer safe products.
5
See Richard A. Epstein, Behavioral Economics: Human Errors and Market Corrections,
73 U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 128-32 (2006) (arguing that the consumer credit card market
functions well and that anything more than light-handed regulation would raise consumers’ transaction costs or create anticompetitive harm); Richard A. Epstein, The Neoclassical Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 803 (2008) (asserting that
regulation reduces overall output in the regulated sector and causes spillover economic losses outside of the regulated sector).
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regulation and suggests how such regulation can support optimal
market functioning.
Two clarifications are in order: First, we are not claiming that the
current regulation of physical products is perfect, or that regulation of
credit products is completely absent. Our claim is that regulation of
physical products is more broadly accepted and more effective than
the regulation of credit products. Second, we are not claiming that all
potentially dangerous physical or credit products should be regulated.
Regulatory intervention is necessary only when markets are shown to
fail, as elaborated below.
Today, consumers can enter the market to buy physical products,
confident that they will not be deceived into buying exploding toasters
and other unreasonably dangerous products. They can concentrate
their shopping efforts in other directions, helping drive a competitive
market that keeps costs low and encourages innovation in convenience, durability, functionality, and style. Consumers entering the
market to buy financial products should enjoy the same benefits.
I. THE PROBLEM
A. The Theory: Why Markets for Consumer Credit Products Are Failing
Credit products are a species of contract. Conceptually, an
agreement to lend money is no different from any other contract. In
the ideal prototype, each party agrees to a certain set of terms, creating a wealth-enhancing transfer for both sides. The role of law is thus
limited—to enforce the parties’ contract, not to meddle with it.
The freedom-of-contract principle and faith in the value of free
markets are premised on a number of assumptions, specifically that
the contracting parties are informed and rational. In the area of consumer credit products, not only are these assumptions untested, but in
many cases both theory and evidence suggest they are unrealistic or
6
directly contradicted by the available data. When those assumptions
are not reliable, then freedom of contract shifts from a system to enhance consumer welfare, and social welfare more generally, to a tool
used by more sophisticated parties to take consumers’ money without
giving value in return.
6

Consumers who are imperfectly informed and imperfectly rational make mistakes. John Campbell has argued that mistakes are “central to the field of household
finance.” John Y. Campbell, President, Am. Fin. Ass’n, Household Finance (Jan. 7,
2006), in 61 J. FIN. 1553, 1554.
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We focus on the risk associated with using products. Of course, all
products carry risks. A toaster, if not used carefully, can cause serious
physical harm. Similarly, a credit card, if not used carefully, can cause
serious financial harm. Yet toasters and credit cards are ever present
despite the risks that they pose. These products are ubiquitous because they provide substantial benefits alongside the serious risks. If
an informed consumer purchases a toaster after accurately concluding
that the benefits of the product outweigh the risks, then the transac7
tion is welfare enhancing. Moreover, informed rational consumers
will minimize product risk by taking optimal care. And a market
populated by informed rational consumers will force manufacturers
and issuers to offer a reasonable level of product risk by optimally de8
signing their products.
The problem, of course, is that consumers are not always perfectly
informed, and very few consumers are perfectly rational. When the
ideals of perfect information and perfect rationality are replaced by
their real-world counterparts, imperfect information and imperfect
rationality, the rosy picture of optimally designed products and welfare-maximizing transactions must be redrawn.
Markets and contracts can be relied upon to maximize welfare
only when consumers are rational and informed. If consumers do not
know what they are buying, markets might not give them what they
would have bought had they known. If consumers have no information about the risks associated with a specific toaster or do not understand these risks, then manufacturers will not invest in designing and
producing low-risk toasters. Why would a manufacturer spend money
on improving its product if uninformed consumers will not reward the
manufacturer with a higher price—which, in a competitive market, is
9
necessary to cover the higher costs of the better, safer product?
The same is true for consumer credit products. It may not be very
expensive to design and offer a high-quality, welfare-maximizing
credit card contract. But the alternative costs of such an optimal contract to the issuer might be substantial. For example, if consumers

7

We abstract at this stage from the possibility of negative externalities. For a discussion of the negative externalities generated by credit products, see infra Part I.C.2.
8
STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW ch. 3 (1987).
9
See id. (analyzing cases where consumers know only average risks). It should be
emphasized that the social objective, against which the ramifications of imperfect information are measured, is not the production of zero-risk products. It will generally
be socially optimal to bear a positive risk level. The point is that imperfect information
will lead to excessive risk.
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know only the standard interest rate and annual fee associated with a
specific card, issuers would offer cards with high penalty interest rates
and fees. Foregoing these high penalties would impose a substantial
cost on the issuer. If the improved contract would not attract more
business and would not allow the issuer to charge higher nonpenalty
interest rates and fees, then there would be no reason for an issuer to
offer a better contract with more reasonable penalties. Moreover, an
issuer who offers an efficient contract with lower penalties and higher
nonpenalty prices will lose business to a competitor who offers an inefficient contract with higher penalties and lower nonpenalty prices.
Imperfect rationality exacerbates these problems. An uninformed
yet rational consumer would understand that she is buying a dangerous product because she understands that sellers have no incentive to
invest in making a safer product given consumers’ imperfect informa10
tion. But the rational uninformed consumer would at least reach
the correct decision about whether to purchase the dangerous product. And if she decides to purchase the dangerous product, the rational consumer will exercise the appropriate level of care. Not so for
the imperfectly rational consumer. The optimistic consumer who underestimates the risks associated with the product might purchase a
product when the benefits do not outweigh the risks. Instead, the underestimating consumer would consider purchasing the product
11
whenever the benefits outweighed the perceived risks. Moreover, this
imperfectly rational consumer will not take adequate care when using
the product, thus risking substantial injury.
The application of these principles in the credit card market, for
example, illustrates the welfare costs. An imperfectly rational consumer might underestimate the likelihood of a penalty-triggering
event. This consumer, even if she is aware of the high penalties, will
underestimate the risk associated with high penalties. Consequently,
this consumer might obtain a credit card that is not welfare maximizing for her. Moreover, she might use this credit card in a way that
unduly exposes her to the risk that penalties will be imposed.
All markets suffer from the risk that consumers will be underinformed and therefore make judgments that are not welfare enhancing. In the market for ordinary consumer products, safety risks—

10

The rational uninformed consumer would understand that the market equilibrium features a dangerous product. Still, if consumers cannot identify the safe seller,
no sellers would have a reason to try to change this equilibrium. See id. at 52-53.
11
Id.

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

10

[Vol. 157: 1

exploding toasters, lawnmowers that slice off toes, baby toys covered
with lead paint, infant seats that crumple on impact, and so on—are
regulated. Effects that are difficult for consumers to see and evaluate
in advance of purchase are tested and controlled. Consumers are
then free to inform themselves about other, more visible features.
Sellers also benefit because they are protected from competition from
12
high-risk alternatives.
Consumer credit products are not inherently safer than physical
products. Nor are markets for credit products inherently superior to
markets for physical products in curbing the imperfect information
and imperfect rationality that might allow safety risks to persist. In
fact, as we discuss below, certain features unique to consumer credit
products render markets for these products especially vulnerable to
the problems of imperfect information and imperfect rationality. As
we develop later in the Article, at least three features of credit products make them particularly dangerous for consumers to use: (1) the
13
complexity of credit products, (2) lenders’ ability to change the
terms of credit products at low cost, simply by printing and mailing a
new form, and (3) lenders’ ability to apply changes to existing customers by sending contract amendments after a customer uses the
product. For now, we note that creditors often design dangerous contracts as a strategic response to consumers’ underestimation of the
risks that these contracts-products entail.
In the remainder of this Part we explore why credit product markets fail. We begin with a description of three forces—learning by
consumers, information provided by third parties (e.g., Consumer Reports), and information provided by sellers—that work in many mar14
kets to reduce imperfect information and imperfect rationality. We
argue that these forces, while undeniably important, have only limited
12

See Adler, supra note 2, at 82-83 (describing the creation of the Consumer Product Safety Commission to regulate safety of consumer goods).
13
Many physical products are also complex—for example, electronic gadgets. Yet
with physical products the benefits are often more complex than the costs. The product may have multiple and complex value-increasing features but a simple, onedimensional price. An exception is complex physical products where different components have different probabilities of failure and different costs associated with these
failures. Sellers have a strong incentive to educate consumers about complex benefits;
they have a much weaker incentive to educate consumers about complex costs. It
should also be emphasized that complexity is, to some extent, endogenous. If consumers fail to comprehend the cost of a complex product, sellers will have an incentive
to produce an inefficiently high level of complexity.
14
A fourth force is reputation. Reputation can be viewed as a learning mechanism, and, therefore, we do not treat it separately.
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power to expose credit risks and to influence the development of safer
products in the credit marketplace. We then examine the informedminority argument—the claim that a small number of informed, rational consumers are enough for markets to work well. According to
this argument, even if many imperfectly informed and imperfectly rational consumers remain, the informed minority will drive the market
to behave as if all consumers were perfectly informed and perfectly rational and to offer only reasonably safe products. We explore why detailed recordkeeping about customers and the ability of credit issuers
to customize their products undercut the impact of the informedminority principle in consumer credit markets.
Finally, we focus attention on an underappreciated category of
missing information that increases the risk associated with credit
products: use-pattern information, meaning information about how
the consumer will actually use the product. Use-pattern information
often receives less attention than product-attribute information because consumers are assumed to know how they are going to use the
product, or, at least, they are assumed to anticipate their future use
more accurately than sellers. These assumptions, while valid in many
markets, are invalid in important consumer credit markets. In these
markets, counterintuitively, sellers often know more than consumers
about consumers’ use patterns. Use-pattern information creates opportunities for creditors to tailor their products to match individuals’
cognitive errors, thus magnifying consumer risks. Moreover, consumers’ use-pattern mistakes can be less susceptible to the three mistakecorrection forces described above.
We discuss below each of these theoretical problems that undermine efficiency in the credit products market. We then turn to the
data showing how consumers are making consistent, costly errors in
dealing with dangerous consumer credit products. We conclude this
Part with a discussion of the impact of these market failures on the
harm to consumers and on the externalities imposed on third parties.
1. The Limits of Learning
Imperfect information leads to more dangerous products. Manufacturers of lawnmowers will produce lawnmowers with a higher probability of causing harm or lawnmowers that cause greater harm in the
event of an accident. Similarly, lenders will offer contracts that inflict
higher financial harm on consumers who suffer a penalty-triggering
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financial accident. Moreover, these contracts might even increase the
15
probability of such a financial accident.
Why do consumers remain uninformed? If information can
eliminate dangerous products, why don’t consumers simply invest in
information acquisition? Imperfect rationality provides one answer.
Consumers do not seek to acquire more information because they are
not aware that they need more information or that more information
is available for them to acquire. Put differently, an imperfectly rational consumer might not be aware of the fact that she is unin16
formed.
Alternatively, an imperfectly rational consumer might be
aware that she is uninformed, yet mistakenly believe that the unknown
information is trivial, irrelevant, or insufficiently important to justify
the cost of its acquisition. For example, a consumer who mistakenly
believes she will never make a late payment on her credit card will not
17
even try to learn the penalty fees and interest rates for late payments.
Or a consumer might know she is imperfectly informed, but she might
conclude that the information she needs is not available or not available at a reasonable cost. For example, given the complexity of the
average credit card contract and the legalistic language used in this
contract, even a consumer who would be willing to invest time and effort to learn the terms of the contract might assume that they are too
obscure for her to master. And those consumers who actually invest
the time and effort to read the contract might not understand it, or,
even if they understand the terms themselves, these consumers might
18
underestimate the risks implied by these terms.
15

See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1377 (2004) (stating that credit card companies frequently incentivize excessive purchases with “[z]ero
annual and per-transaction fees, [and] benefits programs”).
16
See generally Eddie Dekel, Barton L. Lipman & Aldo Rustichini, Standard StateSpace Models Preclude Unawareness, 66 ECONOMETRICA 159 (1998) (examining “the extent to which commonly used models [of bounded rationality] need to be modified in
order to capture unawareness”).
17
A similar problem arises if the consumer underestimates the likelihood of being
late rather than dismissing the possibility of being late altogether. The benefit of
learning the late fees and rates is proportional to the likelihood of being late. And the
perceived benefit of learning the late fees and rates is proportional to the perceived
likelihood of being late. The smaller the perceived benefit of becoming informed, the
smaller the likelihood that this perceived benefit will exceed the cost of becoming informed, and the smaller the likelihood that the consumer will become informed.
18
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CREDIT CARDS: INCREASED COMPLEXITY IN RATES AND FEES HEIGHTENS NEED FOR MORE EFFECTIVE DISCLOSURES TO CONSUMERS 46-51 (2006) [hereinafter GAO, INCREASED COMPLEXITY REPORT] (presenting
the results of interviews with credit card holders and examining the reasons for the
confusion exhibited by the cardholders with respect to credit card terms); see also U.S.
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But there is an even simpler answer, one that does not rely on imperfect rationality. Consumers are uninformed because information
19
is costly to acquire. This is especially true with respect to modern
consumer credit products. The standard credit card or mortgage contract has gotten longer and more difficult to read, and comparison
among such contracts is challenging even for a professional. Moreover, lenders retain the right to change the contract at will, so that
even a consumer who understands the initial contract may be required to invest more and more time to continue to stay abreast of
multiple changes added to the contract and to compare those changes
20
with other available credit products.

GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CREDIT CARDS: CUSTOMIZED MINIMUM PAYMENT DISCLOSURES WOULD PROVIDE MORE INFORMATION TO CONSUMERS, BUT IMPACT COULD
VARY 26-28 (2006) [hereinafter GAO, CUSTOMIZED DISCLOSURES REPORT] (assessing
the feasibility and usefulness of providing cardholders with customized information
about the financial consequences of making minimum payments). Failure to comprehend the implications of available information is the product of imperfect rationality
and cognitive bias. Evidence suggests that learning to overcome such biases is imperfect, especially in the context of financial decisions. See Thomas Gilovich & Dale Griffin, Introduction to HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT
1, 5-7 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) (suggesting through experimental evidence
that, while learning is generally effective in minimizing mistakes, biases in relatively
abstract domains like math and finance are more resilient); Michael Haigh & John
List, Do Professional Traders Exhibit Myopic Loss Aversion? An Experimental Analysis, 60 J.
FIN. 523, 529 (2005) (documenting persistent bias, specifically myopic loss aversion,
even among financial professionals who have ample opportunity to learn); Keith
Stanovich, The Fundamental Computational Biases of Human Cognition: Heuristics that
(Sometimes) Impair Decision Making and Problem Solving, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PROBLEM
SOLVING 291 (J.E. Davidson & R.J. Sternberg eds., 2003) (same); Sumit Agarwal et al.,
The Age of Reason: Financial Decisions over the Lifecycle (MIT Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 07-11, Feb. 11, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=973790 [hereinafter Agarwal et al., Age of Reason](same); Sumit Agarwal et al., Do Consumers Choose
the Right Credit Contracts? 4, 11 (Nov. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=843826 [hereinafter Agarwal et al., Credit Contracts] (reporting that, even given a relatively simple choice between two credit card contracts,
consumers often make suboptimal decisions).
19
For example, Kornhauser states that “[d]issemination and acquisition of information, which play important roles in the setting of prices, involve costs. Imperfections arise from rational agents economizing on these costs.” Kornhauser, supra note
1, at 1156. Of course, this costliness applies to information that affects quality as well
as price.
20
See GAO, CUSTOMIZED DISCLOSURES REPORT, supra note 18, at 14-15 (evaluating
the possibility of providing consumers with standardized and customized “minimum
payment estimates”); GAO, INCREASED COMPLEXITY REPORT, supra note 18, at 33, 36-48
(identifying reasons for consumers’ failure to understand credit card disclosures).
And again imperfect rationality exacerbates the problem. An imperfectly rational consumer might underestimate the likelihood and impact of a midstream change in the
contract, and thus fail to acquire information about such changes.
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The cost of becoming informed might not be prohibitive if it were
distributed across all consumers. Many consumers buy the very same
lawnmower. Similarly, credit card and mortgage contracts are standard form contracts, offered virtually unchanged to many consumers.
If each and every consumer must invest independently in learning
about the product, the cost of acquiring the necessary information
might exceed the benefit of the information to the individual consumer. If, however, the information could be learned once and be
disseminated to all consumers, the aggregate benefit would surely exceed the cost.
The public-good nature of information might generate a collective-action problem that prevents consumers from becoming informed. Individual consumers may reason as follows: If all other consumers are informed, then dangerous products will not be offered,
and I have no reason to invest in acquiring information about the
dangerousness of the product. Conversely, if all other consumers are
not informed, then only dangerous products will be offered. A single
informed consumer will not affect market dynamics. Thus, there is no
reason to invest in acquiring information about the dangerousness of
21
the product. The conclusion is abrupt: individual consumers have
insufficient incentives to invest in acquiring information.
This does not mean that learning is entirely absent. Some errors
can be quite instructive. A consumer who is initially unaware of a currency-conversion fee on her credit card will learn about this fee after
returning from a vacation abroad and receiving the credit card bill.
Other errors are much less informative, as the data on fee/interest
choices show. Our point is not that learning never occurs; rather it is
that the learning is imperfect and that the remaining errors impose
substantial welfare costs.
2. Why Getting Smarter Collectively Does Not Work
In the case of physical products, the collective action problem is
partially solved by publications such as Consumer Reports. Consumer Reports invests in information acquisition and sells that information to

21

To be sure, knowledge about dangerousness is useful in deciding whether to
buy the product, even if this knowledge will have no effect on the quality of the product. But consumers already know that the product is dangerous. The fact that consumers are uninformed means that they cannot identify and reward with a higher price
a seller/lender who offers a safe product. A rational consumer, even if uninformed,
realizes that the market equilibrium will feature dangerous products.
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individual consumers. Consumer Reports buys competing products,
runs tests, and publishes reports. It compiles this information in ways
that facilitate comparison shopping, thus supporting the efficient operation of the market.
Consumer Reports saves consumers the cost of collecting and compiling information, but it cannot completely eliminate the cost of becoming informed. Each consumer must still subscribe to and read the
report in Consumer Reports, and she must remember it when shopping.
As Consumer Reports covers more products and as the report on each
covered product becomes more detailed and informative, the cost of
reading the report increases for each consumer. Even in the age of
the Internet and when digital search further reduces the cost of reading, a relatively small proportion of consumers regularly consult Con22
sumer Reports or its equivalents.
Because the cost of becoming informed is not completely eliminated, the collective action problem
23
Similarly, consumers’ imperfect rationality imposes limits
persists.
24
on the effectiveness of the protection Consumer Reports can offer.
The nature of financial products further limits the effectiveness of
Consumer Reports, or any similar organization, to inform consumers
and correct market imperfections. Because of the complexity and
multiplicity of the products, Consumer Reports must invest substantial
resources in collecting and compiling the necessary information
about credit products. By comparison with physical products like the
lawnmower, credit products often come in many more shapes and
sizes. Compare, for example, the number of lawnmowers Consumer

22

“Consumer Reports magazine . . . has about 4 million subscribers.” ConsumerReports.org—Our Mission, http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/aboutus/mission/
overview/index.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2008).
23
Each consumer reasons that if all other consumers read Consumer Reports she
does not need to read it herself, because only safe products will be offered on the market. And if all other consumers do not read Consumer Reports, only dangerous products
will be offered regardless of whether she reads Consumer Reports or not. Since all consumers reason in a similar fashion, the incentive to read Consumer Reports is inadequately low.
24
An imperfectly rational consumer might find it difficult to process the information provided by Consumer Reports and to use this information when deciding which
product to buy. Specifically, evidence suggests that the average consumer considers
only a handful of attributes when deciding which product to buy. Even if a consumer
reads the detailed report provided by Consumer Reports, she is likely to internalize only a
small portion of the information summarized in the report. In addition, as noted
above, optimism can lead consumers to underestimate product risks, or to underestimate their own exposure to product risks. Such optimism would reduce a consumer’s
incentive to read Consumer Reports.
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Reports evaluated in its most recent report on yard equipment (36)
with the number of different credit cards offered by a single issuer
(Bank of America, for instance, offers over 400 different cards on its
26
website). Multiply the number of cards by the ten largest issuers and
add in the cards offered by the next two hundred issuers and the
scope of the rating task becomes clearer. This is not to say that there
are no complex physical products: automobiles, personal computers,
and other electronic gadgets suffer from similar complexity and multiplicity problems. But consumer credit products are surely among
the more complex, multidimensional products in the marketplace.
Second, as compared to physical products, credit products can
more easily be changed, further increasing the cost of information
collection. To change a lawnmower, the manufacturer needs to redesign an assembly line. To change a credit card product, the issuer
need only print out a new piece of paper. Moreover, a lawnmower
cannot be changed after it has been delivered to the consumer. A
credit card, on the other hand, can be readily changed, even when it
is already in the consumer’s wallet, simply by sending out a mailing
that alters the terms of the agreement. The ease of product change
would require constant vigilance on the part of Consumer Reports—and
on the part of the consumers who relied on Consumer Reports’ help.
Finally, credit card issuers are not required to treat all customers
alike, further complicating the benefits of collective evaluation. For
example, three people might hold the same card on June 1, but by
July 1, one might continue to hold the same card, one might hold a
card with a few more onerous terms, and one might hold a card with
substantially more onerous terms. The identifying logos on the card
and the name of the affinity program might remain the same, even as
the terms applicable to each customer differ dramatically. In such a
case, evaluation of the initial contracts by Consumer Reports would not
only be inadequate, it would be affirmatively misleading. Continuous
evaluation on a consumer-by-consumer basis of the different changes
27
that each card undergoes would entail prohibitive costs.

25

Lawn Mowers: More Make the Cut, CONSUMER REP., May 2006, at 38.
Bank of America, Credit Cards Overview, http://www.bankofamerica.com/
creditcards/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2008).
27
In theory, the problem of midstream changes can be curbed if Consumer Reports
rates issuers according to the number and reasonableness of their mid-stream changes.
In practice, however, such rating would entail substantial cost, since Consumer Reports
would have to survey credit card customers with annoying frequency and rely on both
their understanding of the changes that had been imposed and their willingness to
26
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The purchase of a lawnmower and the decision to use a credit
card face yet another difference: if the customer decides the lawnmower has become unsafe, she can stop using it. The grass may grow,
but she does not have to take on newly appreciated risks. For a customer who has made purchases on the credit card with the plan of
paying over the next two years, however, such an option may not exist.
She may stop using the card for new purchases, but the outstanding
debt balance will subject her to the new terms even if she sees them as
now unacceptably risky. The only credit card users who will have the
option to avoid risky changes in the terms of their cards will be those
who carry no credit balances or who have adequate savings or other
credit options so that they can pay off any balance in full. The major28
ity of credit card users carry a balance, and many, especially lowerincome consumers, cannot pay off their credit card balances in response to a midstream change of terms.
Consumer Reports may help level the information playing field with
many manufactured products, but the nature of credit products limits
its effectiveness in this sphere. Given the complexity, fluidity, and diversity of credit products, Consumer Reports is largely confined to gen29
eral education articles (“Watch Out for These Ten Scams”). This is,
of course, a useful undertaking, but it hardly corrects widespread
market imperfections.
3. Why Sellers Do Not Educate Consumers
Mistake-correction efforts by sellers can sometimes minimize imperfect information and imperfect rationality in consumer markets.
Consider the following, arguably common, scenario: Seller A offers a
product that is better and costs more to produce than the product offered by seller B. Consumers, however, underestimate the added
value from seller A’s product and thus refuse to pay the higher price
that seller A charges. In this scenario, seller A has a powerful incen-

reveal such changes. The large number of different credit card contracts further increases the cost of maintaining such a rating. The considered rating system would become feasible if issuers—forced by regulation or motivated by reputational concerns—
publicly disclosed all midstream changes.
28
See Brian K. Bucks, Arthur B. Kennickell & Kevin B. Moore, Recent Changes in
U.S. Family Finances: Evidence from the 2001 and 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances, FED.
RES. BULL., Mar. 22, 2006, at A1, A30 (“From 2001 to 2004, the proportion of families
carrying a balance rose 1.8 percentage points, to 46.2 percent.”).
29
See Credit Cards: They Really Are Out to Get You, CONSUMER REP., Nov. 2005, at 12
(detailing how credit cards have “become much more treacherous for consumers”).
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tive to educate consumers about her product—to correct their underestimation of the product’s value.
But if both seller A and seller B and many other sellers offer identical products or offer different products that share a certain product
risk, the incentives change. If seller A reduces this risk and invests in
educating consumers about the benefits of her superior product, then
seller A will attract a lot of business and make a supracompetitive
profit. But this is not an equilibrium. After seller A invests in consumer education, all the other sellers will free-ride on seller A’s efforts. They will similarly reduce the product risk and compete away
the profit that seller A would have made. Anticipating such a response, seller A will realize that she will not be able to recoup her investment. Seller A will thus be less likely to improve the safety of her
product, and instead will continue to offer a higher-risk product. This
collective-action problem can lead to the persistence of consumer
30
misperception. For example, if Citibank wanted to issue credit cards
without a universal-default clause, it would have to invest resources in
correcting consumers’ underestimation of how much universal default
costs them. If Citibank was successful in convincing consumers that
they should look for cards without universal default, then other issuers
will also offer such cards, quickly competing away any potential return
on Citibank’s consumer-education investment.
To be sure, sellers of physical products face the risk that, if they
invest in educating the public about the benefits of innovations they
offer, their competitors will imitate these innovations and capture a
portion of the benefits of that education at little or no cost. But once

30

See Howard Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J.L. &
ECON. 491, 527 (1981) (explaining why sellers might not disclose both positive and
negative information); see also Campbell, supra note 6, at 1586-88 (describing the limits
of competition, specifically the collective-action problem that prevents sellers from
educating consumers, in the mortgage market); R. Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My
Brother’s Keeper: The Inability of an Informed Minority to Correct for Imperfect Information, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 635, 659 (1996) (explaining that free riding disincentivizes information
sharing); Richard Hynes & Eric A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Consumer Finance, 4
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 168, 173 (2002) (applying the general argument in Beales et al.,
supra, in the consumer credit context). In some markets the first-mover advantage will
be large enough to overcome the collective-action problem. For a general discussion
of information failures in consumer markets, see Beales et al., supra, at 503-509. On
the limits of advertising as a mistake-correction mechanism, see also Xavier Gabaix &
David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q.J. ECON. 505, 512-21 (2006); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1242-43
(2003).
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again, the ease with which credit contracts can be altered exacerbates
this problem. While the manufacturer of a physical product might
count on the fact that it would take months or even years for a competitor to redesign a product to include the innovation, another
31
credit issuer could adopt a new practice in a matter of weeks. Moreover, innovators of physical products have the chance to protect their
innovations through patents, while no such options are available to
32
those whose products are credit.
Finally, sellers of physical products can often point to a specific,
easy-to-understand feature that improves safety—for example, an
automatic braking system, a child-proof lid, etc. Because many features of financial products are exceedingly complex, it would be difficult both to inform future customers about the feature and to alert
them to its presence elsewhere. If, for example, Citibank dropped
double-cycle billing, it would face a very difficult time explaining to
consumers what the change meant and, because billing practices are
often not even listed in the printed credit card contract, an even
tougher time encouraging consumers to avoid products that involve
double-cycle billing.
Sellers of financial products sometimes provide information to
consumers and even help consumers process this information. For
example, the websites of credit card issuers provide assistance in
choosing among the many different cards offered through the website. The consumer need only enter her credit rating, preferences,
and anticipated use-patterns and the website will recommend the ap33
propriate card. These card-selection algorithms are helpful, but they
31

And the credit issuer would be able to apply the new practice to both existing
and new customers, while the manufacturer of a physical product would typically apply
the new design only to new customers.
32
Even apart from this collective action problem, sellers might prefer not to correct consumer mistakes and might even invest in creating misperception. Arguably,
manipulation of consumer perceptions, and even preferences, is a main purpose of
advertising:. See Edward L. Glaeser, Psychology and the Market, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 408,
409-411 (2004) (“Markets do not eliminate (and often exacerbate) irrationality . . . .
The advertising industry is the most important economic example of these systematic
attempts to mislead, where suppliers attempt to convince buyers that their products
will yield remarkable benefits . . . . It is certainly not true that competition ensures that
false beliefs will be dissipated. Indeed in many cases competition will work to increase
the supply of these falsehoods.”). In a later piece, however, Glaeser argues that government decision makers have weaker incentives than consumers to overcome errors,
and thus intervention in markets might make things worse. Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 144 (2006).
33
See, e.g., Capital One Credit Cards: Find the Card for You or Build Your Own
Credit Card, http://www.capitalone.com/creditcards/; Citi Credit Cards, Find the Per-

20
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are not designed to eliminate consumer errors. First, consumers
might not have accurate information, for example, on their future use
patterns, to enter into the card-selection algorithm. Second, it is not
clear that the algorithm will recommend the card that is best for the
consumer, rather than the card that is best for the issuer. Third, certain undesirable product features, for example, double-cycle billing,
may be common to all of the many cards offered by the issuer. In
such cases, the card-selection algorithm will not steer the consumer
toward a better product. More generally, when a product dimension,
for example, interest rates or rewards programs, becomes salient to
consumers, competition will focus on this dimension. Sellers will inform consumers about how attractive their products are on the salient
dimension, and card-selection algorithms will emphasize the salient
dimension. The problem is that not all dimensions are salient to consumers. And for the nonsalient dimensions, such as double-cycle bill34
ing, sellers have much weaker incentives to inform consumers.
Indeed, there is some evidence that creditors are not able to inform consumers about safer products. The example of Citibank is instructive. In the wake of complaints by consumer groups, investigations by Congress, and significant press coverage, Citi announced that
it would stop two of the most dangerous consumer practices associated with credit cards: universal default and any-time interest rate
changes. The company made a large public show of the decision, receiving substantial praise in Congress and elsewhere. Within two
years, Citi announced that it was reinstituting universal default. John
P. Carey, the chief administrative officer for Citigroup’s credit card
unit explained, “[w]e hoped and expected that these two points of
differentiation would lead customers to vote with their feet. . . . We
35
have been disappointed with the results we have seen so far.” When
the largest credit card issuer in the country has given the most public
launch of a safety feature and it is nonetheless unable to explain to
consumers why they should choose this safer card, the limits of creditor education become clear.
fect Credit Card, https://www.citicards.com (offering selection boxes for “general consumer,” “small business owner,” and “college student,” as well as various features, such
as rewards and interest rate promotions).
34
Salience is, to some extent, endogenous. Sellers could make a nonsalient attribute salient. But often there will be little incentive for them to do so. See Gabaix &
Laibson, supra note 30, at 517-20.
35
Eric Dash, Citigroup Considers Repealing a Pledge, and the Slogan with It, N.Y. TIMES,
June 25, 2008, at C4 (quoting John P. Carey, Chief Admin. Officer, Citibank Credit
Card Unit).
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4. Why the Informed Minority Does Not Drive the Market
Many consumers are uninformed and irrational. This is true for
36
both credit products and physical products. Still, most markets work
reasonably well. Why? The answer is that, in most markets, relatively
few informed, rational consumers can wield enough influence to ensure the efficient operation of the market. Under certain reasonable
conditions sellers will offer safe products to attract those few informed
37
consumers, and the uninformed majority will benefit.
The informed minority wields less power in the market for consumer credit products for two reasons. First, it is not clear that informed consumers will constitute a sufficiently large number to drive
the market. A recent survey study conducted by the Auriemma Consulting Group found that “only a third of consumers applying for a

36

See, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 912 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (noting that
many AT&T customers who received a new service contract with their monthly bill
failed to skim or even look at the new contract, even when it was labeled as important
information), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003); Allan v. Snow
Summit, Inc., 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 813, 824 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (refusing relief to a party
to an adhesion contract where the provision in question was clear but the party failed
to read it); Davis v. M.L.G. Corp., 712 P.2d 985, 993 (Colo. 1986) (recounting the testimony of an automobile rental agent that she “had never observed any of her customers reading the reverse side of the [rental] agreement,” which contained provisions
limiting the company’s liability); Unico v. Owen, 232 A.2d 405, 410 (N.J. 1967) (“The
ordinary consumer goods purchaser more often than not does not read the fine
print . . . .”); Holiday of Plainview, Ltd. v. Bernstein, 350 N.Y.S.2d 510, 512 (N.Y. Dist.
Ct. 1973) (“[I]t is true that defendant (as have many before him and probably many
will after him) failed to read the entire contract . . . .”); Elliot Leases Cars, Inc. v. Quigley, 373 A.2d 810, 813 (R.I. 1977) (“It is common knowledge, and so should have been
known to [the car leasing company], that the detailed provisions of insurance contracts are seldom read by consumers.”); Val Preda Leasing, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 540 A.2d
648, 652 (Vt. 1987) (finding that an average consumer would not understand the numerous exceptions to the limitation on liability for damage to the rental car); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. b (1979) (“A party who makes regular
use of a standardized form of agreement does not ordinarily expect his customers to
understand or even to read the standard terms. . . . Customers do not in fact ordinarily
understand or even read the standard terms.”).
37
See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract
Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1450 (1983)
[hereinafter Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Information] (“[F]irms probably cannot distinguish the consumers who read from those who did not,” so “if enough shoppers exist . . . [,] that the nonshoppers do not read is irrelevant; they benefit from the shoppers’ efforts.”); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of
Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 637-38
(1979); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Product Quality and Imperfect Information, 52
REV. ECON. STUD. 251, 251-52 (1985).
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new credit card do so after researching the cards available to them.”
The study also found that “[n]early half of applicants apply for a new
credit card spontaneously, with no prior thought given to obtaining
39
an additional card.” With a large, uninformed customer base, the
market may feel little disciplinary effect from informed consumers.
Second, the informed-minority argument relies on sellers’ inability to discriminate between the informed minority and the uninformed majority. But if a seller can offer two products—a better
product to informed consumers and a shoddier one to uninformed
consumers—then the benefits that uninformed consumers would enjoy when a critical mass of informed consumers exist in a market disappear. In the consumer credit market, sellers have substantial information about each and every consumer and the capacity to tailor
products to each customer. Accordingly, the no-discrimination assumption is unrealistic. In these markets, informed consumers may
get safer products, but there is no reason for that benefit to carry over
to the uninformed consumers.
An example of the latter form of discrimination surfaced during
Congressional hearings years ago.
Then-Representative (nowSenator) Bernie Sanders of Vermont told the story of a credit card issuer that raised every customer’s interest rate by 2%. The rate increase was not tied to changes in the cost of funds or any difference in
the customers’ ability to repay. Instead, the increase was across the
board. When a handful of customers called to complain, the com40
pany immediately apologized and rescinded the increase. For everyone else—those who were not sophisticated enough to call—the in41
crease stuck.

38

Card Applications, May 16, 2007, http://www.cardweb.com/cardflash/2007/
05/16/card-applications.
39
Id.
40
A similar phenomenon concerns the selective waiving of fees, specifically late
and overlimit fees, for customers who call to complain while leaving such fees in place
for those who do not know this will work.
41
Warranties are another common solution to the problem of uninformed consumers. In markets from automobiles to electrical appliances and computers, seller
warranties protect customers against safety defects. But in the financial-products market, such warranties make less sense. Several difficulties—from defining the financial
benchmark for measuring harm, through proving causation, to diluting consumers’
incentives—explain why financial products do not come with warranties. These difficulties may also explain why credit-products liability is not recognized. John Pottow
has recently argued that reckless lending should give rise to a cause of action in tort or,
at least, should preclude reckless lenders from recovering in bankruptcy. Pottow, supra
note 1, at 420-21. Pottow discusses the shortcomings of a warranty or liability solution,
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5. Who Knows the Most About Me?
The relative dangerousness of credit products turns on another
aspect of imperfect information: how an individual consumer will use
the product. If a customer misestimates her own use patterns, such as
the likelihood that she will go over her credit limit or be unable to
make a payment because of an income shock, then she will select the
wrong card and use it in the wrong way. Consumers can always make
errors about how they might use any product, but the complexity of
credit products and the number of exogenous factors, such as jobs,
medical problems, and family breakups, make them particularly sub42
ject to this form of misestimation. Moreover, while use patterns are,
of course, relevant to both physical products and credit products,
payments from buyer to seller are usually independent of use patterns
for physical products and very much dependent on use patterns for
credit products, and specifically for credit cards.
The impact of misestimation of the customer’s own use is compounded in the credit market by the lender’s superior ability to develop fairly accurate estimates of the consumer’s future use. Sellers
collect voluminous statistics about use patterns. Details of every transaction—the place, time, amount, merchant—are carefully recorded
and preserved. The data are then combined with information about
each customer—name, credit score, address, zip code, payment times,
payment places, payment amounts, and so on. For issuers with multiple relationships with the debtor—home mortgage lender, credit
card issuer, checking account bank, car lender, etc.—the opportunities to collect data multiply. These data can then be categorized by
demographic or geographic groups, creating powerful prediction

but argues that these shortcomings are not critical. Id. at 441-51; see also Vern Countryman, Improvident Credit Extension: A New Legal Concept Aborning?, 27 ME. L. REV. 1, 1718 (1975) (proposing that, “at a minimum, debtors should be allowed to assert the improvidence of a credit extension as a defense to repayment,” and, to a lesser extent,
that the debtor and his other creditors should be entitled to recover from the improvident credit extender for any damages they can prove); Adam Goldstein, Note, Why “It
Pays” to “Leave Home Without It”: Examining the Legal Culpability of Credit Card Issuers Under Tort Principles of Products Liability, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 827, 856-58 (proposing that
credit card companies be exposed to product liability based upon their “defective”
products).
42
For example, optimism about self-control and about the likelihood of adverse
contingencies that could lead to borrowing will cause a consumer to underestimate
future borrowing. The cost of borrowing—including interest rates, fees, and the risk
of financial distress—would thus receive inadequate weight in the consumer’s choice
of a credit card. See Bar-Gill, supra note 15, at 1401.
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models for others in similar groups. Or the data can be mined to create individual debtor profiles that expose particular consumer weaknesses. Based on past history and a few demographic characteristics,
an issuer can generate an accurate estimate of the probability that a
particular consumer will trigger a penalty—an estimate that is often
more accurate than the consumer’s own estimate of the same probability. As Duncan McDonald, former general counsel of Citigroup’s
Europe and North America card businesses, noted:
No other industry in the world knows consumers and their transaction behavior better than the bank card industry. It has turned the
analysis of consumers into a science rivaling the studies of DNA . . . .
The mathematics of virtually everything consumers do is stored, updated, categorized, churned, scored, tested, valued, and compared from
every possible angle in hundreds of the most powerful computers and by
among the most creative minds anywhere. In the past 10 years alone,
the transactions of 200 million Americans have been reviewed in trillions
43
of different ways to minimize bank card risks.

Variations in use, and in lenders’ possession of detailed use-pattern
information, provide an opportunity for some lenders to customize
their products to exploit consumer error to its fullest, far more than
would be possible with physical products.
The importance of use-pattern information also affects the efficacy of the mistake-correction forces described above. With a standardized product (or feature), a consumer who discovers a certain
hidden feature or unusual risk associated with the product can share
this information with family and friends. Since the information pertains to a standardized product (or feature), its relevance to others is
immediately clear. But interpersonal learning is less effective with respect to nonstandardized products or attributes. With a nonstandardized product, the information obtained by one consumer might not
be relevant to another consumer who purchased a different version of
the nonstandard good.
When the nature of the product is more broadly defined to include different potential use patterns, then the degree of standardization shrinks. Even an otherwise standardized product is nonstandardized with respect to use patterns, when different consumers use the
product in different ways. This difference can inhibit learning of usepattern information. After using a credit card for some time, a con43

Duncan A. MacDonald, Card Industry Questions Congress Needs to Ask, AM. BANKER,
Mar. 23, 2007, at 10.
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sumer will obtain valuable use-pattern information, for example, on
revolving patterns, on repayment patterns, and on the likelihood of
late payment. But this information, while valuable to this specific consumer, is likely to be of little value to another consumer who will use
the same card differently.
Third parties are also less effective in curing market imperfections
whenever use-pattern variations are present. Consumer Reports can
read several credit card contracts to evaluate their relative safety. Consumer Reports cannot interview each cardholder to learn about revolving balances, repayment rates, and late payments. Consumer Reports
could interview a sample of cardholders and provide average usepattern information, but the value of such information diminishes as
44
heterogeneity among consumers rises. Similarly, expert advice —for
example, how to evaluate credit cards or what kind of mortgage to
buy—suffers from the same problem of matching the advice with a
45
consumer’s particular pattern of use.
44

Consumers, recognizing their imperfect rationality and the imperfection of the
information at their disposal, take steps to limit the mistakes that they make. In particular, consumers seek advice and consult experts before entering the market. See,
e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Second-Order Rationality, in BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE 355,
361-62 (Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod eds., 2006). While clearly effective in
many contexts, this indirect form of learning is also limited. Consumers do not seek
advice before each and every purchase or use decision. When faced with a big decision, consumers are more likely to take the time and incur the cost of seeking expert
advice. They are less likely to do so when faced with a smaller decision. For example,
consumers are more likely to seek third-party assistance before taking on a substantial
home equity loan. They are less likely to engage in substantial consultations before
deciding to buy sneakers with their credit card. In many markets, consumers make
many small decisions rather than a few large decisions. In these markets, reliance on
expert advice is probably rare. To the extent that product-use decisions are smaller
decisions, mistakes in product use are less likely to be cured by advice and consultation
than mistakes in product purchasing. Use-pattern mistakes affecting product-choice
decisions are also less likely to be cured by advice and consultation. Experts and other
advice-providers can assist the consumer by providing product-attribute information
and by offering more sophisticated analysis of this information. Third-party advisers,
however, generally do not have superior information about the consumer’s wants and
needs—an important determinant of anticipated product use. Evidence suggests that
a substantial number of consumers do not seek advice before making financial decisions. See Victor Stango & Jonathan Zinman, Fuzzy Math and Household Finance: Theory
and Evidence 59, tbl. 8 (Tuck Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 2008-41, Nov. 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1081633 (finding that approximately half of the
households in the data sought advice, but over 30% of households with above-average
bias levels did not seek advice; the bias that this study focuses on is underestimation of
exponential growth, which leads to underestimation of the cost of short-term borrowing and of the return to long-term saving).
45
The importance of use-pattern information also limits mistake correction by
sellers and thus inhibits competition. Use-pattern information is available only to con-
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B. The Evidence: Markets for Consumer Credit Products Are Failing
The preceding section argued that, in theory, credit product markets are likely to be affected by problems of imperfect information
and imperfect rationality that can cause these markets to fail. In this
section, we survey the empirical evidence and argue that imperfect information and imperfect rationality are serious problems in many
46
credit product markets.
The evidence summarized below falls into three categories. The
first includes survey evidence that attempts to assess directly the extent
of consumer information by questioning consumers about credit.
This methodology is obviously limited, but it nevertheless provides
valuable insight. The second category of evidence, which we find
more persuasive, indirectly assesses the limits on consumer information and rationality by measuring the behavioral effects of such limits.
The central idea is that consumers make systematic mistakes in their
choice of credit products and in their use of these products. These
observed mistakes indicate the existence of deficits in either informa-

sumers themselves and to sellers. Many consumers do not collect, compile and retain
the necessary information. Sellers do, but only after serving the specific consumer for
a sufficiently long period of time. Because the main reason for sellers to educate consumers is to get their business, the result is a catch-22. The consumer’s current provider has no incentive to educate the consumer, while the competitor, who has every
incentive to educate the consumer, does not have the necessary information. The
power of the informed-minority argument also diminishes as use-pattern information
becomes more important. The informed-minority argument presumes that the missing information is equally relevant to all consumers—informed and uninformed. This
assumption is necessary if the informed minority is to exert market pressure that will
protect the uninformed majority. But individual use information can be relevant only
to the individual consumer. An informed consumer who recognizes that he is prone
to forgetfulness might avoid credit cards with high late fees. The theory of the informed minority posits that if enough consumers shun cards with high late fees, such
terms will disappear from the market. But an informed consumer who possesses this
use-pattern information, rather than switching cards, may choose to change use patterns. For example, that consumer may employ reminders or enter an automatic payment program to avoid paying a late fee. These steps will not help the uninformed
consumer, who will continue paying late fees.
46
Regulators are obviously concerned with consumer mistakes in credit product
markets, as evidenced by their attempts to educate consumers. For example, the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) posts numerous Consumer Information Brochures on its
website.
Fed. Reserve Bd., Consumer Information Brochures, http://www.
federalreserve.gov/pubs/brochure.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2008); see also, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Interest-Only Mortgage Payments and Payment-Option
ARMs—Are They for You? 2-11 (Nov. 2006), http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/
mortgage_interestonly/mortgage_interestonly.pdf (discussing costs and benefits and
comparing several similar mortgages with differing interest-rate structures).
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tion or rationality—or both. Finally, perhaps the best evidence of
consumers’ lack of information or their systematic irrationality is in
the credit products themselves, which are carefully designed to exploit
any such problems. Accordingly, the observed product designs may
prove the prevalence of information and rationality deficits.
1. Survey Evidence
Starting with the direct survey evidence: a recent study by the
Center for American Progress and the Center for Responsible Lending found that 38% of consumers believe that “[m]ost financial products such as mortgage loans and credit cards are too complicated and
47
lengthy for [them] to fully understand.” Consumers who have dealt
with credit products describe the language that forms the basis of
their agreements with lenders as too complex to comprehend.
The experts confirm the consumers’ intuition. A 2006 study by
the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) found
that “many [credit card holders] failed to understand key terms or
conditions that could affect their cost, including when they would be
charged for late payments or what actions could cause issuers to raise
48
rates.” Moreover the GAO found that “the disclosures in the customer solicitation materials and cardmember agreements provided by
four of the largest credit card issuers were too complicated for many
49
consumers to understand.”
47

CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS ET AL., FREQUENCY QUESTIONNAIRE 8 question 47 (2006),
http://www.americanprogress.org/kf/debt_survey_frequency_questionnaire.pdf (presenting the results of a survey of 1,000 adults, age eighteen and over, from the general
population).
48
GAO, INCREASED COMPLEXITY REPORT, supra note 18, at 6.
49
Id. Edward Yingling, President and CEO of the American Bankers Association,
admitted that the complexity of their products and contracts confuses consumers. See
Credit Card Practices: Current Consumer Regulatory Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Financial Institutions. and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 110th Cong.
14-15 (2007) (statement of Edward L. Yingling, President and CEO, Am. Bankers
Ass’n) (acknowledging that the increased complexity of credit cards confuses consumers and can result in a difficult financial situation, but arguing that the industry is taking these concerns very seriously and working to address them). Comptroller of the
Currency John Dugan similarly acknowledged that current credit card disclosure rules
should be changed to improve consumers’ ability to make well-informed decisions. See
Improving Credit Card Consumer Protection: Recent Industry and Regulatory Initiatives: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
110th Cong. 14-16 (2007) (testimony of John Dugan, Comptroller of the Currency,
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency) [hereinafter Consumer Protection Hearing]. In response, the FRB and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
are revising the disclosure regulations under TILA. See Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd.
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These findings are reinforced by a 2007 study commissioned by
the Federal Reserve Board (FRB). This study, based on focus group
sessions and one-on-one interviews, found that many consumers
poorly understand current credit card disclosures. The Federal Reserve identified terms that many consumers did not understand, including:
· many of the numerous interest rates listed;
· when issuers disclose a range of annual percentage rates
(“APRs”), that their specific APR will be determined by their
creditworthiness;
· that the APR on a “fixed rate” credit card product can
change;
· what event might trigger a default APR;
· which balances the default APR will apply to;
· how long the default APR will apply;
· what fees are associated with the credit card product;
· how the balance is calculated (e.g., two-cycle billing);
· how payments are allocated among different rate balances;
· the meaning and terms of “grace period” and “effective
APR”;
· the time, on the due date, that payment is due;
· when the introductory rate expires;
· how large the post-introductory rate is; and
· the cost of convenience checks.

50

The Federal Reserve Board is in the process of revising Regulation
Z, which governs disclosure of terms and conditions of credit products. The Board proposes to redesign the disclosures required under
Regulation Z and to adopt disclosure designs that the study revealed
51
to be more effective. Yet even the more effective disclosure designs

(May
2,
2008),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20080502a.htm.
50
MACRO INT’L, INC., DESIGN AND TESTING OF EFFECTIVE TRUTH IN LENDING DISCLOSURES, at ii-x (2007), http://www.federalreserve.gov/dcca/regulationz/20070523/
Execsummary.pdf [hereinafter DISCLOSURE EFFICACY STUDY].
51
See Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd. (May 23, 2007), available at http://www.
federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20070523a.htm (announcing the issuance
for public comment of the proposed amendments to Regulation Z).
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that were tested in the study and adopted by the Federal Reserve in
the proposed revisions to Regulation Z did not completely eliminate
52
consumer mistakes.
Finally, the study concludes by noting that a
significant number of consumers “lack fundamental understanding of
53
how credit card accounts work.”
Mortgage products raise the same concerns. A recent FTC survey
found that many consumers do not understand, or even identify, key
54
mortgage terms. Survey evidence suggests that some consumers with
fixed rate mortgages (FRMs) do not know the interest rates on their
55
mortgages. A survey conducted by the Federal Reserve found that
homeowners with adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) were poorly in56
formed about the terms of their mortgages.
The survey results
showed that “[t]hirty-five percent of ARM borrowers did not know the
value of the per-period cap on interest rate changes. Similarly, 44
percent of respondents . . . did not know the values of one or both of
57
the two variables used to calculate the lifetime interest cap.” Moreover, many consumers do not understand that rising interest rates can
58
lead to increases in their ARM rate. And a 2003 survey of financial
52

See DISCLOSURE EFFICACY STUDY, supra note 50 (comparing various proposed
and current disclosure designs, and showing the proposed designs to be more effective, but not fully effective).
53
See id., at 52. Similarly, a recent study conducted by the Auriemma Consulting
Group found that over 40% of respondents do not feel well informed about credit
cards and their benefits before deciding to apply for a new card. See Card Applications,
CARDFLASH, May 16, 2007, http://www.cardweb.com/cardflash/2007/05/16/
card-applications (reporting that 58% of the over 400 respondents to the Auriemma
survey felt well-informed about credit cards, and only one-third applied for new credit
cards after researching other options).
54
See JAMES M. LACKO & JANIS K. PAPPALARDO, FTC, IMPROVING CONSUMER
MORTGAGE DISCLOSURES: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT AND PROTOTYPE
DISCLOSURE FORMS chs. 3, 6 (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/06/
P025505MortgageDisclosureReport.pdf (examining the efficacy of mortgage costdisclosures through thirty-six in-depth interviews and a quantitative survey of over eight
hundred mortgage customers). For example, 95% of respondents could not correctly
identify the prepayment penalty amount, 87% could not correctly identify the total up-front
charges amount, and 20% could not identify the correct APR amount. Id. at 79 tbl.6.6.
55
Cf. Campbell, supra note 6, at 1584 (stating that about 7% of the questioned
households reported “implausibly low mortgage rates”).
56
See Brian Bucks & Karen Pence, Do Homeowners Know Their House Values and
Mortgage Terms? 26-27 (Fed. Res. Bd. of Governors, Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Paper No. 2006-03, 2006), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/Pubs/feds/2006/
200603/200603pap.pdf (concluding that “[b]orrowers with less income or education
seem especially likely not to know their mortgage terms”).
57
Id. at 19 (footnote omitted).
58
Id.; see also Campbell, supra note 6, at 1584 n.27 (citing Bucks & Rence, supra
note 56).
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literacy in Washington State found that victims of predatory lending
59
did not understand the cost of mortgages. Focusing on closing costs,
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has
concluded that “[t]oday, buying a home is too complicated, confusing
and costly. Each year, Americans spend approximately $55 billion on
60
closing costs they don’t fully understand.”
Survey evidence on other consumer credit products similarly suggests that consumers are only imperfectly informed about the relevant
characteristics and costs of these products. For example, payday-loan
customers, while generally aware of finance charges, were often un61
aware of annual percentage rates.
With respect to another consumer credit product, the tax-refund-anticipation loan, approximately
50% of survey respondents were not aware of the fees charged by the
62
lender. Survey evidence also suggests that “[m]ost consumers do not
understand what credit scores measure, what good and bad scores are,
63
and how scores can be improved.” Neither do they fully understand
64
the implications of a low credit score. More generally, a nationwide
survey sponsored by the Consumer Federation of America found that
30% of Americans did not know what the letters “APR” stand for, and

59

See DANNA MOORE, SURVEY OF FINANCIAL LITERACY IN WASHINGTON STATE:
KNOWLEDGE, BEHAVIOR, ATTITUDES, AND EXPERIENCES (Wash. State Univ., Soc. and
Econ. Scis. Research Ctr., Technical Report No. 03-39, Dec. 2003), available at
http://dfi.wa.gov/news/finlitsurvey.pdf (finding that victims of predatory lenders have
statistically significantly lower levels of financial knowledge than the general population), cited in Campbell, supra note 6, at 1585.
60
News Release No. 05-091, U.S. Dep’t of Housing and Urban Dev., Jackson Unvails “Road to Reform” for American Homebuyers (June 27, 2005), http://
www.hud.gov/news/release.cfm?content=pr05-091.cfm.
61
See Gregory Elliehausen, Consumers’ Use of High-Price Credit Products: Do They
Know What They Are Doing? 29-30 (Networks Fin. Inst. at Ind. State Univ., Working Paper No. 2006-WP-02, May 2006) [hereinafter Elliehausen, Consumers’ Use] (“Eighty-five
to 96.1 percent of payday loan customers reported accurate finance charges paid for
their most recent payday loan. In contrast, only 20.1 percent of customers were able to
report accurate annual percentage rate.” (footnote omitted)); GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN
& EDWARD C. LAWRENCE, CREDIT RESEARCH CTR., GEORGE WASH. UNIV., PAYDAY ADVANCE CREDIT IN AMERICA: AN ANALYSIS OF CUSTOMER DEMAND 48-49 (2001), available
at http://www.business.gwu.edu/research/centers/fsrp/pdf/Mono35.pdf (citing similar statistics).
62
Elliehausen, Consumers’ Use, supra note 61, at 31.
63
Press Release, Consumer Fed’n of Am. & Providian, Most Consumers Do Not
Understand Credit Scores According to a New Comprehensive Survey 1 (2004), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/092104creditscores.pdf.
64
See id. at 1-2.

2008]

Making Credit Safer

31

63% did not understand that the APR was the primary indicator of a
65
loan’s cost.
Consumers who lack information about the basic operation of
credit products, who do not understand annual percentage rates, or
who do not know that they have been charged substantial fees, cannot
make effective comparisons among products. Without comparison
shopping, the ordinary discipline that drives markets toward efficiency
is missing. Instead of facing informed consumers to whom they must
offer the best, most competitive product, lenders can offer credit on
onerous terms and compete instead by finding new ways to attract customers, such as clever radio ads or promises of cash rebates.
Other evidence also suggests that consumers have inadequate financial information. Many consumers do not know their credit
66
scores. Since the terms of credit products are often a function of the
consumer’s credit score, these consumers cannot accurately assess the
costs associated with credit products, nor can they shop effectively for

65

Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer Finance Services
Marketplace: The Fringe Banking System and Its Challenge to Current Thinking About the Role
of Usury Laws in Today’s Society, 51 S.C. L. REV. 589, 662 n.441 (2000); see also Diane
Hellwig, Note, Exposing the Loansharks in Sheep’s Clothing: Why Re-Regulating the Consumer
Credit Market Makes Economic Sense, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1567, 1592 (2005) (citing
Drysdale & Keest, supra) (discussing several consumer surveys revealing a lack of consumer knowledge regarding loan costs).
66
A recent survey conducted by Capital One and Consumer Action found that
27% of respondents had never checked their credit report. See Survey: 27% of Consumers Do Not Read Credit Reports, CREDIT & COLLECTIONS WORLD, Oct. 5, 2006,
http://creditandcollectionsworld.com/article.html?id=20061016NIJPR6OI. Another
recent survey from Visa USA found that over 40% of respondents have never checked
their credit score and that only 22% of respondents check their credit score once a
year. See Scores & Jobs, CARDFLASH, Sept. 14, 2007, http://www.cardweb.com/
cardflash/2007/09/14/scores-jobs. A 2003 survey commissioned by the Consumer
Federation of America, and conducted by Opinion Research Corporation International, found that consumers lack essential knowledge about credit reporting and
credit scores. See Poll: Consumers Don’t Understand Credit Reporting, Favor Reforms, INS. J.,
Aug. 11, 2003, http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2003/08/11/
31410.htm (noting that most Americans do not understand what credit scores mean,
how scores can be changed, or even how they can be obtained). See also U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CREDIT REPORTING LITERACY: CONSUMERS UNDERSTOOD THE
BASICS BUT COULD BENEFIT FROM TARGETED EDUCATIONAL EFFORTS 10-11 (2005),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05223.pdf [hereinafter GAO, LITERACY
REPORT] (reporting that, even though 70% of respondents correctly defined a credit
score, less than one third had obtained their scores); Angela Lyons, Mitchell Rachlis &
Erik Scherpf, What’s in a Score? Differences in Consumers’ Credit Knowledge Using OLS and
Quantile Regressions 24-26 (Networks Fin. Inst. at Ind. State Univ., Working Paper No.
2007-WP-01, Jan. 2007) (analyzing data from the GAO’s Literacy Report, supra, to identify demographics in the most need of financial education).
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lower-cost credit products. Beyond the credit score itself, consumers
are poorly informed about general credit-related issues. The mean
Credit Knowledge Score obtained in a 2004 survey conducted by the
67
GAO was 55 out of 100. Many consumers also lack general informa68
tion about bankruptcy law. For consumers who are in financial difficulty, this information is critical to rational decision making. These
data suggest that many consumers are imperfectly informed about the
costs of financial distress and, indirectly, of credit products that might
69
increase the likelihood of financial distress. Finally, a growing literature on consumers’ financial literacy shows that “providing financial
information and education results in positive improvements in con70
sumers’ financial literacy levels.” These findings imply that there is
room for improvement, or, put differently, that millions of consumers
are making financial mistakes.
The impact of consumers’ lack of information is made worse by
the misinformation that many consumers hold. The 2002 Fannie Mae
National Housing Survey found that over half of all African-American
and Hispanic borrowers erroneously believed that lenders are required by law to provide the best possible loan rates. 71 They might
know that they did not fully understand mortgage rates, but their misplaced trust in lenders and mortgage brokers gave them false confidence that their lack of knowledge did not harm them. In such cases,
market imperfections are magnified.

67

GAO, LITERACY REPORT, supra note 66, at 84 fig.10.
Press Release, Experian, Experian-Gallup Survey Shows Many Consumers Are
Not Prepared for a Katrina-Like Disaster (Oct. 12, 2005), http://press.experian.com/
press_releases.cfm (select “United States,” “Consumer Credit,” and “2005” from the
pull-down menus) (summarizing data from the September 2005 Experian-Gallup Personal Credit Index survey).
69
Another underappreciated cost of financial distress and, indirectly, of credit
products follows from the effects of low credit scores on employability. A recent survey
from Visa USA shows that only 20% of Americans know that it is legal for employers to
refuse to hire job applicants with low credit scores. Scores & Jobs, supra note 66.
70
See Lyons et al., supra note 66, at 4.
71
FANNIE MAE, THE GROWING DEMAND FOR HOUSING: 2002 FANNIE MAE NATIONAL HOUSING SURVEY 9 (2002), available at http://www.fanniemae.com/global/
pdf/media/survey/survey2002.pdf.
68
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2. Consumer Behavior
a. Credit Cards
Indirect, behavioral evidence reinforces a vision of poorly in72
formed consumers. In a recent study, economists Haiyan Shui and
Lawrence Ausubel identified mistakes in consumers’ credit card
choices. They found that a majority of consumers who accepted a
credit card offer featuring a low introductory rate did not switch out
to a new card with a new introductory rate after the expiration of the
introductory period, even though their debt did not decline after the
73
initial introductory period ended. This is puzzling because a majority of consumers in the study received multiple pre-approved credit
card offers per month and switching from one card to another would
have entailed only a small transaction cost. With a common tenpercentage-point margin between introductory and postintroductory
interest rates and an average balance of $2,500, this mistake alone cost
74
$250 a year.

72

The studies summarized in this part focus on borrowing behavior. In addition,
experimental evidence suggests that credit cards affect spending behavior. See Drazen
Prelec & Duncan Simester, Always Leave Home Without It: A Further Investigation of the
Credit-Card Effect on Willingness to Pay, 12 MARKETING LETTERS 5, 5-6, 10-11 (2001) (finding that the method of payment—credit card or cash—affects people’s willingness to
pay). See also GEORGE RITZER, EXPRESSING AMERICA: A CRITIQUE OF THE GLOBAL
CREDIT CARD SOCIETY 60-62 (1995); Richard A. Feinberg, Credit Cards as Spending Facilitating Stimuli: A Conditioning Interpretation, 13 J. CONSUMER RES. 348, 349-55 (1986);
Elizabeth C. Hirschman, Differences in Consumer Purchase Behavior by Credit Card Payment
System, 6 J. CONSUMER RES. 58, 59, 62-64 (1979); Michael McCall & Heather J. Belmont,
Credit Card Insignia and Restaurant Tipping: Evidence for an Associative Link, 81 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 609, 612 (1996); Dilip Soman, Effects of Payment Mechanism on Spending Behavior: The Role of Rehearsal and Immediacy of Payments, 27 J. CONSUMER RES. 460, 472
(2001).
73
Haiyan Shui & Lawrence M. Ausubel, Time Inconsistency in the Credit Market 9
(May 3, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
586622. The evidence shows that most consumers do not jump from one card to another and from one teaser rate to another. But detailed statistics are not necessary to
reach this conclusion: it is evident from the fact that issuers offer teaser rates. Unless
issuers have decided to forego interest revenues altogether, issuers would not offer
teaser rates if most consumers did not stay beyond the introductory period. It is clear,
however, that most issuers have not decided to forego interest revenues altogether. In
fact, interest revenues represent 65% of issuers’ total revenues. Examining the Billing,
Marketing, and Disclosure Practices of the Credit Card Industry, and Their Impact on Consumers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 6 (2007)
(statement of Elizabeth Warren, Leo Gottlieb Professor of Law, Harvard Law School).
74
See Shui & Ausubel, supra note 73, at 8-9.
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Shui and Ausubel also found that when faced with otherwise identical credit card offers, consumers prefer a credit card with a 4.9%
teaser rate lasting for an introductory period of six months over a
credit card with a 7.9% teaser rate lasting for an introductory period
of twelve months. Consumers in this study carried an average balance
of $2,500 over a one-year period. Those who accepted the six-month
introductory offer paid a postintroductory rate of 16% during the latter half of the year. These results indicate that at least some consumers were making a substantial mistake: consumers preferred the
lower-rate, shorter-duration card even though they paid $50 more in
interest on this card than they would have with the longer-duration
75
alternative.
What explains these mistakes? Why are consumers routinely paying more interest than they must? One possible explanation is that
consumers systematically underestimate the amount that they will borrow, or at least the amount they will borrow on a specific card, in the
postintroductory period. In other words, at the time they take out
their cards, consumers are optimistic about their future credit needs,
about their future willpower, about the likelihood that they will switch
to a new card with a new, low introductory rate, or about all of the
above.
A second possible explanation attributes a much higher level of
sophistication to consumers. This explanation assumes that consumers are aware of their imperfect self-control and seek credit arrangements that would help them precommit to borrow less. A shorter introductory period can serve as a commitment device. If a consumer
must borrow today but wishes to commit to borrow less in the future,
that consumer may prefer a credit card that allows interest-free borrowing now but makes borrowing very expensive in the future (after
the introductory period ends)—so expensive that the cost of borrow76
ing will overcome any temptation to borrow. The data show, however, that even if the preference for a shorter-period, lower-rate teaser
was driven by a sophisticated attempt to purchase a precommitment
device, this attempt failed. The extent of borrowing at the postintroductory rate implies a substantial level of optimism about the efficacy

75

See id.
See id. at 14-16. This precommitment argument assumes that borrowers cannot
switch to another card with another introductory rate when the introductory rate on
the first card expires. But, as mentioned above, new introductory offers are often
available and switching costs are low.
76
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of the commitment device. In other words, it implies that a large
number of consumers were making a mistake.
The data used in the Shui and Ausubel study was taken from a
randomized experiment conducted by a major credit card issuer in
1995. Such experiments are conducted to help issuers optimize their
marketing strategies. The specific experiment analyzed by Shui and
Ausubel provides clear guidance to the issuer’s marketing department: offer lower introductory rates for shorter durations in order to
increase both the number of customers and total interest revenues.
As this research shows, exploitation of consumer error is an effective
way to boost profits.
Another recent study, by David Gross and Nicholas Souleles, provides further evidence of seemingly irrational consumer behavior.
The most striking data show that many consumers pay high interest
rates on large credit card balances while holding liquid assets that
yield low returns. Specifically, more than 90% of consumers with
credit card debt have some very liquid assets in checking and savings
accounts. The amounts in question are often substantial: one-third of
credit card borrowers hold more than one month’s income in these
liquid assets. With a median balance of more than $2,000 for consumers who have a balance, and a spread of over ten percentage
points between credit card interest rates and the interest rates obtained on assets in checking and savings accounts, a typical consumer
is losing more than $200 per year in interest payments that could have
77
been easily avoided.
Sumit Agarwal, Souphala Chomsisengphet, Chunlin Liu, and
Nicholas S. Souleles developed a study using a unique market experiment conducted by a large U.S. bank to assess how systematic and
78
costly consumer mistakes are in practice. In 1996, the cooperating
bank offered consumers a choice between two credit card contracts:
one with an annual fee and a lower interest rate, and one with no annual fee and a higher interest rate. As the authors explain, “[t]o
minimize their total interest costs net of the fee, consumers expecting
to borrow a sufficiently large amount should select the fee card, and
79
vice-versa” for those not planning to borrow.
Even though the

77

See David B. Gross & Nicholas S. Souleles, Do Liquidity Constraints and Interest
Rates Matter for Consumer Behavior? Evidence from Credit Card Data, 117 Q.J. ECON. 149,
180 (2002).
78
Agarwal et al., Credit Contracts supra note 18.
79
Id.
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choice between the two contracts was especially simple, the authors
80
found that about 40% of consumers chose the wrong contract. On
the bright side, the authors found that “the probability of choosing
the sub-optimal contract declines with the dollar magnitude of the potential error,” and that “those who made larger errors in their initial
contract choice were more likely to subsequently switch to the optimal
81
contract,” implying that the observed mistakes were not very costly.
Nonetheless, the evidence of errors is striking in what is, again, a very
simple decision.
Stephan Meier and Charles Sprenger compare time-preference
data from a field experiment with a “targeted group of low-tomoderate income consumers,” with credit report data on these con82
sumers.
The authors find that consumers who exhibit hyperbolic
discounting and dynamically inconsistent intertemporal choices bor83
row more, and specifically borrow more on their credit cards. This
result suggests that “individuals borrow more . . . than they actually
84
would prefer to borrow given their long-term objectives.” The data
may also suggest that those most prone to error are those borrowing
the most, which means that the impact of errors is exacerbated both
for the individual and for the marketplace.
A study by Sumit Agarwal, John C. Driscoll, Xavier Gabaix, and
David Laibson was based on two separate proprietary datasets from
large financial institutions. The first dataset contained a representative random sample of about 128,000 credit card accounts followed
monthly over a 36-month period (from January 2002 through December 2004). The study found that more than 28% of customers made
mistakes that triggered fees, including late fees, overlimit fees, and

80

Id. at 4. Namely, given ex post borrowing patterns, these consumers would have
saved money by choosing the alternative contract. Of course, in theory, given the possibility of ex post shocks, consumers that chose the incorrect contract ex post might
still have made the optimal choice ex ante. The authors test for and reject the ex post
shock explanation, concluding that these consumers did not make the optimal ex ante
choice. Id. at 9-10.
81
Id. at 5.
82
See Stephan Meier & Charles Sprenger, Impatience and Credit Behavior: Evidence
from a Field Experiment 2-3 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston, Working Paper No. 07-3,
2007), available at http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/wp/wp2007/wp0703.pdf.
83
Id. at 24.
84
Id. at 3. The authors also find that high levels of impatience, represented by a
low long-run discount factor, explain account delinquencies and slow debt repayment
patterns. Id. at 25.
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85

cash-advance fees. The authors consider fee payment a mistake, because “fee payment can often be avoided by small and relatively cost86
less changes in behavior.” The second dataset contained 14,798 accounts which accepted balance-transfer offers over the period January
2000 through December 2002. The authors found that more than
one-third of consumers made mistakes in using the balance-transfer
option. For example, instead of making new credit card charges on
other available cards, these consumers charged purchases to the
teaser rate cards. This was a mistake because teaser rates apply only to
transferred balances, and the interest rate on new purchases is higher
87
than the interest rate charged on the old credit card. The impact of
the mistake is intensified by the fact that the customer’s payments are
allocated first to the teaser-rate transfer balance, so that the higher-rate
new purchases accrue interest for the longest possible period of time.
Nadia Massoud, Anthony Saunders and Barry Scholnick documented evidence that consumers unnecessarily incur late fees and
overlimit fees, even though they had enough money in their deposit
accounts to avoid these costs (accounting for the possibility that funds
in deposit accounts are being held as precautionary balances). The
study constructs a novel dataset covering almost 90,000 individuals.
Analysis of these data shows that even these easily avoided mistakes—
mistakes due to inattention or carelessness—are made by significant
numbers of consumers. Specifically, 4% of consumers fail to make the
minimum payment even though they have sufficient funds in their
deposit accounts (after leaving a precautionary balance). And 1.7% of
consumers exceed their credit limit when they could have paid the
88
excess amount from their deposit accounts.
It is notable that researchers have tested only the most obvious
and unambiguous mistakes. The data show substantial error rates for
the simplest credit decisions. In the credit card area, more complex
credit decisions remain untested.
85

Agarwal et al., Age of Reason supra note 18 25 fig.13. The frequency of fee
payment was lower for consumers in their forties and fifties (approximately 28%) and
higher for younger and older consumers (up to 35%). Id.
86
Id. at 23.
87
Id. at 26-28 fig.15. Again the frequency of mistake was lower for consumers in
their forties and fifties (approximately 27%) and higher for younger and older consumers (almost 50%). Id.
88
Nadia Massoud, Anthony Saunders & Barry Scholnick, Who Makes Credit Card
Mistakes? 15 tbl.1 (Aug. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.
philadelphiafed.org/econ/conf/consumercreditandpayments2007/papers/Scholnick
_Who_Makes_Credit_Card_Mistakes.pdf.
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b. Mortgage Loans
Mortgage loans represent a different borrowing environment. On
the one hand, such loans are far more complex than typical credit
cards, undoubtedly increasing the opportunities for errors. And the
fact that consumers enter into fewer mortgage contracts than credit
card contracts decreases the opportunities for learning. On the other
hand, consumers know that a great deal is at stake (and that they
make these transactions only rarely), which might encourage more
vigilance and, as a result, fewer errors. The data suggest that errors
are prevalent in this financial market.
Subprime home equity loans offer an example. Such loans are
typically targeted at low-income borrowers. For these borrowers, a
higher risk of default may justify higher, subprime interest rates. The
data show, however, that a substantial number of middle-income families (and even some upper-income families) with low default risk sign
up for subprime loans. Because these families qualify for prime-rate
loans, these data indicate a very costly mistake on the part of these
middle-income borrowers.
In 2002, researchers at the National Training and Information
center (NTIC) concluded that at least 40% of those who were sold
high interest rate, subprime mortgages would have qualified for
89
prime-rate loans.
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae estimate that between 35% and 50% of borrowers in the subprime market could qual90
ify for prime-market loans. A study by the Department of Housing
and Urban Development of all mortgage lenders revealed that 23.6%
of middle-income families (and 16.4% of upper-income families) who
refinanced a home mortgage in 2000 ended up with a high-fee, high91
interest subprime mortgage. A study conducted for the Wall Street

89

See Lew Sichelman, Community Group Claims CitiFinancial Still Predatory, ORIGINAJan. 2002, at 25 (reporting on new claims of CitiFinancial’s predatory practices after settlements with state and federal regulators).
90
See James H. Carr & Lopa Kolluri, Predatory Lending: An Overview, in FINANCIAL
SERVICES IN DISTRESSED COMMUNITIES: ISSUES AND ANSWERS 31, 37 (Fannie Mae
Found. ed., 2001) (suggesting that default risk alone does not fully explain the size of
the subprime market); see also Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 730 (2006) (using borrowers’ credit history and loan profile in support of the estimation that, at times, 50%
of borrowers with subprime loans actually were qualified for prime loans).
91
Randall M. Scheessele, Black and White Disparities in Subprime Mortgage Refinance
Lending, at tbl.B.3 (U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. Hous. Fin. Working Paper Series,
Working Paper No. HF-014, 2002), available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/
pdf/workpapr14.pdf.
TION NEWS,
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Journal showed that from 2000 to 2006, 55% of subprime mortgages
went to borrowers with credit scores that would have qualified them
92
for lower-cost prime mortgages. By 2006, that proportion had in93
creased to 61%. Neither of these studies is definitive on the question of overpricing because they focus exclusively on FICO scores,
which are critical to loan pricing but are not the only factor to be considered in credit-risk assessment. Nonetheless, the high proportion of
people with good credit scores who ended up with high-cost mortgages raises the specter that some portion of these consumers were
not fully cognizant of the fact that they could have borrowed for much
less. This conclusion is further corroborated by studies showing that
subprime mortgage prices cannot be fully explained by borrower94
specific and loan-specific risk factors.
What went wrong? The Wall Street Journal points to one possibility: mortgage brokers received 27% higher fees for originating sub95
prime mortgages than for originating conforming loans.
In addition, the complexity of the subprime mortgage products was such that
the average borrower had little chance of understanding the costs associated with an offered mortgage, let alone comparing costs across
96
several products. The market clearly failed these consumers, causing

92

Rick Brooks & Ruth Simon, Subprime Debacle Traps Even Very Credit Worthy: As
Housing Boomed, Industry Pushed Loans to a Broader Market, WALL ST. J. Dec. 3, 2007, at
A1 (citing a study by First American LoanPerformance).
93
Id.
94
See, e.g., REN S. ESSENE & WILLIAM APGAR, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, HARVARD UNIV., UNDERSTANDING MORTGAGE MARKET BEHAVIOR: CREATING GOOD MORTGAGE OPTIONS FOR ALL AMERICANS 2 (2007), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/
publications/finance/mm07-1_mortgage_market_behavior.pdf (citing ALLEN J.
FISHBEIN & PATRICK WOODALL, CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, EXOTIC OR
TOXIC? AN EXAMINATION OF THE NON-TRADITIONAL MORTGAGE MARKET FOR CONSUMERS AND LENDERS 24 (2006), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Exotic
_Toxic_Mortgage_Report0506.pdf (finding that the borrower’s race affects the likelihood of receiving a subprime mortgage).
95
See Brooks & Simon, supra note 92 (reporting the findings of Wholesale Access,
a mortgage research firm, which discovered that U.S. mortgage brokers collected
1.88% of the loan amount as a fee for originating a subprime loan, as opposed to
1.48% for a prime mortgage); see also Gretchen Morgenson, Inside the Countrywide Lending Spree, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2007, § 3 (describing, based on interviews with former
employees and on internal documents, how Countrywide created incentives for brokers and sales representatives to steer borrowers into higher-priced loans and; at the
same time these representatives would promise borrowers: “I want to be sure you are
getting the best loan possible”).
96
See Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 4), available at
http://law.bepress.com/alea/18th/art47 (follow “Download the Paper” hyperlink)
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them to pay far more for credit than they could have qualified for—if
only they had known how to shop.
The welfare implications of these mistakes are significant. As
noted in the CFA/Providian Study:
[A]ccording to Fair Isaac’s website, on a $150,000, 30-year, fixed-rate
mortgage, consumers with credit scores over 720 will be charged a 5.72%
rate with monthly payments of $872, while consumers with credit scores
below 560 will be charged a 9.29% rate with monthly payments of $1,238
(if in fact they are able to qualify for the loan)—an annual difference of
97
$4,392.

Lauren Willis finds that, with an average APR difference of three to
four points between prime and subprime loans, a prime borrower taking a $100,000 thirty-year subprime loan will pay over $200 per month
more than necessary, which amounts to over $70,000 in unjustified
98
charges over the life of the loan.
While the evidence of prime consumers taking subprime loans is
most striking, costly mistakes can also be documented among subprime borrowers. Patricia McCoy, in a recent article, documents the
prevalence of imperfect information in the subprime mortgage market. She describes marketing and contracting practices employed by
subprime lenders to minimize consumers’ ability to shop for lower in99
terest rates. Susan Woodward, analyzing more than 7500 FHA loans
(describing the complexity of subprime mortgage contracts and how it inhibits competition); Willis, supra note 90, at 726-27 (arguing that by creating different mortgage
products for borrowers in similar financial situations, sophisticated lenders create significant barriers to meaningful consumer participation in an efficient mortgage market).
97
Consumer Fed’n of Am. & Providian, supra note 63, at 2.
98
Willis, supra note 90, at 729. This picture becomes grimmer when comparing
prime loans to subprime loans with the not uncommon APRs of 20%, 30%, and
higher. See id. (“In 2003, a year when prime rates averaged less than 6% and points
and fees averaged about 0.50%, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, and Household, all major U.S.
lenders, reported originating subprime loans with APRs exceeding 20%, and Household originated loans with APRs in excess of 30%.”). As compared to a $100,000 thirtyyear prime loan, a 20% subprime loan will cost the consumer over $1,000 extra each
month and over $370,000 extra in total. Id. Putting these figures into perspective,
Elizabeth Warren and Amelia Warren Tyagi conclude that, had the prime household
“gotten a traditional [prime] mortgage instead [of a 20% subprime mortgage], they
would have been able to put two children through college, purchase half a dozen new
cars, and put enough aside for a comfortable retirement.” See ELIZABETH WARREN &
AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND
FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 134 (2003).
99
Patricia A. McCoy, Rethinking Disclosure in a World of Risk-Based Pricing, 44 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 123, 123 (2007); see also Willis, supra note 90, at 726-28 (explaining the difficulties facing consumers in fully understanding their mortgage contract options). As
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(not the typical subprime loans, but often targeting similarly higherrisk borrowers), found that borrowers overpay by thousands of dollars
in fees, due to excessive complexity, which prevents effective compari100
son-shopping and hinders competition.
Eric Stein estimated that
the sum of interest and fees charged on predatory loans, at levels
above what a competitive market would produce, costs affected U.S.
consumers $9.1 billion annually, an average of $3,370 per subprime
101
loan household per year.
Additional evidence of consumer mistakes is provided by data on
foreclosure rates. Subprime foreclosure rates range from 20% to
102
30%. Foreclosure costs a family its home and everything invested in
the home up to that point, along with the costs of relocating and moving to new housing. A foreclosure seriously impairs credit ratings, increasing all credit costs and reducing the likelihood of owning a home
again. Moreover, foreclosure is only the official tip of a serious housing problem. Instead of hanging on for a formal foreclosure, many
families that can no longer make payments on their homes move out,
handing the keys over to the lender, sometimes in return for the
lender’s agreement not to pursue a deficiency judgment against them.
If 20% to 30% of mortgages are in formal foreclosure, the number of
families with subprime loans who are unable to hang on to their
homes is likely to be considerably higher.
It is clearly possible for a rational, informed consumer to take on a
high-cost subprime mortgage with the understanding that adverse
contingencies might lead to default and foreclosure. Nonetheless, the
high rate of foreclosures in the subprime market suggests that not all
consumers knowingly assumed such a high risk of foreclosure. A recent study by Ren Essene and William Apgar concluded that “consumers have a limited ability to evaluate complex mortgage products
a result, subprime borrowers paid prices higher than what their risk profile justified.
See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of
Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2058 (2007) (citing Howard Lax et al.,
Subprime Lending: An Investigation of Economic Efficiency, 15 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 533,
569 (2004)).
100
SUSAN E. WOODWARD, A STUDY OF CLOSING COSTS FOR FHS MORTGAGES, at x,
57-69 (2008), available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/FHA_closing_cost.pdf.
101
ERIC STEIN, COAL. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, QUANTIFYING THE COST OF
PREDATORY LENDING 2-3 (2001), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/
pdfs/Quant10-01.pdf. The number of borrowers was calculated by adding up the
number of borrowers affected by the various methods of predatory lending, which included equity-stripping methods (financed credit insurance, exorbitant up-front fees,
subprime prepayment penalties) and rate-risk disparities.
102
Willis, supra note 90, at 731-32 (summarizing studies).
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and they often make choices which they regret after the fact.”
In
response to the rising foreclosure rates, the Federal Reserve Board,
prompted by voices within the industry and in Congress, has recently
104
proposed regulations that would tighten lending standards.
The critical role of framing effects provides further evidence of
imperfect rationality: a 2004 FTC study evaluated the effects of a new
proposal by HUD requiring disclosure of payments from lenders to
brokers for loans with above-par interest rates. Participants were
shown cost-disclosure forms for two loans—one from a broker and
one from a direct lender—and asked which was less expensive. The
findings were striking. When the broker loan was less expensive than
the lender loan, approximately 90% of respondents in the control
groups (who did not view the new disclosure) correctly identified the
less expensive loan. In contrast, when respondents were shown the
new disclosure, only about two-thirds of consumers correctly identified the less expensive loan. The results were even more dramatic
when the broker loan and direct-lender loan cost the same. In this set
of experiments, the new broker disclosure reduced correct cost comparisons by roughly forty-four percentage points. Moreover, when
these respondents were asked which mortgage they would choose,
they revealed a significant bias against mortgages generated by brokers. Overall, the authors concluded that “[i]f the disclosure requirement has an impact similar to the magnitude found in one of the
hypothetical loan cost scenarios examined in the study, the disclosures
would lead mortgage customers to incur additional costs of hundreds
105
of millions of dollars per year.”
A recent study by Sumit Agarwal, John C. Driscoll, Xavier Gabaix,
and David Laibson, using records on 75,000 home equity loans made
in 2002, identified persistent consumer mistakes in loan applications.

103

ESSENE & APGAR, supra note 94, at i. Essene and Apgar further note that “the
recent rise in mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures suggests that some households
are taking on debt that they have little or no capacity to repay . . . . [And/or they are]
taking out mortgages . . . that are not suitable for their needs.” Id. They suggest that
lenders are exploiting consumer mistakes, noting, for example, that some mortgage
marketing and sales efforts “exploit consumer decision making weaknesses.” Id. at i-ii.
104
Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 1671 (proposed January 9, 2008) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226) (applying new protections to mortgage loans secured by a
consumer’s principle dwelling, including a prohibition on lending based on the collateral without regard to the consumer’s ability to repay).
105
JAMES M. LACKO & JANIS K. PAPPALARDO, FTC, THE EFFECT OF MORTGAGE BROKER COMPENSATION DISCLOSURES ON CONSUMERS AND COMPETITION: A CONTROLLED
EXPERIMENT, at ES-7 (2004).
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In particular, consumer mistakes in estimating home values increased
the loan-to-value ratio and thus the interest rate charged. Such mistakes increase the APR by an average of 125 basis points for home eq106
uity loans and 150 basis points for home equity lines of credit.
While only 5% of borrowers in their forties and fifties made “ratechanging mistakes,” more than 40% of younger and older borrowers
made these mistakes, with the likelihood of mistakes reaching 80% for
107
some age groups.
Another study identified repeated mistakes leading to excessive
broker fees. In particular, this study found that consumers with a college education are able to save $1500 on average by making fewer mis108
takes.
Finally, numerous studies have identified continuing mistakes in refinancing decisions. Many consumers fail to exercise
options to refinance their mortgages, and thereby end up with rates
109
that are substantially higher than the market rate. Other consumers
refinance too early, failing to account for the possibility that interest
rates will continue to decline. According to one estimate, these refinancing mistakes can cost borrowers tens of thousands of dollars or
110
up to 25% of the loan’s value.
For most families, buying a home is the single most important financial decision of their lives. More money is at stake than in any
other household transaction. And yet the data show that consumers
make errors that collectively cost them billions of dollars.

106

Agarwal et al., supra note 18, at 10.
Id. at 12 fig.6, 13 fig.7.
108
Susan Woodward, Consumer Confusion in the Mortgage Market 22 (Sand Hill Econometrics, Working Paper, July 14, 2003), available at http://www.sandhillecon.com/
pdf/consumer_confusion.pdf, cited in Campbell, supra note 6, at 1589.
109
See Campbell, supra note 6, at 1579, 1581, 1590; see also Robert Van Order et al.,
The Performance of Low Income and Minority Mortgages 33-34 (Ross Sch. of Bus. Working
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 1083, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1003444. Similar mistakes have been identified in the U.K. See Campbell, supra note 6, at 1588 (citing DAVID MILES, THE UK MORTGAGE MARKET: TAKING A
LONGER-TERM VIEW, INTERIM REPORT: INFORMATION, INCENTIVES, AND PRICING 53-60
(2003)) (noting that many consumers in the U.K. fail to refinance their mortgages
when they become automatically adjusted to significantly higher rates).
110
See SUMIT AGARWAL, JOHN C. DRISCOLL & DAVID LAIBSON, OPTIMAL MORTGAGE
REFINANCING: A CLOSED FORM SOLUTION 26, 29 (2008), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1010702 (“[M]arket data . . . shows that many households did refinance too close to the [net present value (NPV)] break-even rule during the last 15
years . . . .”). Following the NPV rule, instead of the optimal refinancing rule, leads to
substantial expected losses: $26,479 on a $100,000 mortgage, $49,066 on a $250,000
mortgage, $86,955 on a $500,000 mortgage, and $163,235 on a $1,000,000 mortgage.
107
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c. Payday Loans
Payday loans provide another example of a credit product that
can impose substantial costs on imperfectly informed and imperfectly
rational borrowers. This consumer credit product is designed as a
short-term cash advance offered at a fee. In a typical transaction, a
111
consumer might pay a $30 fee for a two-week $200 cash advance.
The fee structure of payday loans makes it difficult for consumers to
compare directly the costs associated with a payday loan to the costs
associated with other consumer credit products. In the typical payday
loan described above, the $30 fee corresponds to an annual interest
112
rate of almost 400%.
The collective effect of paying $30 for small financial transactions
is large, but a single $30 fee is unlikely to bankrupt any consumer.
The problem lies with the substantial subset of consumers who take
out multiple advances and pay the $30 fee many times over. A customer who misestimates her ability to repay the loan in fourteen days
will likely roll the loan over for another fourteen days. Payday lenders
target such customers, amassing 90% of their profits from borrowers
113
who roll over their loans five or more times during a year. The Cen-

111

See Ronald J. Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV. 855, 857
(2007). A study by the Department of Defense documents payday loans carrying effective annual interest rates of up to 780%. See DOD, REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING,
supra note 3, at 10.
112
Mann & Hawkins, supra note 111, at 857.
113
KEITH ERNST, JOHN FARRIS & URIAH KING, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING,
QUANTIFYING THE ECONOMIC COST OF PREDATORY PAYDAY LENDING 2 (2004), available
at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/CRLpaydaylendingstudy121803.pdf; URIAH
KING, LESLIE PARRISH & OZLEM TANIK, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, FINANCIAL
QUICKSAND: PAYDAY LENDING SINKS BORROWERS IN DEBT WITH $4.2 BILLION IN PREDATORY FEES EVERY YEAR 6 (2006), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/
pdfs/rr012-Financial_Quicksand-1106.pdf; see also Paul Chessin, Borrowing from Peter To
Pay Paul: A Statistical Analysis of Colorado’s Deferred Deposit Loan Act, 83 DENV. U. L. REV.
387, 411 (2005) (finding that about 65% of loan volume in Colorado comes from customers who borrow more than twelve times a year); Flannery & Samolyk, Payday Lending: Do the Costs Justify the Price? 12-13 (FDIC Center for Financial Research, Working
Paper No. 2005-09, 2005) (indicating that between 24% and 30% of customers at payday loan stores borrowed more than 12 times per year). A $30 fee may be required to
cover the costs to the lender of an initial payday-loan transaction. The cost of rolling
over an existing loan is, however, substantially lower. The existence of non-profit payday lenders who charge substantially lower fees suggest that for-profit lenders are
charging more than is necessary to cover their costs. See John Leland, Nonprofit Payday
Loans? Yes, to Mixed Reviews, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2007, at A14 (noting the existence of
many lower nonprofit payday loan providers, some of which charge half the fees of
commercial payday lenders).
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ter for Responsible Lending (CRL) estimates that consumers pay an
114
extra $4.2 billion each year in excess fees on payday loans.
A Department of Defense (DoD) study has shown that payday
lenders prey on members of the military community as a lucrative
115
market. The DoD study found that borrowers take on a payday loan
when they can get a lower-interest nonpayday loan, for example, from
the Military Aid Societies or from the banks and credit unions on mili116
tary installations.
Another recent study, by Sumit Agarwal, Paige
Skiba, and Jeremy Tobacman, found that a majority of payday loan
117
applicants had more than $1000 available in liquid assets.
While
paying a 400% interest rate may be rational, absent other options, under conditions of extreme financial distress, it is very difficult to rationalize when the borrower can draw on substantial liquid assets.

114

KING, PARRISH & TANIK, supra note 113, at 9-10. The $4.2 billion figure assumes that any fee for the fifth rollover and beyond are excess fees, reflecting the
CRL’s position that a business model relying on multiple rollovers is exploitative (especially since many borrowers underestimate the number of rollovers and the resulting
costs). While we cannot evaluate the CRL’s calculation and the resulting $4.2 billion
figure, the cited figure is suggestive of the magnitude of the welfare costs involved.
115
DOD, REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING, supra note 3, at 4.
116
The government has begun organizing Military Aid Societies to provide better
options and a safety net for Service members and their families in need of emergency
funds.
Whereas there may be few alternatives for the average consumer with bad
credit to obtain cash, there is a safety net available for Service members and
their families outside of high interest loans. . . . Additionally, the banks and
credit unions located on military installations have begun to provide lending
products that fulfill the need for quick cash.
Id. at 29. The “Army Emergency Relief (AER), the Navy-Marine Corps Relief Society
(NMCRS) and the Air Force Aid Society (AFAS) . . . are chartered expressly to assist
Service members and their families who have financial crises.” Id. Such products include providing small, short-term loans at reasonable rates, often with a requirement
that borrowers must obtain additional financial education. Loan amounts are limited
$500 or less, with APRs of 11.5% to 18%, and provide between two weeks and six
months to pay. Id. at 31-34. “In 2005, the Aid Societies provided . . . [,] either through
no-interest loans or grants,” an average support per case of between $808 and $917.
Id. at 30.
117
See Sumit Agarwal, Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, How Do Consumers
Choose Between Credit Cards and Payday Loans? 2-3 (Feb 15, 2008) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (finding, based on a dataset of loan records from a
large payday lender and a matched dataset of transactions and credit histories at a financial institution, that 3,000 of the 4584 payday loan applicants had more than $1000
in available liquidity).
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3. Product Design
The evidence described above strongly suggests that imperfect information and imperfect rationality pervade credit product markets.
Another category of behavioral evidence reinforces the same conclusion. These data focus on seller behavior, specifically on evidence of
how sellers design their credit products. In many cases, sellers design
their products to exploit consumers’ imperfect information and imperfect rationality. Observing such product designs provides powerful
118
evidence of the prevalence of these imperfections.
a. Credit Cards
i. Long-Term Interest Rates
Changes in the credit card contract illustrate the growing sophistication of card issuers in exploiting consumer imperfections. Until
recently, credit card interest rates (standard APRs) were exceptionally
high. The reason, as admitted by economists who worked as Visa consultants, was that issuers felt that demand for their product was not
119
sensitive to this price dimension.
Consumers, at the time, were focusing on annual fees, not on long-term interest rates. One explanation is that consumers optimistically believed that they would not borrow, or would not borrow as much, in the long run. As a result, they
focused on the annual fee—which they would pay regardless of the
amount they borrowed—rather than the interest rate which implied
far greater costs, but only for those consumers who carried a balance.
A lender could significantly increase profits by dropping the annual
fee and raising interest rates. More recently, long-term interest rates
have become more salient to consumers, perhaps reflecting their
growing concern over rising balances on credit cards. The design of
the credit card product changed in response. Long-term interest rates
were reduced to attract and retain customers, as other charges were
increased.

118

Bar-Gill, supra note 15, at 1375-79.
Evans and Schmalensee describe the credit card issuers’ “view that the overall
demand for credit is relatively insensitive to interest rates, a view supported by at least
one empirical study and considerable folklore within the industry.” DAVID S. EVANS &
RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WITH PLASTIC: THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION IN BUYING
AND BORROWING 167 (1999).
119
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ii. Penalty Fees and Rates
When interest rates became salient, competition focused on the
interest rate dimension, and revenues from finance charges dropped
accordingly. But credit card issuers did not simply forego revenues.
Instead, they began to increase penalty fees and rates, which remain
120
largely invisible to consumers.
For example, the average late fee
121
rose from $12.83 in 1995 to $33.64 in 2005.
The average overlimit
122
fee on cards in 2005 was $30.18, going as high as $39.
Penalty fees
123
are the fastest growing source of revenue for issuers. Of the $24 bil124
lion in credit card fees that U.S. card holders paid in 2004, penalty
125
fees totaled $13 billion a year and accounted for 12.5% of issuers’
126
revenues.
120

In Beasley v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., the bank’s “Credit Card Task Force” proposed increasing “late” and “overlimit” fees as a “good source of revenue.” 1 Cal. Rptr.
2d 446, 448 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). Penalty fees are perceived as a “good source of revenue” because the industry perceives that “there (are) very few cardholders that switch
cards because the late fee is too high.” See Credit Card Fees Soar Again, CNNMONEY,
Aug. 18, 1998, http://money.cnn.com/1998/08/18/banking/q_bankrate (quoting
Peter Davidson, Executive Vice President, Speer & Assocs, Atlanta).
121
GAO, INCREASED COMPLEXITY REPORT, supra note 18, at 18. Issuers have also
been imposing cutoff times on the due dates, which have increased the likelihood that
a payment is considered late. See 2005 Credit Card Survey, CONSUMER ACTION NEWS
(S.F. Consumer Action, S.F., Cal.), Summer 2005, at 2, available at http://
www.consumer-action.org/news/articles/2005_credit_card_survey/ (finding that 34% of
the forty-seven surveyed issuers set cutoff times).
122
See GAO, INCREASED COMPLEXITY REPORT, supra note 18 (finding that overlimit
fees on fixed interest rate cards had increased by an average of 6.5%, and overlimit
fees on variable-rate cards had increased by 6%). It should be emphasized that issuers
allow continued use of a credit card, even when the cardholder is over her limit.
123
Penalty fees have been growing rapidly since 1996, when the Supreme Court
allowed issuers to apply the lax or nonexistent limitations on fees from their home
state to borrowers in other states (exportation), thus effectively deregulating late and
overlimit fees. See Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 737, 747 (1996); see also
TAMARA DRAUT & JAVIER SILVA, BORROWING TO MAKE ENDS MEET: THE GROWTH OF
CREDIT
CARD
DEBT
IN
THE
’90S
35
(2003),
available
at
http://www.demos.org/pub1.cfm (stating that late fees are the fastest growing source
of revenues for issuers); Bob Herbert, Caught in the Credit Card Vise, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
22, 2003, at A17 (illustrating the effect of increased late fees, “the fastest growing
source of revenue for the industry,” on consumers (quoting DRAUT & SILVA, supra)).
124
2005 Credit Card Survey, supra note 121, at 10.
125
Nadia Massoud et al., The Cost of Being Late: The Case of Credit Card Penalty Fees 23 (Am. Fin. Ass’n, 2007 Chicago Meetings Paper, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=890826; see also NAT’L CONS. LAW CTR., TRUTH IN LENDING 27 (4th ed. Supp.
2002) (“Over-limit fees are a major source of revenue for many credit card issuers.”).
126
Visa and MasterCard credit card issuers’ total revenue was $103.4 billion in
2004. Jeffrey Green, C&P’s 2006 Bank Card Profitability Study & Annual Report, CARDS &
PAYMENTS, May 2006, at 30, 31.
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The cost to consumers of penalty fees and rates rose significantly
127
with the advent of “universal default.”
Universal default clauses
cause cardholders’ rates to increase (by an average of 6%) when the
cardholder takes certain actions, such as applying for a mortgage, and
128
having too much credit available.
A credit card company often
doubles or triples interest rates when a cardholder’s credit score
129
drops.
Consumers are imperfectly aware of the range of events that
can trigger universal default and of the magnitude of the default interest rates. Even savvy consumers who actively seek disclosures from
credit card companies often find the process difficult and exasperating. The information given is frequently unclear, obfuscated, or “lacking in key details about conditions, especially those related to fees and
other costs, and to the circumstances that trigger universal default
130
rules.”
Even the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
recognized the problem and issued an advisory letter instructing national banks to disclose fully and prominently events that could result
131
in an increase in APR.
Moreover, to be effective, the timing of information is crucial.
“Advance notice of default or penalty rate increases is not required by
law. In many cases, the first time consumers learn of a rate increase is
132
when they open their statements.”
A warning, however, does not

127

Recently, in response to mounting criticism, Citibank took the lead in stopping
the universal default practice. See Citi Stops Universal Default, CARDLINE, Mar. 1, 2007.
128
See 2005 Credit Card Survey, supra note 121, at 1 (listing several events that can
trigger a universal default rate).
129
Id.
130
Id. Universal default “tops the list of unfair practices because customers are
given little choice about the rate or fee hikes.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
131
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC ADVISORY LETTER 200410, CREDIT CARD PRACTICES (Sept. 14, 2004), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/
Advlst04.htm.
132
2005 Credit Card Survey, supra note 121, at 1. Regulation Z does require credit
card companies to send written notices to affected cardholders of any rate-term
changes at least 15 days before such change becomes effective. GAO INCREASED COMPLEXITY REPORT, supra note 18, at 26. This disclosure, however, has proven to be ineffective, if only because the consumer is informed about the rate increase after completing the act that triggered the rate increase. A GAO study asserted that credit card
companies have generally ceased practicing universal default based on the idea that
the six largest issuers and twenty-five of twenty-eight popular large-issuer cards generally do not automatically raise interest rates if cardholders made a late payment to another creditor. Id. Yet many of these same issuers have not changed their practice of
raising interest rates, merely providing notice to cardholders of triggering circumstances either in their disclosures or immediately prior to a rate hike. Id. at 24-25. The
FRB is
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mean that consumers will be able to pay off or transfer their existing
balances. As a result, many will be unable to avoid paying additional
133
penalty fees imposed by a universal default rate hike.
And, from an
ex ante perspective, even consumers who are aware of the universal
default clause might overestimate their ability to avoid the rate increase. In sum, when getting a new credit card consumers are likely to
134
underestimate the risks associated with universal default. The prevalence of universal default clauses can be explained, at least in part, as
135
a strategic response by issuers to this underestimation bias.
iii. Other Fees
Credit card products include a long list of additional fees. Riskrelated fees include late fees, overlimit fees, and bounced-check fees.
Convenience and service fees include annual fees, cash-advance fees,
stop-payment-request fees, fees for statement copies and replacement
cards, foreign-currency-conversion fees, phone-payment-convenience
136
fees, wire-transfer fees, and balance-transfer fees.
Many consumers

considering a change to its Truth-in-Lending rules that would generally prohibit rate increases unless the cardholder receives 45 days [sic] prior notice.
The notice would allow the consumer to avoid the rate increase by paying off
the card balance [at the pre-increase rate] or moving it to another card.
Rate Changes, CARDFLASH, September 28, 2007, available at http://www.cardweb.com/
cardflash/2007/09/28/rate-changes (citing John C. Dugan, Comptroller of the Currency, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Before the Financial Services Roundtable (Sept. 27, 2007), available at http://www.occ.gov/ftp/release/
2007-104a.pdf).
133
Rate Changes, supra note 132.
134
Issuers justify “universal default” as a component of efficient, risk-based pricing.
It is not clear whether all the events that trigger “universal default” are indeed predictive of future nonpayment. Our point, however, is different: even if “universal default” is efficient ex post, meaning it efficiently increases prices only for high-risk borrowers, ex ante efficiency is sacrificed when borrowers underestimate the expected
costs of the clause.
135
Another recent innovation also magnifies the cost of penalty fees. Some issuers
are dividing up credit extensions between multiple cards so that a customer with a
$2,500 credit limit will be issued five cards with five $500 limits (instead of a single card
with a $2,500 limit). Five cards mean five opportunities to pay late fees, overlimit fees,
etc. See generally Robert Berner, Cap One’s Credit Trap, BUS. WK., Nov. 6, 2006, at 35
(detailing Capital One’s practice of issuing several cards to its customers—even those
customers who have currently outstanding overlimit balances—in order to generate
more late fees and overage charges).
136
See Mark Furletti, Credit Card Pricing Developments and Their Disclosure 10-13 (Fed.
Reserve Bank of Phila., Payment Cards Center, Discussion Paper, 2003), available at
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/pcc/papers/2003/CreditCardPricing_012003.pdf (detailing credit card fees).
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are not aware of these fees—their existence, their magnitude, or the
likelihood that they will be triggered—when signing up for a new
credit card. The FRB’s Regulation Z, which implements Truth in
Lending Act (TILA) credit card disclosure requirements, does not require advance disclosure of all fees upon application or solicitation.
Moreover, some of the existing fees are not specifically mentioned in
Regulation Z and, as a result, issuers make their own decisions about
137
disclosures.
On November 8, 2006 the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York approved a class-action settlement, by which Visa
and MasterCard agreed to pay $336 million to credit card and debit
card holders for allegedly unlawful currency-conversion practices.
(Visa and MasterCard deny any wrongdoing.) The class-action suit
claimed, among other things, that issuers charged currencyconversion fees that were not appropriately disclosed, violating the
138
provisions of TILA and the Electronic Funds Transfer Act.
When consumer behavior is not sensitive to a certain price dimension, issuers can be expected to increase this price dimension. Moreover, as the currency-conversion litigation suggests, issuers may be deliberately fostering misperception about certain price dimensions.
iv. Introductory Rates
The introductory teaser rate is another example of product design
that targets consumers’ imperfect rationality. Assuming that the costs
of switching from one credit card to another are small, teaser rates
would not be offered by an issuer that faces perfectly rational consumers. These consumers would transfer their balance to a new card
with a low teaser rate as soon as the old card reverted to the high
postintroductory rate.

137

See id. at 13-14 (“Issuers generally disclose [phone-payment, wire-transfer and
stop-payment] fees to consumers by including a menu or a description of these other
fees in ‘welcome kit’ mailings to new customers or in ‘Cardmember Agreements.’”).
138
See In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1409, slip op. at 3-4
(S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2006) (order granting preliminary approval of the settlement agreement), available at http://www.ccfsettlement.com/documents/; Third Consolidated
Amended Class Action Complaint at 1, In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig.,
MDL No. 1409 (S.D.N.Y.), available at http://www.ccfsettlement.com/documents/; see
also Furletti, supra note 136, at 14 (“Regulation Z does not explicitly address disclosure
of the foreign currency conversion fee. Unlike most fees that can be observed upon a
detailed review of a card statement, foreign currency conversion fees are often rolled
into the transaction amount or the conversion factor.”).
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Issuers offer teaser rates because they are attractive to consumers
who think they will switch, or pay off their balance, when the introductory period ends, but end up staying and paying the high postintroductory rates. There are two parts to this story. The first part focuses on the ex post stage. Ex post, consumers do not switch and
borrow at the high postintroductory rates. In fact, a recent study
found that most borrowing is done at the high postintroductory rates,
139
rather than at the low teaser rates.
Another recent study estimated
that effective switching costs must be approximately $150 to explain
140
the limited switching observed.
There is clearly a psychologicalinertia component reflected in such high switching costs.
The second part of the story focuses on the ex ante stage. Not
only do consumers fail to switch ex post, but they also fail to anticipate
this effective lock-in ex ante. Alternatively, consumers simply believe
that they will not need to borrow beyond the introductory period.
The ex ante part of the story is necessary to explain why consumers
are more sensitive to introductory rates than they are to long-term
rates, despite the fact that most of the borrowing is done at the high
141
long-term rates. In fact, a recent study found that “consumers are at
least three times as responsive to changes in the introductory interest
rate as compared to dollar-equivalent changes in the post-introductory
142
interest rate . . . .”
And survey evidence suggests that more than a
third of all consumers consider an attractive introductory interest rate
143
to be the prime selection criterion in credit card choice.

139

See Gross & Souleles, supra note 77, at 171, 179. See also Lawrence M. Ausubel,
Credit Card Defaults, Credit Card Profits, and Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 249, 263
(1997) (“[A] substantial portion of credit card borrowing still occurs at postintroductory interest rates[;] . . . finance charges paid to credit card issuers have not dropped as
much as the introductory offers might suggest.”); David Laibson et al., A Debt Puzzle, in
KNOWLEDGE, INFORMATION, AND EXPECTATIONS IN MODERN MACROECONOMICS 228,
228-29 (Philippe Aghion et al. eds., 2003) (finding that consumers pay high effective
interest rates “[d]espite the rise of teaser interest rates”).
140
Shui & Ausubel, supra note 73, at 24.
141
See Bar-Gill, supra note 15, at 1405-07 (explaining that “a consumer with a current financing need will take the teaser rate bait” because she underestimates her future borrowing).
142
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Adverse Selection in the Credit Card Market 21 (June
17, 1999) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.ausubel.com/
creditcard-papers/adverse.pdf.
143
EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 119, at 225.
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v. Additional Design Features
Other features of the credit card contract are also designed to exploit consumers’ imperfect information and imperfect rationality. In
particular, many technical features of the credit card contract provide
benefits to issuers while imposing underappreciated costs on consumers. Among these features are low (and even negative) amortization
144
145
rates, compounded interest, pro-issuer payment allocation meth146
147
ods, and balance-computation methods.
Issuers also commonly
insert an arbitration clause that requires consumers to settle disputes
by binding arbitration that excludes aggregation via class arbitration,
blocks public access to information revealed in the arbitration, and
eliminates the procedural rights that would have been available in the
148
court system.

144

Bar-Gill, supra note 15, at 1408. Recently, minimum payments have been going
up, arguably in response to concerns voiced by consumer groups and the Federal
Banking Agencies. See Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
Comptroller Dugan Expresses Concern about Negative Amortization (Dec. 1, 2005), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/toolkit/newsrelease.aspx?Doc=I51QIBS3.xml (noting
new regulatory requirements for increased minimum credit card payments to avoid
negative amortization); Letter from Richard Spillenkothen, Dir., Bd. of Governors of
the Fed. Reserve Sys., to the Officer in Charge of Supervision and Appropriate Supervisory and Examination Staff at Each Federal Reserve Bank and to Banking Organizations Supervised by the Federal Reserve (Jan. 8, 2003), available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/2003/sr0301.htm. A recent amendment
to TILA also improves the information that consumers receive on the costs of slow repayment. See The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8 § 1301, 119 Stat. 23 (mandating the provision of examples of
repayment timeframes using minimum payments).
145
See Furletti, supra note 136, at 15 (“By adding finance charges to the balance
each day, issuers increased finance charge revenue without increasing stated annual
percentage rates.”).
146
See GAO, INCREASED COMPLEXITY REPORT, supra note 18, at 27 (“[C]ardholder
payments [are often] allocated first to the balance that is assessed the lowest rate of
interest.”); Furletti, supra note 136, at 15 (discussing issuers’ allocation of payments
first to low APR balances).
147
See GAO, INCREASED COMPLEXITY REPORT, supra note 18, at 27-28 (describing
the two-cycle billing method); Furletti, supra note 136, at 16 (noting the effective
elimination of the grace period through double-cycle interest).
148
See 2005 Credit Card Survey, supra note 121, at 2 (detailing survey results revealing that more than 50% of banks use arbitration clauses).
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b. Mortgage Loans
i. Deferred Costs
Some mortgage products, like credit cards, defer much of the
product’s cost into the future (beyond what is inherently implied by a
loan contract). Specifically, subprime mortgage contracts often re149
quire a very small, or even zero, down payment.
In addition, the
common 2/28 (or 3/27) hybrid mortgages offer low introductory interest rates for the initial two (or three) year period, to be followed by
150
sharp increases in payments.
These features of the mortgage product may be responding to consumers’ optimism bias. A consumer
who overestimates the rate by which her income will increase will prefer a mortgage with a small down payment and a low introductory
151
rate.
When the introductory period ends and her income does not
increase as expected, this consumer may face foreclosure.
In addition, when taking loans, consumers can overestimate the
availability and attractiveness of refinancing options at the end of the
introductory period. Consumers may also underestimate the deterrent effect of the prepayment penalty, a charge that is often many
thousands of dollars and makes refinancing very expensive. Consumers who misestimate the costs or availability of refinancing, will necessarily underestimate the likelihood of paying the high postintroductory rate. Moreover, consumers might overestimate their ability to
make optimal refinancing decisions. The complexity of the optimal
refinancing decision, and the evidence that many consumers fail to
make optimal refinancing decisions, suggest that mortgage products
that appear attractive largely because of the refinancing option may
be responding to consumers’ imperfect rationality. This hypothesis is
especially powerful given the market’s rejection of alternative product
152
designs that are less demanding of the consumer.
Arguably, the

149

Bar-Gill, supra note 96 (manuscript at 15-16).
Id.
151
Id.; see also Willis, supra note 90, at 778 (invoking consumer myopia as an explanation for introductory rates).
152
See Campbell, supra note 6, at 1585-86 (arguing that the common contractual
designs “reward sophisticated decision making and continuous monitoring of financial
markets,” and suggesting that such contractual designs, rather than less-demanding
designs proposed by economists—for example, mortgages that adjust interest and
principal payments for inflation, and automatically refinancing nominal FRMs—may
be responding to consumers’ imperfect rationality).
150
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business model based on low teaser rates is viable only because many
153
consumers refinance less often than they anticipate.
ii. Proliferation of Fees
Comparison shopping for cars is relatively easy because the customer can compare total prices for similar products. Mortgage borrowing is much more complex because lenders have disaggregated
fees. The cost of borrowing money now includes a number of fees,
such as origination fees (including document-preparation fees, underwriting-analysis fees, tax-escrow fees, and escrow-fund-analysis fees)
that are often not disclosed until late in the purchasing process. It is
as if a person purchasing a car discovered only at the time of sale that
there would be additional charges for paint, for a bumper, and for
tires. Such additional charges would likely be omitted from the
buyer’s initial estimates of affordability and would escape inclusion as
154
the buyer compared different loan options.
Similarly, costs imposed later or not at all, such as late fees, foreclosure fees, and prepayment penalties, are likely to be omitted from a
buyer’s analysis. These fees can be 10% (and sometimes more) of the
155
loan value. Such fees, including those imposed at origination, at refinancing, and at default, have proliferated, presumably as lenders
have seen them as an opportunity to increase revenues without en-

153

Such an outcome can be explained either by an underestimation of refinancing costs or by an underestimation of the difficulty of making optimal refinancing decisions. See DAVID MILES, THE UK MORTGAGE MARKET: TAKING A LONGER-TERM VIEW,
INTERIM REPORT: INFORMATION, INCENTIVES, AND PRICING § 3 (2003)) (concluding,
based on an analysis of the UK mortgage market, that lenders can offer attractive
teaser rates only because many consumers fail to refinance); see also DAVID MILES, THE
UK MORTGAGE MARKET: TAKING A LONGER-TERM VIEW: FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 97 (2004) (noting borrowers’ poor understanding of interest-rate risks).
154
To many consumers, the single most salient feature of the loan is the monthly
payment. Lenders will therefore manipulate their product design to present a low
monthly payment. The monthly payment, however, is a poor proxy for the true price
of the loan, given the complexity and multidimensionality of subprime mortgage
loans. See Bar-Gill, supra note 96 (manuscript at 19-20) (detailing the sources of
origination fees such as credit checks, certifications, and document preparation);
Willis, supra note 90, at 780-89 (deveopling the argument that “borrowers who rely on
monthly payments as a simplifying heuristic are vulnerable to price gouging”).
155
See Willis, supra note 90, at 731 (highlighting a reduction in origination fees to
10% from 25%).
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156

countering customer resistance.
These products are arguably designed to maximize profits from consumer decision-making errors.
The numerous fees and penalties together with adjustable interest
rates have transformed the mortgage loan into a product with multidimensional, nontransparent pricing. Multidimensionality enables
tailoring of the product to the special needs of each borrower. But it
also creates information problems that sharply inhibit comparison
157
shopping.
c. Payday Loans
Perhaps the most dangerous feature of the payday-loan product is
the loan rollover. Many payday borrowers do not pay back the loan
on the next payday. Instead, they roll over, meaning they renew the
loan for another period. A Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) study by Mark Flannery and Katherine Samolyk found that
about 46% of all payday loans are either renewals of existing loans or
new loans that follow immediately upon the payment of an existing
158
loan.
Other studies have found even higher rollover rates. A study
by the DoD found that among U.S. military personnel “75% of payday
customers are unable to repay their loan within two weeks and are
159
forced to get a loan ‘rollover’ at additional cost.” And a study by the
Center for Responsible Lending found that 90% of payday loans are
160
made to borrowers with five or more payday loans per year.
The design of the payday loan as a short-term cash advance that is
oftentimes continuously renewed for prolonged periods of time responds to consumers’ underestimation of the likelihood and cost of
loan rollover. Researchers at the Center for Responsible Lending observe that “[s]ince the loan comes due on payday, borrowers expect to
have money in their account to cover the check. Many borrowers,
however, find that paying back the entire loan on payday would leave
them without funds necessary to meet basic living expenses, such as

156

Id. at 725, 731, 766-68; see also Bar-Gill, supra note 96 (manuscript at 30-31)
(“[I]ncreased complexity . . . allows [lenders] to hide the true cost of the loan in a
multidimensional pricing maze.”).
157
Willis, supra note 90, at 726-28; Bar-Gill, supra note 96; see also McCoy, supra
note 99, at 124 (finding that subprime price quotes are available only after payment of
nonrefundable fees).
158
Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 113.
159
DOD, REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING, supra note 3, at 14.
160
See supra note 113 and accompanying text (discussing rollover costs).
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161

electricity, rent, and groceries.”
This results in an unanticipated
rollover, which means the cost of the loan is far higher than the consumer initially assessed. The payday loan product is arguably designed to take advantage of consumers’ optimism bias and their consistent underestimation of the risk of nonpayment.
C. The Harm: Implications of Credit Market Failure
1. Harm to Consumers
The evidence summarized above suggests that many credit products are extremely costly to consumers. The data on credit card
choice and use show that consumer mistakes cost hundreds of dollars
a year per consumer. Failure to switch cards at the end of the intro162
ductory period costs $250 a year. Choosing lower introductory rates
lasting for shorter introductory periods instead of higher introductory
163
rates lasting for longer introductory periods costs $50 a year. Paying
high interest rates on credit card balances while holding liquid assets
164
Consumer mistakes in
that yield low returns costs $200 a year.
choosing mortgage products cost even more. Borrowers who take a
$100,000 thirty-year subprime loan while qualifying for a comparable
prime loan suffer an average financial harm of over $200 per month,
165
$2400 per year, and over $70,000 in total.
More generally, mistakes
that prevent effective competition within the subprime market cost
166
Suboptimal prepayment deborrowers an average of $3370 a year.
cisions alone can cost borrowers tens of thousands of dollars or up to
167
25% of the loan’s value. In the payday loan market, a 2004 study by
the Center for Responsible Lending estimated that, each year, predatory payday lending practices cost U.S. families $3.4 billion in excess

161

ERNST FARRIS & KING, supra note 113, at 3; see also Mann & Hawkins, supra note
111, at 882 (“[T]here is every reason to think that typical decision-making problems
like the availability heuristic and the optimism bias cause the typical consumer to give
inadequate weight to the risk that the [payday] transaction will turn out poorly.”).
162
See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
163
Shui & Ausubel, supra note 73, at 8-9.
164
See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
165
See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
166
See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
167
See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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168

fees and charges.
And a DoD study reported a cost of $80 million
169
every year to military families from abusive payday-loan fees.
These numbers suggest that harm to consumers is substantial.
The aggregate costs are staggering. The per-consumer costs must be
multiplied by the large numbers of consumers who bear these costs.
The $250 cost of failing to switch cards at the end of the introductory
period is born by 35% of borrowing consumers who chose cards with
170
introductory offers—1.4 million consumers each year.
This implies
an aggregate annual cost of $350 million. And this for a single mistake triggered by a single design feature of the credit card product. In
171
the home-mortgage market, 35% of prime-qualified borrowers, or
172
480,000 borrowers, get a subprime loan and pay an extra $2,400 a

168

ERNST, FARRIS & KING, supra note 113, at 2. Average APRs for payday loans
range from 391% to 443% in conservative estimates. “This estimate is conservative because it does not account for additional costs related to insufficient fund (NSF) fees,
bounced check fees, disparities between the credit risk and effective interest rate
charged borrowers, and increased public costs due to collection efforts and payday
lending induced bankruptcies.” Id. at 2 n.1. A DoD study has found that APRs for
payday lending have reached as high as 780%. DOD, REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING,
supra note 3, at 10.
169
DOD, REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING, supra note 3, at 12.
170
This number is based on the following data: (1) about 17 million households
open a new general purpose credit card account each year; (2) about 50% of new accounts include introductory rates; (3) about 50% of cardholders carry a balance. See
Fixed Rate vs Intro Rate, CARDFLASH, July 29, 1999 (reporting findings from a 1999 study
of account acquisition and attrition conducted by PSI Global); Ana M. Aizcorbe et al.,
Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Evidence from the 1998 and 2001 Survey of Consumer
Finances, 89 FED. RES. BULL. 1, 23-25 (2003) (stating that, according to 2001 SCF data,
44.4% of households carry credit card debt; among the 72.7% of households holding
at least one bank card, 53.7% carry a balance); David I. Laibson et al., supra note 139
230, 231 (noting that the fraction of households with at least one credit card that are
borrowing on their credit cards is 63%). We recognize that cards with introductory
offers might be issued at different rates to borrowing and nonborrowing consumers or
households. Nevertheless, the preceding calculation probably yields a conservative estimate, if issuers are more likely to target introductory offers to borrowers and/or if
borrowers are more likely to be attracted by introductory offers.
171
Carr & Kolluri, supra note 90, at 37; cf. Sichelman, supra note 89, at 25 (claiming that up to 40% of Citi customers received loans at higher rates than they qualified
for); Willis, supra note 90, at 730 (“It is estimated that as many as half of the borrowers
with subprime loans were qualified for lower prime interest rate loans . . . .”).
172
The 480,000 figure was calculated by multiplying the percentage of subprime
borrowers who could have qualified for more conventional prime loans (20%) by the
total number of subprime borrowers (2.4 million). See STEIN, supra note 101, at 14
n.49 (providing the 2.4 million figure); Mike Hudson & E. Scott Reckard, More Homeowners with Good Credit Getting Stuck with Higher-Rate Loans, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2007, at
A1 (providing the 20% figure).
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173

year, on average.
This implies an aggregate annual cost of approximately $1.3 billion. More generally, imperfect competition and
consumer mistakes in the subprime mortgage market cost 2.4 million
174
borrowers a total of $9.1 billion annually.
And yet these numbers
underestimate the full magnitude of the harm caused by unsafe credit
products. The data measure only the bluntest errors. The costs imposed by dozens of other potential mistakes, particularly those associated with complex pricing, remain unmeasured. More importantly,
175
these numbers do not include the cost of financial distress.
While the per-accident harm caused by unsafe physical products
may exceed the “per-accident” harm caused by unsafe credit products,
176
the number of victims of financial products is much larger.
Tens of
millions of consumers pay more than they should on their credit
cards, mortgages, or payday loans. By comparison, only 80,000 con177
sumers are harmed in lawnmower-related accidents each year.
For
present purposes, the important point is that aggregate harm from
unsafe credit products is sufficiently large to justify a systematic examination of possible regulatory fixes. Of course, unlike harm caused
by physical products, harm caused by financial products is not a direct
welfare cost, but rather it is a transfer from consumers to sellers of
credit. Yet, when this transfer is the product of mistake, a welfare cost
will often follow. We further elaborate on these welfare costs below.
2. Externalities
Consumer mistakes, especially when coupled with product design
aimed at exploiting these mistakes, hurt consumers. The welfare costs
of these mistakes are not limited to the direct harm suffered by the

173

See Willis, supra note 90, at 729.
STEIN, supra note 101, at 2-3, 18-19.
175
Recent evidence shows a causal link between unsafe credit products and financial distress, including bankruptcy. See MANN, supra note 3, ch. 3 (arguing that a rise in
credit card use is causally connected to increased rates in bankruptcy filings).
176
Cf. Letter from Comm’rs of the FTC to Wendell H. Ford, Chairman of the
Consumer Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., and John
C. Danforth, Ranking Minority Member of the Consumer Subcomm. 6 n.12 (Dec. 17,
1980), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-unfair.htm (describing consumer injury as potentially “substantial if it does a small harm to a large number of
people, or if it . . . raises a significant risk of concrete harm”).
177
A Little Safety Goes a Long Way with DIY (NPR radio broadcast June 21, 2007),
available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=11220621.
174
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mistaken consumers. Unsafe credit products generate a series of
178
negative externalities.
a. The Cost of Financial Distress
The costs of financial distress are borne by immediate family
members. For example, the 1.8 million people filing bankruptcy in
2001 were matched by another 1.9 million children and elderly adult
dependents who were not directly responsible for the bills, but who
179
lived in households that declared bankruptcy.
Indeed, households
with children are nearly three times more likely to declare bankruptcy
180
than their childless counterparts.
The negative effects of economic distress on children have not
been studied extensively, but research hints at the future these children face. The catalog of damages inflicted on children when their
parents divorce—falling test scores, low self-esteem, discipline problems, depression—also applies to middle-class children whose parents
181
are in financial trouble.
Financial collapse has an additional wrinkle less common among children of divorce: it often sends a child

178

See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 111, at 881-84 (discussing how financial distress resulting from debt generally increases the overall burden on the social safety net,
including effects upon health, employment, and family, and how payday lending, specifically, decreases competition, choice, and overall welfare of relevant neighborhoods); see also JEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 13-18, 37-41 (warning of myriad negative
pressures resulting from rampant foreclosures on subprime mortgages, including: depressed neighboring housing prices; foreclosure costs falling on homeowners, taxpayers, local governments, and mortgage servicers; lost tax revenues from abandoned
homes; creation of tax liabilities for homeowners; tightening of lending standards for
families facing foreclosures; a contagion effect whereby concentrated foreclosures
cause additional foreclosures; and higher levels of violent crime).
179
Elizabeth Warren, Bankrupt Children, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1003, 1010 fig.1 (2002).
180
Id. at 1013 fig.3. For two-parent households the ratio of bankruptcies for families with minor children and those with no minor children is about 2:1, and for singleparent households the ratio is about 4:1. Id. at 1015 fig.4.
181
See SUSAN E. MAYER, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: FAMILY INCOME AND CHILDREN’S
LIFE CHANCES 76-77 (1997) (finding that five- to seven-year-olds whose parents experienced a drop in income of 35% or more between two adjacent years were more likely
to experience lower test scores and behavior problems in the classroom). Mayer controlled for other factors, such as parents’ marital status, race, and parents’ age at the
birth of the child. Id. at 77 tbl.4.5; see also Dania S. Clark-Lempers et al., Family Financial Stress, Parental Support, and Young Adolescents’ Academic Achievement and Depressive
Symptoms, 10 J. EARLY ADOLESCENCE 21, 33 (1990) (reporting that adolescents from
families in financial distress are more likely to experience depression); Les B. Whitbeck et al., Family Economic Hardship, Parental Support, and Adolescent Self-Esteem, 54 SOC.
PSYCHOL. Q. 353, 353-54 (1991) (finding that adolescents from families in financial
distress are more likely to experience low self-esteem).
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into adult roles long before her time. Sociologist Katherine Newman
observes that “[f]or downwardly mobile families, it is the parents who
need their kids’ emotional support. . . . Their children want to be
more independent, but a sense of responsibility and obligation pulls
182
them back.”
For elderly relatives relying on adult children who get into financial trouble, the impact may be immediate. An estimated 20,000
households filing for bankruptcy in 2001 indicated they had to move
an elderly relative to a cheaper care facility in order to deal with their
183
financial problems.
Financial distress can impose significant costs
on ex-spouses or noncustodial children if the debtor is no longer able
to pay support. Women’s groups across the country uniformly opposed amendments to the bankruptcy laws in part because of their
concern that ex-husbands would be under so much pressure from
credit card issuers and mortgage lenders that there would be nothing
184
left for support recipients.
Not even death will insulate families
from the sting of aggressive debt collectors. Sears, for example, had a
special team to collect from bereaved families when a customer died
still owing a credit balance—even though the family had no legal ob185
ligation to pay these debts.
Bankruptcy may be the extreme measure of financial distress, but
not all families in financial trouble declare bankruptcy. A survey of
households in 2007 showed that 40% of families were “very concerned” or “somewhat concerned” about paying their bills that
186
month.
Nearly half of all credit card holders missed at least one

182

KATHERINE S. NEWMAN, FALLING FROM GRACE: DOWNWARD MOBILITY IN THE
AGE OF AFFLUENCE 105 (1999).
183
Bankruptcy Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 25
(Feb. 10, 2005) (statement of Elizabeth Warren), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/
testimony.cfm?id=1381&wit_id=3996 (presenting unpublished data from the 2001 Consumer Bankruptcy Project).
184
See, e.g., JOAN ENTMACHER, NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., BANKRUPTCY BILL WILL
HARM ECONOMICALLY VULNERABLE WOMEN AND THEIR FAMILIES 1-2 (2002) (arguing
that proposed bankruptcy reform would make the collection of child support more
difficult); Elizabeth Warren, What is a Women’s Issue? Bankruptcy, Commercial Law and
Other Gender-Neutral Topics, 25 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 19, 21 (2002) (noting that no
women’s group has publicly endorsed proposed restrictions on bankruptcy).
185
WARREN & WARREN TYAGI, supra note 98, at 142-43.
186
Press Release, Consumer Fed’n of Am., Holiday Spending Plans: More Consumers Than in Previous Years Say They Will Cut Spending (Nov. 19, 2007), available at
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Holiday_Spending_Press_Release_11-19-07.pdf.
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187

payment last year, and an additional 2.1 million families missed one
188
or more mortgage payments.
In 2004, about one in every six
189
households in the U.S. dealt with a debt collector.
Economist Michelle White has estimated that about 17% of all households in the
United States would see a significant improvement in their balance
190
sheets if only they were willing to sign a bankruptcy petition.
That
is, 18 million households would have profited from a bankruptcy filing, compared with the 1.5 million that actually filed, suggesting that
at least 16.5 million families who did not file for bankruptcy are dealing
191
with some form of financial distress—and some of its attendant costs.
The impact of financial distress does not stop with the immediate
family. An individual in financial distress will often require support
from more distant family, friends, or the state. Such transfers from
one individual to another, including transfers mediated by the state,
involve transaction costs. These transaction costs are especially large
when the bankruptcy system—and the attendant lawyers’ fees, filing
fees, claim forms, and other paperwork—is involved.
Foreclosures can be even more expensive. Bank takeovers of residential housing cost taxpayers money and threaten the economic sta192
bility of already-imperiled neighborhoods.
A recent housing report
187

Walecia Konrad, How Americans Really Feel About Credit Card Debt, BANKRATE.COM,
Feb. 20, 2007, at 3, http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/financial_literacy/Feb07_
credit_card_poll_national_a1.asp (follow “3” hyperlink beneath article title).
188
Sandra Block, Foreclosure Hurts Long after Home’s Gone, So Cut a Deal While You
Can, USA TODAY, Mar. 23, 2007, at 3B.
189
TOM W. SMITH, TROUBLES IN AMERICA: A STUDY OF NEGATIVE LIFE EVENTS
ACROSS TIME AND SUB-GROUPS 23 tbl.2 (2005) (noting that 15.8% of Americans dealt
with payment pressure from stores, creditors, or bill collectors in 2004); Lucy Lazarony, Denying Our Debt, BANKRATE.COM, Apr. 6, 2004, http://www.bankrate.com/brm/
news/financial-literacy2004/debt-denial.asp (observing that 11% of Americans have had
a credit card bill go to collection).
190
Michelle J. White, Why It Pays to File for Bankruptcy: A Critical Look at the Incentives Under U.S. Personal Bankruptcy Law and a Proposal for Change, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 685,
718 tbl.2 (1998). White shows that about 17% of U.S. households would profit from
filing for bankruptcy—and yet, for some reason, presumably at least somewhat influenced by a sense of shame or stigma, they do not file. Id.
191
See U.S. Census Bureau, Table AVG1: Average Number of People per Household, by Race and Hispanic Origin, Marital Status, Age, and Education of Householder:
2007, available at http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/
cps2007/tabAVG1.xls (providing the total number of American households,
116,011,000).
192
See JEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 15-16; see also Nelson D. Schwartz, Can the Mortgage Crisis Swallow a Town?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2007, at § 3; Henry M. Paulson, Jr., U.S.
Sec’y of the Treasury, Remarks on Current Housing and Mortgage Market Developments (Oct. 16, 2007), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/
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observed: “Foreclosures are costly—not only to homeowners, but also
to a wide variety of stakeholders, including mortgage servicers, local
governments and neighboring homeowners. . . . [Costs can reach] up
193
to $80,000 for all stakeholders combined . . . .”
Lenders can lose as
well, forfeiting as much as $50,000 per foreclosure, translating into
194
roughly $25 billion in total foreclosure-related losses in 2003.
“[A]
city can lose up to [$19,227] per house abandoned in foreclosure in
lost property taxes, unpaid utility bills, property upkeep, sewage and
195
maintenance.” Many foreclosure-related costs fall on taxpayers who
ultimately pay the bill for services provided by their local governments.
Financial distress also affects the productivity of borrowersworkers. Recent evidence collected by the DoD shows that employees
or, in the DoD’s case, military personnel, become less productive
196
when in financial distress.
This finding should not come as a surprise. An employee concerned about debt repayment and about protecting her family from abusive debt-collection practices is clearly less
197
able to focus on work.
b. Market Distortions
Consumer mistakes also lead to market distortions, preventing
markets from attaining allocative efficiency. Consumer mistakes skew
the demand function, inflating demand for products with underesti-

hp612.htm (“Foreclosures are costly and painful for homeowners. They are also costly
for mortgage servicers and investors. They can have spillover effects into property values throughout a neighborhood, creating a downward cycle we must work to avoid.”).
193
JEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 17. See also Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The
External Costs of Foreclosure: The Impact of Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures on Property
Values, 17 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 57, 69, 70-72 (2006) (finding that a single-family
home foreclosure causes a decrease in values of homes within an eighth of a mile—or
one city block—by an average of 0.9% to 1.136%, or approximately $1,870 when the
average home sale price is $164,599, and 1.44% in low- and moderate-income communities, or about $1,600 when the average home sale price is $111,002).
194
See, e.g., Desiree Hatcher, Foreclosure Alternatives: A Case for Preserving Homeownership, PROFITWISE NEWS AND VIEWS (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., Chi., Ill.), Feb. 2006, at
2, available at http://www.chicagofed.org/community_development/files/02_2006_
foreclosure_alt.pdf (observing that five-hundred-thousand nonfarm mortgage loans
were in foreclosure at the end of 2003, causing $25 billion in costs for lenders).
195
JEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 38.
196
See DOD, REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING, supra note 3, at 39-43 (listing case
studies involving military personnel with loan troubles).
197
The DoD report also describes how military personnel in financial distress become more vulnerable to extortion and, consequently, lose their security clearance.
Id. at 35-36, 86-87.
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mated risks. The inflated demand skews the market price and leads to
allocative inefficiency.
Consider two credit products, a closed-end bank loan and a credit
card. The bank loan is better suited for some consumers and for certain purposes. And the credit card is better suited for other consumers and for other purposes. Now assume that the credit card, by its
nature or by specific design, triggers more consumer mistakes. And
because of these mistakes, the relative attractiveness of the credit card
increases. The result would be that consumers, who, absent mistakes
and misperception, would take a closed-end bank loan, opt for credit
card financing instead. The increased demand for credit cards and
the reduced demand for bank loans affect the relative prices of these
two credit products. As a result, mistakes by imperfectly informed and
imperfectly rational consumers distort the financing choices of in198
formed, rational consumers as well.
Similarly, with imperfect information and imperfect rationality,
credit may seem less costly than it really is. Accordingly, more consumers will want to borrow. The economy will respond by shifting resources to meet this increased demand—a shift that, given the mistakes underlying the increased demand, leads to allocative inefficiency
(since there are better uses for these resources). The most recent example is in the subprime mortgage industry. Artificially inflated demand for financing, fueled in part by consumer mistakes, contributed
to the real-estate bubble.
Another market distortion is caused when an increased risk of default caused by unsafe products increases the prices of safe products.
A consumer who gets into financial trouble is likely to default on most
or all outstanding credit obligations, not just on those that caused the
problem. When a debtor is out of money, the losses are often shared
by “good” creditors and “bad” creditors alike. Because unsafe credit
products increase the risk of default on all credit obligations, costs increase both for safe and for unsafe credit products. Anticipating an
increased likelihood of nonpayment, sellers of safe products are
forced to increase the price of their products, pricing in the risk of default caused by the unsafe products. The higher prices that consum-

198

See Bar-Gill, supra note 15, at 1434 (“[S]ellers will not compete on dimensions
of the product . . . that are invisible to imperfectly rational consumers.”).
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ers must pay for safe products represent another cost of unsafe prod199
ucts.
3. Distributional Concerns
The preceding subsections described how unsafe credit products
reduce the overall amount of resources in a society. Unsafe credit
products also regressively redistribute the remaining resources.
There are several reasons for this distributional effect: First, not
all consumers have identical information, and not all are equally rational. Better-educated consumers are less likely to make mistakes.
Richer consumers are also less likely to make mistakes, if only because
200
they can hire experts who will prevent them from making mistakes.
Second, as a consequence of these differences in information and rationality, sellers targeting less-educated, poorer consumers will offer
more products that are finely tuned to exploit consumer mistakes.
Third, if poor consumers are generally in greater need of financing
than rich consumers, then poor consumers will suffer more from mistakes related to the choice and use of consumer credit products. Finally, if richer consumers make a credit mistake, they can often buy
their way out of the problem—paying off a credit card bill in full or
refinancing a mortgage on more favorable terms. Poor consumers
lack the financial cushion that rich consumers have, and therefore
they are more vulnerable to the unexpected costs of credit products
and are more likely to stumble into financial distress. In his American
Finance Association 2006 Presidential Address, John Campbell showed that “for a minority of households, particularly poorer and less
educated households, there are larger discrepancies [between ob201
served and ideal behavior] with potentially serious consequences.”
Campbell speculates that “the existence of naive households [i.e., the
199

Perhaps even more costly, from a social welfare perspective, are the ex ante distortions caused by the prospect of financial distress. A lender will have an added incentive to offer an unsafe credit product if it can recover not only from the borrower
but also from the borrower’s family, friends, and perhaps also from the state (via welfare payments made to the borrower) when the borrower is in financial distress. Cf.
Eric Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionablility Doctrine,
Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283, 31819 (1995) (arguing that stricter usury laws can serve to counteract market distortions
due to welfare programs).
200
See Lyons et al., supra note 66, at 25 (“[C]onsumers who were less educated,
lower-income, older, or Hispanic tended to be less knowledgeable [about credit reporting].”).
201
Campbell, supra note 6, at 1554.
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poorer and less educated households that make mistakes] permits an
equilibrium . . . in which confusing financial products generate a
cross-subsidy from naive to sophisticated households, and in which no
[other] market participant has an incentive to eliminate this cross202
subsidy.”
Available evidence supports these observations about the disparate
impact of consumer mistakes across different socioeconomic
203
groups.
Evidence suggests that better-educated, richer consumers
make fewer mistakes in the home mortgage market. For example,
Susan Woodward found that consumers with a college education
avoid mistakes that cost less sophisticated consumers $1500 on aver204
age in broker fees.
In a more recent study, Woodward found that
offers made by brokers to borrowers without a college education are
205
$1100 higher on average.
Robert Van Order et al. found that “lowincome [mortgage] borrowers are less likely to prepay when it is op206
In the credit cards market, recent evitimal for them to do so.”
dence shows that poorer consumers make more mistakes. Using a
rich data set covering almost 90,000 individuals, Nadia Massoud, Anthony Saunders, and Barry Scholnick found that poorer consumers
were more likely to incur unnecessary late fees and overlimit fees even
when they had sufficient money in their deposit accounts so that they
207
could have avoided these costs.
The study accounted for the possibility that funds in deposit accounts are being held as precautionary
208
balances.
202
203

Id. at 1555.
For example, Essene and Apgar state that

the recent rise in mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures suggests that some
households are taking on debt that they have little or no capacity to repay . . . ,
[and/or] taking out mortgages that . . . are not suitable for their needs. . . .
[T]he concentration of foreclosures in many of the nation’s lowest-income
and economically vulnerable neighborhoods threatens to reverse recent gains
in efforts to expand homeownership opportunities for all.
ESSENE & APGAR, supra note 94, at i; see also Willis, supra note 90, at 725-27 (explaining
how creative loan structuring can help or hurt consumers depending on their sophistication).
204
Woodward, supra note 108, at 2.
205
WOODWARD, supra note 100, at ix, 49.
206
Van Order et al., supra note 109, at 21.
207
See Massoud, Saunders & Scholnick, supra note 88, at 33 (concluding that
poorer individuals pay fees due to inattention and mistake rather than financial difficulty).
208
See id. at 14 (suggesting that “individuals with low cash flows may hold additional deposits as precautionary balances”).
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There is also evidence of disparate impact across different racial
209
groups.
Studies have shown persistent disparities in the share of
subprime lending made to African-American and Hispanic borrowers
210
versus similarly situated whites.
A study by the Federal Reserve
Board, evaluating 177,487 subprime loans, suggested the possibility
that “minority borrowers are incurring prices on their loans that are
211
higher than is warranted by their credit characteristics.”
Another
study, based on the Federal Reserve data, found that “AfricanAmerican and Latino borrowers are at greater risk of receiving higherrate loans than white borrowers, even after controlling for legitimate
212
risk factors.”
A third study by the Survey Research Center at the

209

See WILLIAM APGAR, AMAL BENDIMERAD & REN S. ESSENE, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS.
STUDIES, HARVARD UNIV., MORTGAGE MARKET CHANNELS AND FAIR LENDING: AN
ANALYSIS OF HMDA DATA 1-2 (2007), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/
publications/finance/mm07-2_mortgage_market_channels.pdf (evaluating competing
claims about the causes of observed differences in mortgage lending outcomes along
racial lines); Massoud, Saunders & Scholnick, supra note 88, at 9 (describing the practice of “redlining,” where banks make mortgage decisions based on the racial composition of neighborhoods); Editorial, Subprime in Black and White, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17,
2007, at A26 (arguing that lawmakers must aggressively investigate the existence of racial discrimination by lenders).
210
See BRADFORD CALVIN, CTR. FOR CMTY. CHANGE, RISK OR RACE? RACIAL DISPARITIES AND THE SUBPRIME REFINANCE MARKET 6-8 (2002), available at http://
butera-andrews.com/legislative-updates/directory/Background-Reports/Center%20for
%20Community%20Change%20Report.pdf (positing a direct relationship between
disparities in subprime lending and income that exists throughout all regions and
metropolitan areas of the United States); FISHBEIN & WOODALL, supra note 94, at 24
(showing the increased likelihood of African-American and Hispanic homeowners receiving payment option mortgages); U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV. & U.S. DEP’T
OF THE TREASURY, CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING 35 (2000), available
at http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/treasrpt.pdf (noting that “black borrowers accounted for 19 percent of all subprime refinance loans but only 5 percent of
overall refinance mortgages”); Paul Calem, Kevin Gillen & Susan Wachter, The
Neighborhood Distribution of Subprime Mortgage Lending, 29 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 393,
401-404 (2004) (examining racial disparity in subprime lending in Philadelphia and
Chicago, and finding the highest concentration of subprime loans among AfricanAmerican homeowners).
211
Robert B. Avery, Glenn B. Canner & Robert E. Cook, New Information Reported
Under HMDA and Its Application in Fair Lending Enforcement, 91 FED. RES. BULL. 344, 381,
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2005/summer05_hmda.pdf.
This study did not offer any firm conclusions regarding the illegal predatory targeting
of protected classes, choosing instead to simply note that Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act (HMDA) data alone are “insufficient to account fully for racial or ethnic differences in the incidence of higher-priced lending . . . .” Id. at 379.
212
DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, UNFAIR
LENDING: THE EFFECT OF RACE AND ETHNICITY ON THE PRICE OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGES 3 (2006), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/rr011exec-Unfair_
Lending-0506.pdf.
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University of Michigan found that “black homeowners are significantly
more likely to have prepayment penalties or balloon payments attached to their mortgages than non-black homeowners, even after
213
controlling for age, income, gender, and creditworthiness.”
And a
fourth study, by Susan Woodward, found that black borrowers pay an
additional $415 in mortgage fees and Latino borrowers pay an addi214
tional $365 in mortgage fees.
In addition, consumer shopping behavior differs across racial
groups. “African-Americans are more than 50 percent less likely than
Hispanics and the general population to shop for an equity lender at
215
their own bank, savings and loan or credit union,” which generally
offer more favorable rates. Furthermore, studies have shown that African-Americans “systematically underestimate their credit worthiness”
216
and are less likely to apply for mortgage financing. As a result, African-Americans as a group are “more likely to obtain a loan after being
‘sold a loan,’” which was crafted and targeted at them, “than as a re217
sult of having searched for a loan.”
A recent survey conducted by a Hispanic civil rights and advocacy
group, the National Council of La Raza, found that 56% of Hispanic
households use credit cards, and that nearly 77% of Hispanic credit
card users carry a balance on their credit cards, compared to 45% of
218
all credit card users.
Moreover, 19.3% of Hispanics describe their
credit card debt situation as “burdensome and not enough money to
pay down [the balance]” and 11.4% report that they are “maxed out
219
and can’t use [their cards].” One of the major problems, according
to the National Council of La Raza, is that nearly 22% of Hispanic

213

Michael S. Barr et al., Who Gets Lost in the Subprime Mortgage Fallout? Homeowners
in Low- and Moderate-Income Neighborhoods 2-3 (April 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1121215.
214
WOODWARD, supra note 100, at ix, 45-46.
215
AARP, 2003 CONSUMER EXPERIENCE SURVEY: INSIGHTS ON CONSUMER CREDIT
BEHAVIOR, FRAUD AND FINANCIAL PLANNING 41 (2003), available at http://assets.aarp.org/
rgcenter/consume/cons_exp.pdf.
216
ESSENE & APGAR, supra note 94, at 23; see also Campbell, supra note 6, at 1584
(finding that race is correlated with prompt refinancing).
217
ESSENE & APGAR, supra note 94, at 23. See also Morgenson, supra note 95 (stating that in December 2006, in an agreement with the New York State Attorney General, Countrywide agreed “to compensate black and Latino borrowers to whom it had
improperly given high-cost loans in 2004”).
218
Latino Credit Card Use: Debt Trap or Ticket to Prosperity?, ISSUE BRIEF: EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY Feb. 15, 2007, at 1 (Nat’l Council of La Raza, Wash., D.C.), available at
http://www.nclr.org/files/44288_file_IB17_ExecuSumm_FNL.pdf.
219
Id. at 2 (alterations in original).
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borrowers have no credit score, which makes it difficult for them to
220
obtain credit at favorable rates.
Payday lenders and subprime mortgage companies target minority
neighborhoods. In Chicago, for example, 41% of the city’s subprime
refinancing occurs in black neighborhoods, although only 10% of the
221
overall refinancing takes place in these same neighborhoods.
An
Illinois study found that there were 37% more payday loans issued in
222
minority neighborhoods than in white neighborhoods.
The presence of these lenders in poorer, minority neighborhoods is not surprising. After all, payday loans and subprime mortgages are designed
to extend credit to borrowers who are denied access to traditional
credit products. Nevertheless, the broad exposure of minorities to
payday loans and subprime mortgages implies a broad exposure to the
risks associated with these products.
Women may also be disproportionately harmed by unsafe financial products. A recent survey found that “two-thirds of women
graded themselves at C or lower in their knowledge of financial ser223
vices or products.”
Another recent study found that older women
display much lower levels of financial literacy than the older popula224
tion as a whole. An inadequate understanding of financial products
is likely to result in more welfare-reducing mistakes.
Finally, there is evidence that legal intervention aimed at curing
mistakes in consumer credit markets does not help all consumers to
the same extent. In particular, there is evidence that “the beneficial
effects of [TILA] in enabling consumers to better shop for attractive
225
loans may have been limited to well-educated, affluent borrowers.”
And the recent Federal Reserve study, which examined the efficacy of
TILA disclosures, concluded:
[O]ne important finding has been that there are a number of consum-

220

Id.
U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., UNEQUAL BURDEN: INCOME & RACIAL DISPARITIES IN SUBPRIME LENDING IN AMERICA 5 (2000), available at http://www.huduser.org/
publications/pdf/unequal_full.pdf.
222
MARTI WILES & DANIEL IMMERGLUCK, WOODSTOCK INST., REINVESTMENT ALERT
NUMBER 14: UNREGULATED PAYDAY LENDING PULLS VULNERABLE CONSUMERS INTO
SPIRALING DEBT 7 (2000), available at http://woodstockinst.org/document/alert.pdf.
223
John Leland, Baltimore Finds Subprime Crisis Snags Women, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15,
2008, at A1 (citing a 2006 survey by Prudential Financial).
224
Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, Planning and Financial Literacy: How Do
Women Fare? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W13750, 2008),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13750.pdf.
225
Hynes & Posner, supra note 30, at 194 (citing a collection of studies).
221
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ers who lack fundamental understanding of how credit card accounts
work. These participants tended to be those with lower educational levels, and were likely subprime consumers (i.e., those with low credit
scores). Unfortunately, this population is generally charged higher fees
and interest rates than other consumers, and thus has the most at stake
in understanding how these charges are calculated and how they can be
226
avoided.

The burden of credit-market imperfections are not spread evenly
across economic, educational, or racial groups. The wealthy are insulated from many credit traps, while the vulnerability of working- and
middle-class families increases. For those closer to the economic margin, a single economic mistake—a credit card with an interest rate
that unexpectedly escalates to 29.99% or misplaced trust in a broker
who recommends a high-priced mortgage—can trigger a downward
economic spiral from which no recovery is possible.
D. Summary: The Markets for Consumer Credit Products Are Failing
Theory predicts and data confirm that markets for credit products
are failing. Consumers, their families, their neighbors, and their
communities are paying a high price for systematic cognitive errors.
Creditors have aligned their products to exploit such errors, driving
up costs for many consumers. Competition for manufactured products has produced a wide array of consumer-friendly features: ease of
use, lower prices, more style, and hundreds of innovations that consumers have enjoyed. Competition in the credit market has similarly
produced valuable products and features. But it has also produced an
array of risky products and unsafe features. Twenty years ago, no one
had heard of universal default, overlimit fees, liar’s loans, teaser mortgages, payday rollovers, or the dozens of other innovations that have
exploited consumers’ imperfect understanding of complex credit
products. Regulation assured that no manufacturer had to compete
with another manufacturer who was willing to produce an unsafe
product for less money. But regulation has not built the same floor
under financial products. To restore efficiency to consumer credit
markets, the same kind of basic safety regulation is needed.

226

DISCLOSURE EFFICACY STUDY, supra note 50, at 52.
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II. THE SOLUTION
A. Existing Responses and Why They Failed
The lynchpin of consumer credit regulation was usury law. Harking back to biblical times, through to the foundation of the American
colonies, and later of the American states, usury laws regulated credit
by imposing a cap on the interest rate that any lender could charge.
With a clear upper bound on the price of credit, incentives to raise
prices while obscuring the total cost of borrowing were low. In 1978, a
Supreme Court interpretation of ambiguous language in a national
227
banking law effectively abolished state usury laws.
By the 1990s,
product innovation, from payday lending to universal default to creative mortgage financing, took root without much regulatory scrutiny.
While the states still play some role, state law has largely been preempted by federal legislation. We begin our survey of existing solutions with an overview of common law approaches to the regulation of
consumer credit. After discussing the shortcomings of the ex post,
common law approach, we turn to ex ante regulation. We discuss the
multiple-regulators problem and the regulatory arbitrage opportunity
it creates, starting with federal versus state regulators and ending with
the multiplicity of federal regulators. Beyond the multiple-regulators
problem, we argue that no single regulator has the necessary combination of motivation and authority to effectively regulate consumer
credit products.
1. Ex Post Judicial Intervention
a. Existing Ex Post Solutions
There are essentially two ex post judicial tools available to protect
consumers. The first is the common law of contracts, and the second
is the fallback protection of bankruptcy. Both offer consumers some
protection against dangerous credit products. But as ways to overcome the dangers facing consumers in the financial marketplace,
both have serious systemic limitations.

227

In 1978, the Court allowed a Nebraska bank to export credit card rates to Minnesota. Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp., 439 U.S.
299, 318 (1978). The credit card companies soon generalized the principle. Citibank
moved its operations to South Dakota, which had a high interest rate cap, and Delaware soon raised its usury rate to attract more credit card business.
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Consumer credit transactions are regulated by the general law of
contracts. The main doctrinal vehicle for policing these transactions
228
is the unconscionability doctrine.
This doctrine gives courts broad
power to strike down contract terms and entire contracts that shock
the conscience and are the product of a flawed bargaining proce229
dure.
Unconscionability review is most commonly applied to con230
tracts between consumers and sophisticated corporations, and it has
231
been used to police credit contracts.
Yet courts have been very cir232
cumspect in applying unconscionability review to credit contracts.
As explained below, the reluctance of common law judges to intervene in credit transactions is justified by institutional, doctrinal, and
233
procedural considerations.
Moreover, with respect to interest rates
and possibly other contractual provisions that form the centerpiece of
credit contracts, unconscionability review is likely preempted by fed234
eral law.

228

See U.C.C. § 2-302 (2007); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981).
See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.28, at 314 (3d ed. 1999) (explaining
the doctrine of unconscionability generally as it is invoked by consumers, and discussing its use in franchise disputes).
230
See, e.g., id. (discussing the application of unconscionability to contracts when
there is disparity of sophistication among the parties).
231
See Posner, supra note 199, at 304-05 (discussing the application of unconscionability analysis in credit cases where lenders set exorbitantly high credit prices to offset
risk).
232
For example, courts have generally rejected unconscionability claims made
against arbitration clauses in credit card contracts. See, e.g., Arriaga v. Cross Country
Bank, 163 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1194-95 (S.D. Cal. 2001) (finding that a credit card contract’s arbitration clause was neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable);
Bank One, N.A. v. Coates, 125 F. Supp. 2d 819, 830-36 (S.D. Mass. 2001) (ruling
against unconscionability even where an arbitration clause required plaintiff to bear
arbitration fees and restricted available remedies); Marsh v. First USA Bank, N.A., 103
F. Supp. 2d 909, 920 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (holding that the arbitration was not unconscionable though the clause was not bargained for). Such claims have been upheld,
but only in extreme cases. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., 298 F.3d
778, 785 (9th Cir. 2002) (showing that an arbitration clause that exempts drafter’s
claims is most likely to be unconscionable); Lozada v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc., 91
F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1105 (W.D. Mich. 2000) (“[A]n arbitration provision is substantively
unconscionable because it waives class remedies, as well as declaratory and injunctive
relief.”); see also Korobkin, supra note 30, at 1274-75 (discussing arbitration-clause unconscionability cases).
233
See infra Part II.A.1.b.
234
See infra Part II.A.2.a; see also Cade v. H & R Block, Inc., No. 1454-21, 1993 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 19041, at *15-18 (D.S.C. 1993) (reviewing the preemption of state unconscionability claims for refund-anticipation loans, but essentially stating that states’ attempts to regulate credit card interest rates and other contractual provisions would be
similarly preempted).
229
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With the prevalence of penalty fees in credit transactions, a second common law doctrine—the penalty doctrine—could also be used
to police consumer credit contracts. Contract law precludes the specification of damages for nonperformance that exceeds the true harm
to the breached-against party, or a reasonable ex ante (at the time of
contracting) estimate of such harm. Such excessive damages are con235
sidered an unlawful penalty, and as such are not enforceable.
At
least in some cases, the large penalties specified in consumer credit
contracts clearly exceed the actual harm caused to the lender, as well
as any reasonable ex ante estimate of such harm. For example, when
a credit-card holder is required to pay a $30 fee for missing the due
date on a $10 balance by only a day, the harm to the issuer is smaller,
probably much smaller, than $30. The attempt to collect $30 is ar236
guably an unlawful penalty.
Thus far, however, few courts have so
237
ruled.
The ever-present option that a financially troubled consumer will
file for bankruptcy and discharge all outstanding debt obligations imposes some regulatory oversight on consumer credit markets. In theory, lenders can be deterred from offering unsafe credit products by
the threat that debt incurred through such unsafe products will be
discharged in bankruptcy. The potential efficacy of such a threat is
evident from lenders’ intense lobbying to restrict consumers’ access to
bankruptcy. These lobbying efforts have been successful. Recently, in
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of

235

See U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (2007); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356

(1981).
236

One commentator has even questioned the constitutionality of credit card late
fees. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Are Credit Card Late Fees Unconstitutional?, 15 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 457, 475-487 (2006) (arguing that state and federal laws regulating
credit card penalties may allow credit card companies to impose late fees on consumers that far exceed the limits imposed by the Supreme Court’s decision in State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Cambpbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003)).
237
See, e.g., Hitz v. First Interstate Bank, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 890 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)
Beasley v. Wells Fargo Bank, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 448 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that
bank’s “late” and “overlimit” fees were illegal liquidated damages in a class action suit);
see generally Gary D. Spivey, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Provision Imposing
“Late Charge” or Similar Exaction for Delay in Making Periodic Payments on Note, Mortgage, or
Instalment Sale Contract, 63 A.L.R. 3d 50, 59 (1975) (discussing courts’ interpretations of
credit card fees as enforceable liquidated damages and not additional interest).
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238

2005 (BAPCPA) , Congress constrained consumers’ ability to dis239
charge credit card debt.
Before BAPCPA was signed into law, courts struggled with the issue of debt dischargeability. In the credit card debt context, this
struggle was often initiated by issuers’ attempts to prevent dischargeability by accusing consumers of fraud under 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(2)(A). Over time, the courts limited the scope of the fraud
240
exception. For example, the Supreme Court, in Field v. Mans, formulated a subjective test, according to which the debtor’s intent to
repay is sufficient to make the debt dischargeable, precluding the
creditor from making an allegation that the debtor defrauded the
241
company by using a credit card when he was unable to pay.
The courts have also scrutinized the marketing techniques and
screening procedures employed by credit card issuers, ruling that, in
some cases, overzealous solicitation without sufficient inquiry into the
consumer’s ability to pay precludes any claim of nondischargeabil242
ity.
Scrutiny of the contractual design itself could be the next step.
Courts could use unsafe product design as a shield against a lender’s

238

Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
Issuers have also taken to the courts, increasing their challenges against the
dischargeability of credit card debt based on 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2006). See
Margaret Howard, Shifting Risk and Fixing Blame: The Vexing Problem of Credit Card Obligations in Bankruptcy, 75 AM. BANKR. L.J. 63, 110-140 (2001) (addressing the common
law requirement of justifiable reliance in cases involving fraudulent debtors, and arguing for a rigorous standard of fraud).
240
516 U.S. 59, 77 (1995).
241
Cf. David F. Snow, The Dischargeability of Credit Card Debt: New Developments and
the Need for a New Direction, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 63, 79-80 (1998) (arguing that when Field
v. Mans found credit card debt dischargeable irrespective of the debtor’s financial
condition the court departed from the common law standard); Alane A. Becket, Fifth
Circuit Sets Its Standard for Credit Card Non-dischargeability, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2001,
at 14 (2001) (analyzing the Fifth Circuit’s standard for credit card nondischargeability,
established in In re Mercer, 211 F.3d 214 (5th Cir. 2000)); Richard H. Gibson, Credit
Card Dischargeability: Two Cheers for the Common Law and Some Modest Proposals for Legislative Reform, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 129, 153-55 (2000) (explaining the three-step process
for applying the legal standard of justifiable reliance established in Field v. Mans to
common law credit card cases); John D. Sheehan, The 9th Circuit Clarifies Intent on Credit
Card Debt Dischargeability, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July/Aug. 1997, at 16 (1997) (reassessing
the Ninth Circuit’s use of a totality of the circumstances standard to determine fraudulent intent in light of Field v. Mans).
242
See Snow, supra note 241, at pt. III.B.3 (stating that where courts have considered industry credit screening practices, they have found that the creditors failed to
establish justifiable reliance); see also Howard, supra note 239, at 79-80 (stating that the
behavior of the creditor should also be considered in determining dischargeability, as
it is in common law fraud).
239
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claim of nondischargeability. In addition, unsafe product design can
theoretically be used not only as a shield, but also as a sword to ex243
clude credit card issuers from any recovery in bankruptcy.
Once
again, however, the protection is more theoretical than actual.
Contract law and bankruptcy law together provide some protection for consumers who get into trouble with dangerous credit products. A consumer may raise some defenses in contract law to avoid the
obligation to pay, or, if the impact is severe enough, the consumer
may file for bankruptcy to discharge all debts, including those involving dangerous credit products. This protection, however, has substantial limits.
b. The Failure of Existing Ex Post Solutions
The ex post common law approach is not well suited for the regulation of consumer credit markets. It is not surprising that courts have
been reluctant to try to regulate these markets using general contract
law doctrines and bankruptcy law rules. The problem is not with particular judges; it is systemic. Concerns about institutional competence, doctrinal limitations and procedural barriers justify the observed judicial restraint.
i. Institutional Competence
Effective regulation of consumer credit markets requires information that is more readily accessible to regulatory agencies than to
courts. For example, while the penalty doctrine may well be used in
extreme cases to strike down late-fee provisions in credit card con244
tracts, courts will often find it difficult to conduct the comprehensive analysis of an issuer’s cost structure that would be required to
separate illegal penalties from reasonable liquidated damages. Moreover, in many cases, even a thorough understanding of a single
lender’s business is insufficient for effective regulation. Rather, a
broader perspective is needed—a perspective that encompasses market structure and demand characteristics. As the required informa-

243

Cf. In re Jordan, 91 B.R. 673, 680 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (showing a debtor objection to a proof of claim in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding asserting illegal late
charges imposed by a creditor). An even more extreme approach, borrowing from the
concept of lender liability in the commercial-bankruptcy context, would render the
issuer liable to the bankrupt consumer’s other creditors. See 5-79 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE. ¶ 79.05 (2003).
244
See supra Part II.A.1.a.
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tion and analysis extend beyond the facts of any specific case, the relative institutional advantage shifts from courts to regulatory agencies.
The single-plaintiff structure of contract litigation makes inquiry into
a range of different practices very difficult, particularly when some of
the practices may have affected the particular plaintiff who is asserting
a problem and some may not have. This plaintiff-centered perspective
further limits a court’s view of the problem.
The comparative institutional disadvantage of courts has been
previously noted in the more general context of consumer contracts.
Lewis Kornhauser argued that imperfections in consumer markets
may be more amenable to legislative rather than to judicial correc245
tion. With respect to disclosure regulation, Richard Craswell has recently argued that common law courts applying contract law doctrine
on a case-by-case basis are at an institutional disadvantage compared
246
with regulators who enjoy a broader market perspective.
Kip Viscusi, Richard Epstein and Alan Schwartz have similarly argued that
safety warnings should be designed by regulatory agencies, not by
247
common law courts.
Lawyers are well schooled in the notion of using single-plaintiff litigation to right legal wrongs. But in the field of
regulation of consumer credit markets, there is substantial consensus
that such litigation is ill suited to produce the most effective results.
ii. Doctrinal Limitations
The main doctrinal tool for policing consumer credit markets is
the contract-law doctrine of unconscionability. The limits of the unconscionability doctrine, largely shared by alternative doctrines, explain the inadequacy of an ex post, common law approach to the

245

See Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 1180-81 (arguing that market imperfections
leading to unconscionable contracts may be more amenable to legislative rather than
to judicial correction).
246
Richard Craswell, Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure
in Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92 VA. L. REV. 565, 592-93 (2006); see also Beales et al.,
supra note 30, at 528; Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Information, supra note 37, at 1456-59
(arguing that case-by-case judicial decisions are a poor mechanism for implementing
general bans due to the deciding courts’ limited access to important information).
247
See RICHARD EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 110-12 (1980); W. KIP
VISCUSI, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 155–56 (1991) (arguing that a common law
establishment of warnings will reduce their value by causing firms to be overly conservative, and recommending a standardized warning system); Alan Schwartz, Proposals for
Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 398 & n.90 (1988)
(questioning the effectiveness of common law warnings because of jury speculation on
the adequacy of warnings).
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regulation of consumer credit markets. As currently interpreted, the
unconscionability doctrine is too narrow to address many of the problems in the consumer credit market. For example, it would not be
considered unconscionable for a credit card issuer to offer consumers
a choice between (1) a credit card with a zero-percent teaser rate and
a high long-term rate, and (2) a credit card with no teaser rate but a
lower long-term rate. This strategy might impose significant costs on
ill-informed consumers, but would never come close to the standards
necessary to find unconscionability.
A possible response is to interpret unconscionability more
broadly. Such a move, however, runs a substantial risk of doing more
harm than good. Substantial expansion of the doctrine of unconscionability would have consequences far outside the realm of credit
products and well into markets that may not suffer from the same defects. In theory, courts could develop a special, broader unconscionability doctrine that would apply only to credit contracts. More generally, courts could develop a series of market-specific unconscionability
doctrines for each consumer market. These market-specific doctrines
would be based on a fact-intensive inquiry of market conditions and
practices. But such an approach would entail a sharp departure from
current unconscionability jurisprudence—a departure that institutional and procedural considerations advise against.
Doctrinal constraints similarly limit the efficacy of regulation
through bankruptcy law. Specifically, the courts are not free to write
on a clean slate. Provisions designed to protect debtors from overreaching creditors are often tangled enough to leave plenty of room
for those creditors to make strong claims for collection. The courts’
struggle with Section 523(a)(2)(A), for example, has not been an easy
248
one.

248

Compare In re Dougherty, 84 B.R. 653, 657 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1988) (formulating a
totality of the circumstances test examining a nonexclusive list of twelve objective factors relevant to dischargeability), with In re Eashai, 87 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 1996)
(rejecting the totality of the circumstances test from In re Dougherty and requiring proof
of false representation, intent to deceive, justifiable reliance, and actual damages). See
generally In re Rembert, 141 F.3d 277, 281 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating that the use of a
credit card implies a representation of an intention but not an ability to pay); In re
Hashemi, 104 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 1997) (requiring creditor to show only that, as
a whole, relevant evidence indicates debtor intended to pay); In re Anastas, 94 F.3d
1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996) (interpreting “intent to deceive” factor to require investigation only of whether debtor intended to pay, not whether debtor had the ability to
pay); In re Ward, 857 F.2d 1082, 1084 (6th Cir. 1988) (requiring a credit check as a
precondition for justifiable reliance).
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iii. Procedural Barriers
Unlike harm caused by noncredit consumer products, which is
commonly a low-probability but high-magnitude harm, the harm
caused by consumer credit products is typically a high-probability, low249
magnitude harm.
An unsafe consumer credit product often harms
many consumers, but the harm to each consumer is usually small. As
a result, litigation is a far less effective tool to deal with dangerous financial products than to deal with dangerous physical products.
Credit card fees provide a ready example. Compared with their
reluctance to invoke the unconscionability doctrine, courts have been
somewhat more susceptible to penalty-doctrine claims raised against
250
various fees in consumer credit contracts.
Nonetheless, the sharp
growth in penalty fees over the past decade, and the increasing fraction of profits they produce for credit card issuers, suggest that consumer efforts to resist fee charges have had minimal impact across the
market. According to the GAO, late fees averaged $12.83 in 1995.
251
They soared 162%, to an average of $33.64 in 2005.
In 2005, penalty fees, which include late fees, overlimit fees, and a few others, ac252
counted for 7.2% of issuer revenues, or $7.88 billion.
While not all
these fees would be illegal if scrutinized under the current penalty
doctrine, this increase was produced in large part by late fees and
overlimit fees that are not always tied to the actual or estimated losses
the creditor suffers as a result of the consumer’s “breach.”
But the odds are small that these fees could be meaningfully challenged by lawsuit. A single fee is often small; the average late payment
253
fee imposed by credit card companies is now $35.
The aggregate
effect may be huge, but it makes little economic sense for any single
borrower to litigate such a modest amount. Even high interest
charges, which may seem huge to the borrower, would be dwarfed by
the costs of litigation and subsequent appeals. Families who have
problems with credit are unlikely to have the resources to pursue judicial remedies.

249

See supra Introduction.
In particular, several such claims have been accepted against late and overlimit
fees in credit card contracts. See supra note 237.
251
See GAO, INCREASED COMPLEXITY REPORT, supra note 18, at 18.
252
See eCID (the electronic version of Card Industry Directory), Analysis, Industry
Statistics section, http://www.cardforum.com/staticpage.html?pagename=ecidinfo.
253
Thomas Redman, Late Payment Fees, CARDTRAK.COM, Apr. 20, 2007,
http://www.cardtrak.com/news/2007/04/20/late_payment_fees.
250
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Other aspects of credit card practices further undercut the effectiveness of any judicial remedy for fee charges or other harmful terms.
The widespread inclusion of arbitration clauses in standard credit
card contracts inoculates lenders against the possibility of class action
lawsuits, which would otherwise change the economics of pursuing
254
debtor’s rights.
Other contract terms have similar effects. Forumselection clauses and contractual provisions to shift the cost of all attorneys’ fees to the loser can further increase the costs—and the
risks—of litigation as a meaningful way to protect borrowers.
Regulation through bankruptcy presents its own systemic problems. Even in bankruptcy court, which is often more informal, the
costs of litigation will far outstrip any benefits for many debtors, making resistance to creditors’ efforts to collect a problematic economic
calculation. BAPCPA further increased costs, driving up attorneys’
fees, increasing paperwork, creating time delays, and erecting extra
hurdles on the way to a discharge. Filing fees have also increased.
Even if consumers manage to scale all the newly erected barriers, they
discover that post-BAPCPA the courts’ power to protect consumers
has been limited. Because most credit card debt listed in bankruptcy
is currently discharged, bankruptcy courts have little room at the margins to influence the creditors’ bottom lines by declaring certain practices off limits. Perhaps the most significant limitation on the capacity
of the bankruptcy system to provide effective consumer regulation is
that relatively few consumers pass through its doors. Although bankruptcy filings have climbed over the past decade, the number of filers

254

See Korobkin, supra note 30, at 1274-75 (finding that courts generally uphold
arbitration clauses, though some have struck agreements that explicitly preclude class
actions). Arguably, this problem could be remedied by legislation or court rulings that
ensure access to class action litigation (or arbitration). Such legal reform is, however,
unlikely in the foreseeable future, given lenders’ relative political strength. Interestingly, arbitration clauses, and specifically arbitration clauses precluding class actions,
are much more common in consumer contracts than in business-to-business contracts.
See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical
Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly-Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL
L. REV. 335, 373 (2007) (noting that, although large corporations do not embrace arbitration in their agreements with other corporations, lenders and credit card issuers
insist on such clauses in consumer contracts); Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey Miller &
Emily L. Sherwin, Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in
Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871 (2008) (reporting
that more than three-quarters of contracts between studied companies and consumers
contained arbitration clauses, while less than 10% of the companies’ “negotiable, nonconsumer, nonemployment” contracts had similar clauses).
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and the amount of debt they carry are mere specks on the overall $2.5
255
trillion consumer credit industry.
2. Ex Ante Regulation
The effectiveness of ex post judicial regulation of consumer credit
products is severely limited. But ex ante regulation, as currently constructed, faces substantial limits as well. First, state law, which in many
cases took the lead on consumer protection issues, is being increasingly preempted by federal law. Second, current ex ante regulation
excessively relies on legislation, which cannot effectively respond to
market innovation. Third, and most importantly, despite the multiplicity of regulators, there is no single regulator that has both the authority and motivation to police the safety of consumer credit products.
a. The Erosion of State Power
The United States has a dual banking system. This dual system allows financial institutions a variety of options for organizing themselves under state or federal law. They may become nationally- or
256
state-chartered banks, thrifts, or credit unions. This variety provides
lenders with some choice between federal and state regulation. In
particular, banks choosing a federal charter can do business in a state,

255

See Federal Reserve Statistical Release, G19: Consumer Credit (June 6, 2008),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/20080606/ (listing the total outstanding
consumer credit for the month of April, 2008 as being in excess of 2.5 trillion dollars).
256
One commentator has described banks’ different options for organization:
In commercial banks, for example, there are four possible patterns of regulation: (1) national banks, federally chartered by the Comptroller of the Currency, which automatically are members of the Federal Reserve System and insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) (currently, most
of the very large banks are national banks); (2) state chartered banks, also
members of the Federal Reserve System and therefore insured by the FDIC;
(3) state banks insured by the FDIC but not members of the Federal Reserve
System (most of the numerous small state banks are in this category); (4) state
banks operating without federal deposit insurance. Few banks are in this last
category because lack of federal deposit insurance is seen as competitively too
disadvantageous.
Kenneth E. Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30
STAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1977) (footnotes omitted); see also Christopher L. Peterson, Preemption, Agency Cost Theory, and Predatory Lending by Banking Agents: Are Federal Regulators
Biting Off More Than They Can Chew?, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 515, 515-16 (2007) (describing
the creation of the dual banking system in the United States).
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but avoid regulation under that state’s laws—particularly under that
state’s consumer protection laws.
In the past, all financial institutions—federally chartered national
banks and state banks as well—were subject to the laws of the bor257
rower’s state, especially to the usury laws in the borrower’s state.
This changed in the late 1970s when the United States Supreme
Court, interpreting the word “located” in section 85 of the National
258
Bank Act (NBA), decided that national banks are governed by the
usury laws of the state where their headquarters are located, not by
259
the usury laws of the state where the customer is located.
In 1996,

257

William Eskridge, collects and discusses a number of sources regarding the history of usury laws. William Eskridge, One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The Need for Mortgage Rules Consonant with the Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale and
Loan Transaction, 70 VA. L. REV. 1083 (1984). These include Jeremiah W. Blydenburgh, A Treatise on the Law of Usury (1844), which reprints mid-nineteenth-century
usury laws from each state; Sidney Homer, A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES (2d ed.
1977), which traces and analyzes interest rates across various investment instruments
across the United States from the colonial period into the 1970s; and Franklin W.
Ryan, USURY AND USURY LAWS (1924), which chronicles the debate over the repeal of
usury laws in the mid–nineteenth century, and describes early-twentieth-century attempts to combat loan-sharking and other “immoral” lending practices.
258
12 U.S.C. § 85 (2006).
259
See id. (“Any association may take, receive, reserve, and charge on any loan or
discount made, or upon any notes, bills of exchange, or other evidences of debt, interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State, Territory, or District where the bank is
located . . . .”). In 1978, the Supreme Court held that this provision of the National
Bank Act gave national banks “most favored lender” status in their home state and also
allowed national banks to “export” their home-state interest rates to borrowers residing
in other states. See Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp.,
439 U.S. 299, 301 (1978) (affirming the Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding that the
NBA “authorizes a national bank based in one state to charge its out-of-state credit-card
customers an interest rate . . . allowed by its home state, even though that rate is
greater than that permitted by the state of the bank’s nonresident customers”). For a
comprehensive analysis of the “most favored lender” and “exportation” doctrines, see
Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding Exportation Doctrine and Its Effect
on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REV. 518, 544-617 (2004). Congress
granted “most favored lender” status and “exportation” authority to FDIC-insured state
banks and thrift institutions in 1980. See id. at 565-67 (discussing 12 U.S.C. § 1831d,
which applies to all FDIC-insured state banks); id. at 601-03 (discussing 12 U.S.C. §
1463(g)(1), which applies to federally chartered thrift institutions). See also Credit Card
Practices: Current Consumer and Regulatory Issues: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Financial
Institutions and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 110th Cong. 70
(2007) (written testimony of Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School) [hereinafter Wilmarth Testimony] (describing the
holding of Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp.). The
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, gives
the OCC the power to use the NBA, a federal statute, to preempt state law. See Mark
Furletti, The Debate over the National Bank Act and the Preemption of State Efforts to Regulate
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the Court extended this ruling to any payment compensating a creditor for an extension of credit, including numerical periodic rates, annual and cash-advance fees, bad-check fees, overlimit fees, and late260
payment fees.
As a result, state interest rate regulation has been effectively preempted. Currently, any lender with a federal bank charter can locate its operations in a state with high usury rates (e.g.,
South Dakota or Delaware) and then export that interest rate to cus261
tomers located anywhere else in the country.
States have become
powerless to protect their citizens from such lending practices going
262
on within their borders. It is noteworthy that state-level interest rate
and fee regulation is not preempted by corresponding federal regulation. Rather, the preemption follows from the federally defined rules
applicable only to federally chartered banks. Specifically, the NBA
rule that interstate lending is subject to the laws of the state in which
the lender is headquartered triggered interstate regulatory competition to attract lenders, and this competition effectively eliminated
state-level price regulation.
In addition, direct federal preemption works to undermine state
law in areas other than interest rate and fee regulation. Recently, the
federal government has used its powers under the Supremacy Clause
263
of the U.S. Constitution to preempt more and more state law.
In
2004, the OCC issued a regulation (the “activities preemption regulation”) that expanded the scope of preemption. The OCC insulated
all banks carrying its charter from any state laws that it deemed to

Credit Cards, 77 TEMPLE L. REV. 425, 426 (2004) (citing repeated rulings by various
courts upholding the OCC’s power to preempt state law under the NBA).
260
See Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 744-45 (1996) (upholding the validity of 12 C.F.R. § 7.4001(a)); see also Schiltz, supra note 259, at 560-65
(discussing Smiley and the OCC’s expansive interpretation of “interest” under 12 U.S.C.
§ 85); Wilmarth Testimony, supra note 259, at 70).
261
“In addition, the OCC issued a ruling in 1998 that allows a national bank to
‘export’ the ‘interest’ allowed by the law of any state in which the bank maintains either its main office or a branch.” Wilmarth Testimony, supra note 259, at 70; see also
Schiltz, supra note 259, at 553-56 (discussing OCC Interpretive Letter. No. 822 (Feb.
17, 1998)). On the deregulation of interest rates in the home mortgage market, see
Eskridge, supra note 257, at 1107-10; Willis, supra note 90, at 718.
262
On regulatory competition in the banking system, see Scott, supra note 256.
Such regulatory competition generates negative interjurisdictional externalities. South
Dakota enjoys tax revenues from banks that choose to locate in the state, while those
banks enjoy profits generated by interest rates charged to customers in California and
Massachusetts—profits that legislatures in California and Massachusetts specifically
prohibit. Banks in haven states impose costs that are borne largely by consumers in
other states.
263
Peterson, supra note 256, at 516.
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“‘obstruct, impair, or condition a national bank’s ability to fully exercise its Federally authorized powers’ in four broadly-defined areas—
viz., real estate lending, lending not secured by real estate, deposit264
taking, and other ‘operations.’”
This regulation cancels out much
265
state-level consumer protection law.
It is not surprising that a number of banks have switched from
state to federal charters. Examples of such regulatory arbitrage are
the recent decisions by JPMorgan Chase, HSBC, and Bank of Montreal (Harris Trust) to convert from state to national charters—
264

Wilmarth Testimony, supra note 259, at 72 (quoting 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4008 (lending not secured by real estate), 7.4007 (deposit-taking), 7.4009 (other “operations”),
34.4(a) (real estate lending) (2008)). These regulations were recently upheld by the
Supreme Court. See Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1564-65 (2007).
See also JONATHAN R. MACEY ET AL., BANKING LAW AND REGULATION ch. 7, sec. E. (4th
ed., 2008); Elizabeth R. Schiltz, Damming Watters: Channeling the Power of Federal Preemption of State Consumer Banking Laws, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1028886; Robert M. Morgenthau, Who’s Watching
Your Money?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2007, at A21. For a comprehensive analysis and critique of the OCC’s rules, see Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC’s Preemption Rules Exceed
the Agency’s Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer
Protection, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225 (2004) [hereinafter Wilmarth, OCC’s
Preemption Rules]. The OCC’s activities-preemption regulation is closely similar to preemptive rules previously issued by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS). See 12
C.F.R. §§ 545.2, 557.11, 560.2. These rules are discussed in Wilmarth, OCC’s Preemption
Rules, supra, at 283-84. A previous OCC regulation, 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006, recently upheld
by the Supreme Court, extends federal preemption to state-chartered operating subsidiaries of national banks. See Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1572-73 (2007).
265
See Wilmarth Testimony, supra note 259, at 72-73 (arguing that the OCC only
recognizes state laws when they increase the power of national banks); MACEY ET AL.,
supra note 264, ch. 7, sec. E (“[The OCC preemption rules] significantly undercut the
states’ ability to promulgate effective consumer protection laws, since those laws may
not apply to national banks or to their operating subsidiaries.”). The precise extent to
which state consumer protection laws are preempted is unclear. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, OCC PREEMPTION RULES: OCC SHOULD FURTHER CLARIFY THE
APPLICABILITY OF STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS TO NATIONAL BANKS (GAO-06387) 10-17 (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06387.pdf (questioning the applicability of state consumer protection laws in light of OCC preemption
power); see also, Wilmarth Testimony supra note 259, at 73-74 (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra) (noting the GAO’s concern regarding the application of
state consumer protection laws). But even when state law is not preempted, state-level
enforcement is substantially impaired by the OCC’s “visitorial powers” preemption
regulation, which gives the OCC exclusive power to enforce both state and federal laws
against national banks. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000; see also Wilmarth Testimony, supra note
259, at 74 (“The combined effect of the OCC’s preemption regulations is to make the
OCC the final arbiter of the scope of national bank powers, as well as the sole enforcement agency with respect to national banks and their operating subsidiaries.”);
Wilmarth, supra note 264, at 228-29, 327-34 (discussing the regulation). The Second
Circuit recently confirmed the validity of that regulation. See Clearing House Ass’n v.
Cuomo, 510 F.3d 105, 120 (2d Cir. 2007).

2008]

Making Credit Safer

83

decisions that removed more than $1 trillion of banking assets from
the state-regulated banking system. In April 2006, the Bank of New
York, one of the largest remaining state banks, agreed to sell its 338
retail branches to JPMorgan Chase, thus merging one of the last large
state operations into a national bank. Arguably, these significant
structural changes in the banking industry were driven at least in part
by the favorable regulatory environment that the OCC created for na266
tional banks.
Mark Furletti of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia has observed that now almost any state statute designed to protect consum267
ers is preempted by federal law.
State law is reserved for statechartered banks. State laws, once the principle source of consumer
protection, can offer local citizens only modest protection. Many
credit practices that a state may deem fraudulent, deceptive, or otherwise unlawful will be nonetheless permitted within state borders
whenever federally chartered institutions are involved.
The current regulatory scheme thus has two systemic problems.
By permitting the states to compete for business by offering less and
less consumer protection, the regulation scheme starts to unravel.
Moreover, federal regulations that preempt state consumer protection
without substituting other protection schemes create large holes in
the regulatory fabric that encourage lenders to use a national charter
to evade local protection. The combination not only leaves consumers with little protection, it also creates structures in which the most
aggressive lenders can pursue their tactics with impunity.
The erosion of state power in itself need not be problematic from
a consumer protection perspective. In an era of interstate banking,
uniform regulation of consumer credit products at the federal level
may well be more efficient than a litany of consumer protection rules
that vary from state to state. The problem is not in the federal preemption; it is in the failure of federal law to offer a suitable alternative
to the preempted state law.

266

See Wilmarth, supra note 264, at 363-64 (arguing that the OCC’s preemption
rules incentivize nationalization of banks); see also Wilmarth Testimony, supra note 259,
at 74-75 (citing examples of multistate banks converting to national charters due to
OCC preemption rules).
267
See Furletti, supra note 259, at 426 (examining “regulatory consequences of the
NBA’s near total preemption of state statutes designed to protect credit card consumers”).
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b. Regulatory Agencies, Not Legislators
Two regulatory approaches fit within the ex ante framework. In
one, regulation is the direct product of the legislature, passed one
statute at a time. In the other, broad enabling legislation is implemented by a single, specialized regulatory agency that is charged with
supervising consumer products within its portfolio. In effect, the difference is whether the ongoing regulation of a market is lodged with
legislators or if the legislators have empowered the regulators to
monitor the market and develop new and nuanced responses. A significant portion of current consumer protection law is based on a series of highly targeted statutes. These include the Truth in Lending
268
269
Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Fair Debt Collection Prac270
271
tices Act, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the Home Ownership
272
273
and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA), and many more.
The main
drawback of these statutes is their specificity. Each one identifies specific problems to be addressed and identifies within the statutory
framework what practices will be outlawed and what practices will not.
The specificity of these laws inhibits beneficial regulatory innovations,
so that there is little innovation in such areas of consumer disclosure
or developing responses to new financial devices. If a practice was not
already well documented by the time Congress addressed the issue,
regulatory inertia set in and the likelihood that it would be covered by
268

15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1613, 1631–1649, 1661–1667f (2006).
Id. §§ 1681–1681x.
270
Id. §§ 1692–1692p.
271
Id. §§ 1691–1691f.
272
Id. § 1639.
273
Examples of state-level legislation are also abundant. See, e.g., Raphael W. Bostic et al., State and Local Anti-Predatory Lending Laws: The Effect of Legal Enforcement Mechanisms, 3-8, 26 (August 7, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1005423 (describing state-level “mini-HOEPA” statutes and
other anti-predatory lending laws). Proposed legislation provides additional examples.
Focusing on credit card regulation, see, for example, Joe Adler, In Focus: Card Rules
Have Fed, Lawmakers Far Apart, AM. BANKER, May 29, 2007, at 1 (listing bills: Stop Unfair Practices in Credit Cards Act of 2007, S. 1395, 110th Cong. (2007) (introduced by
Sens. Levin and McCaskill); Universal Default Prohibition Act of 2007, S. 1309, H.R.
2146, 110th Cong. (2007) (introduced in the Senate by Sen. Tester; introduced in the
House by Reps. Ellison et al.); Credit Card Minimum Payment Warning Act of 2007, S.
1176, 110th Cong. (2007) (introduced by Sens. Akaka, Durbin, Leahy, and Schumer);
Credit Card Repayment Act of 2007, H.R. 1510, 110th Cong. (2007) (introduced by
Reps. Price et al.); Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of
2007, H.R. 1461, 110th Cong. (2007) (introduced by Reps. Udall and Cleaver)); Credit
Card Payment Fee Act of 2007, H.R. 873, 110th Cong. (2007) (introduced by Reps.
Ackerman and Maloney).
269
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regulation was almost nil, even if the regulator had the formal authority to address the new practice. New practices, both good and bad,
have occurred outside the regulatory framework, while old practices
274
are rigidified even when better approaches become possible.
In the race between regulation and market innovation, market
participants have stronger incentives than regulators to change, and
market participants face substantial incentives to test the boundaries
of the regulatory framework. Regulation will invariably follow the
market. In an optimal regulatory framework, regulation follows the
market closely, without lagging far behind. Regulation through specific statutes does not allow for a timely and effective response to market innovations.
In an industry in which innovation is rapid, regulation through
legislation is too clumsy and slow to be effective. This would be true
even in a political environment amenable to frequent additions and
adjustments to an evolving corpus of consumer protection legislation.
The inadequacy of specific statutes is even more problematic in a political environment driven by powerful lobbying forces. The combined power of lenders, enhanced by their superior resources and
their single-minded focus on credit-related issues, will nearly always
drown out the power exercised by consumers. For example, even the
basic—and largely uncontroversial—effort to require credit card
companies to disclose how long it will take a customer to pay off a
credit card balance if the customer makes only minimum monthly
payments was stalled for years. Eventually, a watered-down and largely
ineffective version of this important disclosure was enacted as part of
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
275
2005, Section 1301.
c. Mismatch of Authority and Motivation
Effective regulation requires both authority and motivation. Yet
none of the many regulators in the consumer credit field satisfies
these basic requirements. Federal banking regulators have the authority but not the motivation. For each federal banking agency, consumer protection is not first (or even second) on its priority list. By

274

This is not to say that specific legislation cannot have a positive effect. Sure it
can. See, e.g., Bostic et al., supra note 273 (studying the effects of state-level antipredatory lending statutes).
275
§ 1301, 15 U.S.C. § 1637 (2006).
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contrast, the FTC makes consumer protection a priority, but it enjoys
only limited authority over consumer credit markets.
i. The Banking Agencies: Authority Without Motivation
Five federal banking agencies exercise authority over various slices
of the consumer credit market. The FRB, which is the central bank of
the United States, directly supervises state-chartered banks that choose
276
to become members of the Federal Reserve System.
The Federal
Reserve also serves as an umbrella supervisor of banks regulated un277
der the other banking agencies.
The Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency, located within the Treasury Department, was created by
278
Congress to oversee the national banking system.
The OCC charters and supervises national banks. The Office of Thrift Supervision,
also located within the Treasury Department, charters and supervises
federal savings associations and also supervises state-chartered savings
279
associations that belong to the Deposit Insurance Fund.
The FDIC
is “the primary federal regulator of state banks that are chartered by
the states that do not join the Federal Reserve System[, yet take advantage of federal deposit insurance]. In addition, the FDIC is the
backup supervisor for the remaining insured banks and thrift institu280
tions.”
Finally, the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA),
an independent federal agency, charters and supervises federal credit
unions. NCUA also “operates the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund (NCUSIF)[,] insuring [savings accounts] in all federal
281
credit unions and many state-chartered credit unions.”

276

KENNETH SPONG, BANKING REGULATION: ITS PURPOSES, IMPLEMENTATION, AND
EFFECTS 30 (1983). The Fed’s enforcement authority is limited to these banks. See BD.
OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 76 (2005), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_complete.pdf [hereinafter FRB, PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS].
277
The Structure of the Federal Reserve System, http://www.federalreserve.gov/
pubs/frseries/frseri.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2008).
278
See Furletti, supra note 259, at 427 (citing legislative history of the NBA).
279
OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, STRATEGIC PLAN (2000–2005) FOR THE OFFICE
OF THRIFT SUPERVISION 1 (2000), http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/4/48103.pdf [hereinafter OTS, PLAN]. The vast majority of state-chartered savings associations belong to
the Deposit Insurance Fund.
280
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Who Is the FDIC?, http://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/
symbol/index.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2008).
281
Nat’l Credit Union Admin., About NCUA, http://ncua.gov/AboutNCUA/
Index.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2008).
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The banking agencies have authority to enforce the federal consumer credit laws. The Federal Reserve Board’s consumer protection
responsibilities include “[1] writing and interpreting regulations to
carry out many of the major consumer protection laws, [2] reviewing
bank compliance with the regulations, [3] investigating complaints
from the public about state member banks’ compliance with con282
sumer protection laws.”
Specifically, Congress charged the Federal
283
Reserve with implementation of the TILA. TILA was passed in 1968
with the stated purpose of “assur[ing] a meaningful disclosure of
credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed
284
use of credit.”
The Federal Reserve implemented TILA “by writing
Regulation Z, which requires banks and other creditors to provide detailed information to consumers about the terms and cost of consumer credit for mortgages, car loans, credit and charge cards, and
285
other credit products.”
In addition to the TILA, the Federal Reserve implements and enforces numerous other consumer protection

282

See FRB, PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS, supra note 276, at 75.
See id., at 75-76 (“Congress passed the Truth in Lending Act to ensure that consumers have adequate information about credit. The Board implemented that
law . . . .”); see also A. Brooke Overby, An Institutional Analysis of Consumer Law, 34 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1219, 1272 (2001) (“The archetype of all modern consumer disclosure statutes is perhaps the United States [TILA], which among other things requires
creditors to disclose clearly and conspicuously the ‘annual percentage rate’ and ‘finance charge’ in consumer credit transactions.” (footnotes omitted)); Heidi Mandanis
Schooner, Consuming Debt: Structuring the Federal Response to Abuses in Consumer Credit, 18
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 43, 54 (2005) (“The most prominent example of the federal
laws that regulate the extension of credit by banks is [TILA], which requires lenders to
disclose the terms and cost of the loan.” (footnote omitted)).
284
15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2006). TILA has been amended several times to provide
additional consumer protection. These amendments include (descriptions in parentheses quoted from FRB, PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS, supra note 276, at 78-80): the Fair
Credit Billing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666–1666j (2000), (specifies how creditors must respond to billing-error complaints from consumers, imposes requirements to ensure
that creditors handle accounts fairly and promptly, and applies primarily to credit and
charge card accounts); the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, Pub.
L. No. 103-325, §§ 151–158, 108 Stat. 2190 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.) (providing additional disclosure requirements and substantive limitations
on home equity loans with rates or fees above a certain percentage or amount); the
Fair Credit and Charge Card Disclosure Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-583, § 1 102 Stat.
2960 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (requiring that applications for credit cards that are sent through the mail, solicited by telephone, or made
available to the public (for example, at counters in retail stores or through catalogs)
contain information about key terms of the account).
285
FRB, PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS, supra note 276, at 76.
283
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286

laws.
More generally, the FRB has broad authority under the Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act to prevent unfair or decep287
tive acts and practices.
Regulations promulgated under these statutes are enforced directly by the Federal Reserve against state-chartered banks that chose
to become members of the Federal Reserve System. Enforcement
against other banks and financial institutions is carried out by the
286

The Federal Reserve also implements the following (descriptions in parentheses quoted from FRB, PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS, supra note 276, at 78-81): the Fair
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2006) (prohibiting discrimination in the extension of housing credit on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, handicap, or family status); the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (protecting consumers against inaccurate or misleading information in credit files maintained
by credit-reporting agencies and requiring credit-reporting agencies to allow credit
applicants to correct erroneous reports); the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1692–1692p (prohibiting discrimination in credit transactions on several bases, and
requiring creditors to grant credit to qualified individuals without requiring cosignature by spouses, to inform unsuccessful applicants in writing of the reasons credit
was denied, and to allow married individuals to have credit histories on jointly held
accounts maintained in the names of both spouses); the Consumer Leasing Act of
1976, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1667–1667e (requiring that institutions disclose the cost and terms
of consumer leases, such as automobile leases); the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p (prohibiting abusive debt collection practices); the Expedited Funds Availability Act (1987), 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4010 (specifying when depository institutions must make funds deposited by check available to depositors for withdrawal and requiring institutions to disclose to customers their policies on funds
availability); the Home Equity Loan Consumer Protection Act of 1988, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1637a, 1647, 1665b (requiring creditors to provide consumers with detailed information about open-end credit plans secured by the consumer’s dwelling and regulating advertising of home equity loans); the Truth in Savings Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4301–
4313 (regulating the advertising of savings accounts, requiring that depository institutions disclose to depositors certain information about their accounts—including the
annual percentage yield, which must be calculated in a uniform manner—and prohibiting certain methods of calculating interest); the Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction
Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C.) (enhancing consumers’ ability to combat identity theft,
increasing the accuracy of consumer reports, allowing consumers to exercise greater
control over the type and amount of marketing solicitations they receive, restricting
the use and disclosure of sensitive medical information, and establishing uniform national standards in the regulation of consumer reporting).
287
Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1980, 15 U.S.C. §§ 57b-1 to -4
(2006) This statute
[a]uthorizes the Federal Reserve to identify unfair or deceptive acts or practices by banks and to issue regulations to prohibit them. Using this authority,
the Federal Reserve has adopted rules substantially similar to those adopted by
the FTC that restrict certain practices in the collection of delinquent consumer debt, for example, practices related to late charges, responsibilities of
cosigners, and wage assignments.
FRB, PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS, supra note 276, at 80.
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banking agencies—OCC, OTS, FDIC, and NCUA at the federal level,
and by state banking agencies—that supervise these other institu288
tions.
Moreover, the federal banking agencies can use section 8 of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to prevent unfair or deceptive acts
or practices under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act—
“whether or not there is an FRB regulation defining the particular act
289
or practice as unfair or deceptive.”
The authority of the federal
banking agencies is limited on one important dimension. Their supervisory powers are restricted to depository institutions—i.e., banks.
This restriction proved especially problematic during the recent subprime debacle, as a majority of subprime lenders were nonbank mort290
gage brokers and finance companies.
The Federal Reserve has the
power, under TILA and HOEPA, to issue regulations binding upon all
mortgage lenders. Only recently did the FRB propose to exercise
291
these powers. But even when the Federal Reserve issues such broadreaching regulations, the federal banking agencies cannot enforce
them on mortgage issuers that are not organized as banks.

288

See About the OCC, http://www.occ.gov/aboutocc.htm (last visited Oct. 1,
2008) (stating that the OCC enforces some consumer protection laws); FED. DEPOSIT
INS. CORP., STRATEGIC PLAN 2005–2010 2 (2005), http://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/
strategic/strategic_plan05_10.pdf (listing the assurance that consumer rights are protected as one of the two strategic goals listed for the supervision program); see also
Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904,
1905 (Jan. 5, 2004) (“Part 34 of [the OCC’s] regulations implements 12 U.S.C. 371,
which authorizes national banks to engage in real estate lending subject to ‘such restrictions and requirements as the Comptroller of the Currency may prescribe by regulation or order.’”). And one of the seven legal practice areas in the OCC Law Department is responsible for community and consumer law. See Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency, Legal and Regulatory, http://www.occ.gov/law.htm (last visited Oct. 1,
2008) (“The Community and Consumer Law Division (CCL) provides legal interpretations and advice on consumer protection, fair lending and community reinvestment
issues.”).
289
Julie L. Williams & Michael S. Bylsma, On the Same Page: Federal Banking Agency
Enforcement of the FTC Act to Address Unfair and Deceptive Practices by Banks, 58 BUS. LAW.
1243, 1244 (2003); see also OCC Advisory Letter 2002-3, Guidance on Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices (Mar. 22, 2002), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/
ftp/advisory/2002-3.doc (advising national banks regarding practices constituting unfair or deceptive acts).
290
Greg Ip & Damian Paletta, Regulators Scrutinized in Mortgage Meltdown, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 22, 2007, at A1 (finding that in 2005, 23% of subprime mortgages were issued
by regulated thrifts and banks, another 25% were issued by bank holding companies,
which were subject to different regulatory oversight through the federal system, and
52% “originated [with] companies with no federal supervision, primarily mortgage
brokers and stand-alone finance companies”).
291
See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 1672, 1672-73 (Jan. 9, 2008) (codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 226) (regulating all lenders of mortgages secured by principal dwellings).

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

90

[Vol. 157: 1

In theory, the banking agencies have authority to investigate new
products, to develop new regulations, and to police those new regulations. The relevance of such power, however, is diminished by the
agencies’ lack of interest in exercising this power. The problem is not
one of immediate politics or a particular party in government. The
problem is deep and systemic. These agencies are designed with a
primary mission to protect the safety and soundness of the banking
292
system. This means protecting banks’ profitability.
Consumer protection is, at best, a lesser priority that consists largely of enforcing
293
Truth-in-Lending disclosure rules. The closer alignment of banking
292

A broad interpretation of “safety and soundness,” however, can include consumer protection on the theory that unsafe credit products can lead to consumer default. See, e.g., Schooner, supra note 283, at 62-63 (“The primary argument in favor of
vesting federal bank regulators with responsibility for implementing consumer protection laws is the inherent overlap between consumer protection and prudential regulation. For example, a bank that is involved in predatory lending practices not only
harms consumers by charging undisclosed fees, but also may threaten the bank’s financial condition by systematically making overly risky loans.”); John D. Hawkes,
Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Before the Women in Housing and Finance
(Feb. 12, 2002), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2002-10a.doc (cautioning that government regulation inevitably entails burdensome costs).
293
The Federal Reserve describes its duties as falling into four general areas:
[1] [C]onducting the nation’s monetary policy by influencing the monetary
and credit conditions in the economy in pursuit of maximum employment,
stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates; [2] supervising and regulating banking institutions to ensure the safety and soundness of the nation’s
banking and financial system and to protect the credit rights of consumers;
[3] maintaining the stability of the financial system and containing systemic
risk that may arise in financial markets; [4] providing financial services to depository institutions, the U.S. government, and foreign official institutions, including playing a major role in operating the nation’s payments system.
Fed. Reserve Bd., FRB: Mission, http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/mission/
default.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2008). The Federal Reserve does not view consumer
protection as its core mission. As one scholar explained, “the Federal Reserve’s . . .
regulatory role remains focused on safety and soundness and not on other goals of financial regulation, such as consumer protection.” Heidi Mandanis Schooner, The Role
of Central Banks in Bank Supervision in the United States and the United Kingdom, 28 BROOK.
J. OF INT’L L. 411, 427 (2003). Like the Federal Reserve, the OCC’s core mission is
“[e]nsuring a Safe and Sound National Banking System for All Americans.” OCC,
Administrator of National Banks, http://www.occ.gov (last visited Oct. 1, 2008). The
OTS’s core mission is “to ensure a safe and sound thrift industry,” and it allocates the
bulk of its resources to this mission. See OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, STRATEGIC
PLAN (2003–2008), at 3 (2003), available at http://files.ots.treas.gov/480008.pdf. Nevertheless, the OTS lists “fair access to financial services and fair treatment of thrift customers” among its other strategic goals. OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, OMB FY2006
BUDGET/PERFORMANCE
PLAN
SUBMISSION
3,
6
(2006),
available
at
http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/4/480030.pdf.
OTS lists among its priorities to
“[c]onduct safety and soundness examinations of savings associations every 12-18
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regulators with the banking industry than with banking customers is
most obvious in cases where the interests of banks and consumers collide.
A recent example of such conflict was the intervention of the OCC
in a dispute in California. The state legislature passed a law requiring
credit card companies to reveal how long a customer would have to
make minimum payments on a card before the balance would be paid
in full and how much interest the customer would pay in the meantime. After the law was enacted, banks sued to enjoin enforcement.
The OCC intervened—on the part of the banks. The OCC took the
position that only the OCC could impose such requirements on the
294
banks.
Because the OCC had not imposed any such obligations on
the banks, it took the position that “no regulation” was the OCC’s
regulatory stance—and it warned the states off. Ultimately, the district
court backed up the OCC. The California example is not unique.
Former New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer stated that the OCC
“is actively engaged in undercutting the role of state regulators in en295
suring that banks fairly serve the needs of all customers.”

months that also incorporate an assessment of compliance with consumer-protection
laws and regulations,” and to “address[] unfair or deceptive practices of regulated savings associations and promote[] fair access to financial services for all Americans and
fair treatment of customers.” Id. at 6-7. As with other banking agencies, consumer
protection is not the main focus of the FDIC. The FDIC identifies three major program areas: insurance, supervision, and receivership management. FED. DEPOSIT INS.
CORP., supra note 288. Finally, the NCUA enforces existing consumer protection laws
but focuses on safety and soundness of credit unions. See NCUA Compliance SelfAssessment Guide, http://www.ncua.gov/GuidesManuals/ConsumerCompliance/
ConsumerCompliance.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2008) (providing guidance for selfassessment of credit union boards); see also Press Release, Nat’l Credit Union Admin.,
NCUA Emphasizes Consumer Protection at Event on Capitol Hill (Feb. 9, 2007), available at http://www.ncua.gov/news/press_releases/2007/MA07-0209.htm.
294
See Brief for the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Plaintiffs, Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Lockyer, 239 F. Supp. 2d 1000 (E.D. Cal.
2002) (No. 02-1138) (describing the OCC’s statutory authority and recent case law invalidating state laws restrictive of national banks). As the Lockyer court stated,
courts should give great weight to any reasonable construction of a regulatory
statute adopted by the agency charged with the enforcement of that statute.
The Comptroller of the Currency is charged with the enforcement of banking
laws to an extent that warrants the invocation of this principle with respect to
his deliberative conclusions as to the meaning of these laws.
239 F. Supp. 2d at 1013 (quoting NationsBank of N.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co.,
513 U.S. 251, 256-57 (1995)).
295
Eliot Spitzer, Att’y Gen., N.Y. Att’y Gen. Office, Testimony Before the Assembly
Standing Committee on Banks Regarding the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s Preemption of State Consumer Protection Laws (Apr. 16, 2004), available at http://
householdwatch.com/wp/2004/09/02/testimony-of-eliot-spitzer-regarding-the-occ.
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More generally, in 2004, the OCC issued regulations preempting
the application of many state laws, including many consumer protec296
tion laws.
The OCC, when intervening to prevent state consumer
protection efforts, invokes the idea of a national banking system and
297
the threat of inconsistent state regulations.
If the OCC were more
concerned with inconsistent regulations than with protecting banks’
interests, it would step in and issue its own consumer protection regulations—applicable across the country. So far, this has not hap298
pened.
As Professor Wilmarth noted in his testimony before Con296

See supra Part II.A.2.a; see also Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, supra note 288, at 1905-06 (clarifying preemption of state law with
respect to the OCC); Furletti, supra note 259, at 426 (examining “regulatory consequences of the NBA’s near total preemption of state statutes designed to protect credit
card consumers” in which the NBA was used by the OCC to effect this broad preemption); Schooner, supra note 283, at 46 (noting that OCC issued regulations that sought
to preempt state laws “despite much criticism”).
297
See, e.g., Bank Activities and Operations: Real Estate Lending and Appraisals,
,69 Fed. Reg. at 1907-08 (asserting the need for preemption because “[m]arkets for
credit (both consumer and commercial) . . . are now national, if not international, in
scope,” and “the elimination of legal and other barriers to interstate banking . . . has
led a number of banking organizations to operate . . . on a multi-state or nationwide
basis”). “The agency therefore regards it as imperative that national banks be ‘enable[d] . . . to operate to the full extent of their powers under Federal law, without interference from inconsistent state laws, consistent with the national character of the
national banking system . . . .’” Keith R. Fisher, Toward a Basal Tenth Amendment: A Riposte to National Bank Preemption of State Consumer Protection Laws, 29 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 981, 995-96 (2006) (quoting Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1908); see also Lockyer, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 1012-13,
1016 (explaining that the OCC “is responsible for administration of the [NBA],” where
the fundamental purpose of the NBA is to “establish a national banking system free
from intrusive state regulation,” and also concluding that the “national banks’ authority is not normally limited by, but rather ordinarily preempts contrary state law” (citing
Barnett Bank of Marion County., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 32, 34 (1996)); Fisher,
supra, at 995-96 (examining the justification for preemption as presented in the OCC’s
regulations); Schooner, supra note 283, at 46 (“National banks applaud the OCC’s policy as allowing them the opportunity to operate under a single federal legal standard as
opposed to varied state standards.”); Letter from Stephen I. Zeisel, Senior Counsel, &
Ralph J. Rohner, Special Counsel, Consumer Bankers Ass’n, to John D. Hawke, Jr.,
Comptroller of the Currency 1 (Oct. 3, 2003) available at http://www.cbanet.org/
files/FileDownloads/OCCPreemption.pdf (“[N]ational banks must be able to exercise
the full range of federally established banking functions, without interference or burden from state regulatory and visitorial regimes.”).
298
See Wilmarth Testimony, supra note 259, at 76-83 (attesting to the failure of
OCC to protect consumers); Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities;
Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 68 Fed. Reg. 6161,
6376 (Feb. 7, 2003) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7, 34) (stating that national banks
are subject to OCC regulation); see also Fisher, supra note 297, at 985-86 (“OCC contests the authority of state law enforcement officials to commence litigation to enforce
compliance with state laws and with those federal laws that Congress has empowered
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gress, “[s]ince January 1, 1995, the OCC has not issued a public enforcement order against any of the eight largest national banks” and
has only issued thirteen orders against national banks for violating
299
consumer lending laws.
In contrast, “[d]uring 2003 alone, state officials initiated more than 20,000 investigations . . . [,] took more than
4,000 enforcement actions in response to consumer complaints about
abusive lending practices,” and held lenders accountable to the tune
300
of $1 billion in penalties and restitution.
The OCC’s inaction may also be attributable, at least in part, to its
direct financial stake in keeping its bank clients happy. Large national banks fund a significant portion of the OCC’s budget. Assessments comprise 95% of the OCC’s budget, with the twenty largest national banks covering nearly three-fifths of these assessments. The
state officials to enforce, even where OCC itself has declined to act.”). Furthermore,
Fisher notes that
[t]he only actual regulatory prohibitions that OCC has promulgated are
against making real estate loans “based predominantly on the bank’s realization of the foreclosure or liquidation value of the borrower’s collateral, without regard to the borrower’s ability to repay the loan according to its terms”
(that is, prohibiting equity stripping), and against engaging in “unfair or deceptive trade practices within the meaning of section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act” and the implementing regulations of the FTC. The latter is
rather a hollow gesture given that, as OCC freely admits, it took OCC and the
other federal banking agencies “more than twenty-five years to reach consensus on their authority to enforce the FTC Act.”
Id. at 992-93 (footnotes omitted).
299
Wilmarth Testimony, supra note 259, at 77-78. Two of these orders probably
resulted only due to indirect pressures exerted by other federal agencies. Id.
300
Id. at 79. These actions have attempted to stop “a wide variety of abusive practices . . . such as predatory lending, privacy violations, telemarketing scams, biased investment analysis, and manipulative initial public offerings.” Id. at 78. In many of
these cases, the OCC filed amicus briefs in support of the banks arguing for the preemption of states’ consumer protection laws. Id. Other commentators confirm this as well:
In response to a 2005 Freedom of Information Act request, the OCC reported
that its “customer assistance group” employed a grand total of three people
whose job primarily involved investigating and resolving consumer complaints. By comparison, according to a fact sheet from the House Financial
Services Committee, state banking agencies and [attorneys general’s] offices
employ nearly 700 full-time examiners and attorneys who make sure that consumer laws are enforced. In 2003 alone, state bank agencies brought 4,035
consumer enforcement actions. Since 2000, the OCC has brought just 11
consumer enforcement actions. The biggest two involved cases that were initiated and investigated by state attorneys general and that the OCC initially
tried to prevent from going forward.
Stephanie Mencimer, No Account: The Nefarious Bureaucrat Who’s Helping Banks Rip You
Off, NEW REPUBLIC, August 27, 2007, at 14, 14-15.
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OCC’s ability to attract large banks to the national banking system results in a significant financial gain. During 2004–2005, the charter
conversions of three large, national banks—JP Morgan Chase, HSBC,
and Bank of Montreal—resulted in the transfer of $1 trillion of banking assets into the OCC’s jurisdiction. This transfer alone raised
301
OCC’s assessment revenues by 15%.
Moreover, the greater the stability of OCC institutions, the more influence the agency has. By attracting more financial-services companies to incorporate as federally
chartered banks under the supervision of the OCC, the agency can
expand its influence. Accordingly, the OCC would be reluctant to
impose substantial constraints on banks, fearing that such constraints
might induce the banks to switch to a competing regulator.
The lack of interest and incentives to address consumer protection issues is not limited to the OCC. Recently, the Federal Reserve
has come under congressional scrutiny for failing to exercise its rule302
making authority to protect consumers.
In response to well303
publicized pressure from Congress, the Federal Reserve and the
OCC have begun to address some of the consumer protection problems associated with consumer credit products, specifically credit
304
305
cards and subprime mortgage loans.
But the agencies’ long history of inaction in the consumer credit markets suggests that the
301

See Wilmarth Testimony, supra note 259, at 17.
Improving Federal Consumer Protection in Financial Services: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Financial Servs., 110th Cong. 37-38 (2007) (statement of Rep. Frank) [hereinafter Frank Statement] (“[I]f the Fed doesn’t start to use that authority to roll out
the rules, then we will give it to somebody who will use it.”).
303
See John Poirier, Lawmaker Tells Fed to Step Up Consumer Protection, REUTERS, June
13, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idUSN1339842620070613
(quoting Frank Statement, supra note 302).
304
See supra note 132 (discussing potential changes by the FRB); see also Consumer
Protection Hearing, supra note 49, at 15-16 (advocating to Congress that current credit
card disclosure rules should be changed to improve consumers’ ability to make wellinformed decisions). In response, the FRB and the OCC are revising the disclosure
regulations under TILA. See Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd., supra note 51 (“The
[proposed] provisions . . . follow the Board’s 2007 proposal to improve the credit card
disclosures under [TILA].”).
305
See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 1672 (proposed Jan. 9, 2008) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226) (providing new protections for high-price mortgages secured
by a consumer’s dwelling). The Fed and the other banking agencies became aware of
questionable lending practices in the subprime mortgage market in 2004. Yet they
took no action until September 2006 and even then issued only a “guidance” that addressed only exotic mortgage products (e.g., Option ARMs) to the exclusion of most
subprime loans. A broader “guidance” was issued only in June 2007. And binding
rules were not proposed until January 2008. See generally Edmund L. Andrews, Fed and
Regulators Shrugged as Subprime Crisis Spread, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2007, at A1.
302
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agencies lack the interest or willingness to dedicate the resources
needed to create effective consumer protection.
ii. The FTC: Motivation Without Authority
Consumer credit products are also regulated by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC). While consumer protection is generally of secondary importance to banking agencies, one of the central missions of
306
the FTC is consumer protection.
But the FTC’s consumer protection activities span many different categories of consumer products,
307
leaving only limited resources for consumer credit products.
More
importantly, the FTC lacks authority over banks and other depository
institutions, and thus cannot effectively regulate consumer credit
products. The FTC Act specifically excludes banks from FTC supervi308
sion.
Even the hallmark FTC mandate—to prevent unfair and de309
ceptive acts and practices —cannot be enforced by the FTC when
310
the actors are financial institutions. Instead, if the FTC found that a
bank engaged in unfair or deceptive acts, it would have to turn to the
banking agencies to deal with the problem. Moreover, the FTC Improvement Act of 1975 gave the Federal Reserve—not the FTC—the
authority to define what constitutes unfair and deceptive acts and
311
practices by a financial institution.
This is not to say that the FTC has no authority over consumer
credit products. The FTC assures compliance by nondepository enti312
ties with a variety of statutory provisions under TILA and other

306

See FTC—About Us, http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/about.shtm (last visited Oct. 1,
2008) (summarizing the mission of the FTC to both protect consumers and promote
fair competition).
307
See FTC, Legal Resources—Statutes Relating to Consumer Protection Mission,
http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/stat3.shtm (last visited Oct. 1, 2008) (describing the many different statutes the FTC implements); FTC, Commission Actions for December 2007,
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/12/index.shtm (last visited Oct. 1, 2008) (describing
how during a single month in 2007, the FTC was involved in actions pertaining to
rental car issuers, marketers of medical bracelets, and the Multiple Listing Service for
selling homes).
308
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2006).
309
Id. § 45.
310
Williams & Bylsma, supra note 289, at 1244-45. The FTC does have authority
over nonbank lenders, however. For example, many mortgage companies fall into this
category.
311
Id. at 1244.
312
“These provisions include mandatory disclosures concerning all finance
charges and related aspects of credit transactions, requirements for advertisers of
credit terms, and a required three-day right of rescission in certain transactions involv-
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313

credit laws.
The FTC also regulates mandatory disclosures by nonfederally insured depository institutions, under the Federal Deposit
314
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991.
In addition, the
FTC performs some other credit-related functions: it combats identity
315
theft, which is often related to consumer credit products; it enforces
316
statutory limits on debt collection practices; it exercises some oversight over “credit repair” services, prohibiting untrue or misleading

ing the establishment of a security interest in the consumer’s residence.” FTC, supra
note 307; see also Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1613, 1631–1649, 1661–
1667f (2006). The description of this law, as well as the descriptions of other laws in
the text and notes below, are taken from FTC, supra note 307.
313
See Fair Credit Billing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666–1666j (2006) (requiring prompt
written acknowledgment of consumer billing complaints and investigation of billing
errors by creditors, prohibiting creditors from taking actions that adversely affect the
consumer’s credit standing until an investigation is completed, and requiring that
creditors promptly post payments to the consumer’s account and either refund overpayments or credit them to the consumer’s account); §§ 1637a, 1647, 1665b (implementing provisions of the Home Equity Loan Consumer Protection Act of 1988 by requiring creditors to provide certain disclosures for open-end credit plans secured by
the consumer’s dwelling and imposing substantive limitations on such plans); Home
Ownership and Equity Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (establishing disclosure requirements and prohibiting equity stripping and other abusive practices in connection
with high-cost mortgages); Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11
U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C.) (requiring certain creditors to disclose on the front of
billing statements a minimum monthly payment warning for consumers and a toll-free
telephone number, established and maintained by the Commission, for consumers
seeking information on the time required to repay specific credit balances); Fair
Credit and Charge Card Disclosure Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-583, 102 Stat. 2960 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (requiring credit and charge card
issuers to provide certain disclosures in direct mail, telephone, and other applications
and solicitations to open-end credit and charge accounts and under other circumstances); Consumer Leasing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1667–1667f (regulating personal property leases that exceed 4 months in duration and that are made to consumers for personal, family, or household purposes, imposing limitations on the size of penalties for
delinquency or default and on the size of residual liabilities, and requiring certain disclosures in lease advertising). The preceding descriptions of acts are quoted from
FTC, supra note 307.
314
12 U.S.C. § 1831t (2006) (charging the FTC with enforcement of audit and disclosure requirements for depository institutions lacking federal deposit insurance).
315
See Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117
Stat. 1952 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 20 U.S.C.) (amending
the Fair Credit Reporting Act) (giving consumers access to credit information in addition to providing for mitigaion of the likelihood and harm of identity theft); Identity
Theft Assumption and Deterrence Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-318, 112 Stat. 3007
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2006)) (establishing the FTC as the agency
responsible for identity-theft claims).
316
See Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p (2006).
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representations and requiring certain affirmative disclosures; it protects consumers’ privacy rights against financial institutions and credit
bureaus that collect consumer information by ensuring the accuracy
318
of the collected information; and it enforces antidiscrimination laws
319
in the consumer credit context.
Beyond the implementation and
enforcement of these specific statutes, the FTC enjoys general authority to prevent unfair and deceptive trade practices and, in particular,
to prevent unfair advertising practices—but not in depository institu320
tions.
In other words, credit cards and mortgages issued by banks
321
or thrifts are exempt from the reach of the FTC.
This litany of agencies, limits on rulemaking authority, and divided enforcement powers results in inaction. No single agency is
charged with supervision over any single credit product that is sold to
the public. No single agency is charged with the task of developing
expertise or is given the resources to devote to enforcement of consumer protection. No single agency has an institutional history of
protecting consumers and assuring the safety of products sold to
322
them.

317

See Credit Repair Organizations Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1679–1679j (2006) (prohibiting deceptive and abusive tactics for the collection of debts incurred from personal,
family, or household expenditures).
318
See Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 6801–6809, 6821–6827 (2006)) (requiring financial institutions to have privacy policies in place to protect data integrity); Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–
1681(u) (2006) (setting requirements for creditors providing information to credit
reporting agencies to ensure accuracy); Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of
2003, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2006) (amending the Fair Credit Reporting Act) (providing free annual credit reports for consumers from three major credit reporting
agencies).
319
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–1691f (2006).
320
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a)(2), 57a(f) (2006).
321
See Letter from Donald S. Clark, Sec’y, FTC, to Jennifer L. Johnson, Sec’y, Bd.
of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., at 1 (Sep. 14, 2006), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2006/November/20061121/OP-1253/OP-1253_
53_1.pdf (describing the authority of the FTC and noting the FTC’s “wide-ranging responsibilities regarding consumer financial issues for most nonbank segments of the
economy”).
322
As Henry Paulson, Secretary of the Treasury, remarked,
our complex and fragmented regulatory system complicates an already difficult situation. Existing federal laws address mortgage fraud, disclosures, fair
lending, unfair and deceptive practices, and other aspects of the mortgage
process. But the regulatory and enforcement authority varies across different
federal agencies. States have also enacted an additional layer of regulation,
typically applied only to certain institutions that operate within that state and
enforced by the state agencies.
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B. A New Proposal
Learning from the strengths and, more importantly, from the
shortcomings of current solutions, it is possible to sketch the outlines
of a more effective regulatory response to the identified failures in
consumer credit markets. We propose the creation of a single federal
regulator—a new Financial Product Safety Commission or a new consumer credit division within an existing agency (most likely the FRB or
FTC)—that will be put in charge of consumer credit products. Our
proposed regulatory framework has three critical elements: (1) ex
ante regulation, rather than ex post judicial scrutiny; (2) regulation by
an administrative agency with a broad mandate, rather than by specifically targeted piecemeal legislation; and (3) entrusting the authority over consumer credit products to a single, highly motivated federal
regulator, such that the same regulation applies to all similar prod323
ucts, regardless of the identity of the lender.
First, the proposed solution adopts an ex ante approach. The
regulation of consumer credit markets is not amenable to ex post judicial review. While extreme practices may be policed using the unconscionability doctrine or other common law doctrines, these tools
are too blunt to provide a comprehensive regulatory response to unsafe consumer credit products. The proposed regulator will develop
expertise that will enable it to promulgate nuanced regulations that
324
account for product innovation.

This patchwork structure should be streamlined and modernized.
Henry M. Paulsen, Jr., Sec’y, U.S. Treasury, Remarks at the Georgetown University Law
Center on Current Housing and Mortgage Market Developments (Oct. 16, 2007),
available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/hp612.htm.
323
A different approach would reverse the preemption trend and restore state authority over consumer credit products. This approach would also have to reverse the
exportation doctrine in order to avoid a race to the bottom. But empowering the
states would come at a cost. First, not all states will be equally motivated to regulate
consumer credit products (perhaps due to regulatory capture in certain states). Second, not all states will be equally effective in regulating consumer credit products—
e.g., resources, at least in some states, will be significantly more modest than federal
resources. Finally, state-level regulation will potentially expose national lenders to fifty
different regulatory regimes. For these reasons, we believe that an optimally designed
regulatory framework at the federal level is superior to state-level regulation. We recognize, however, that a comprehensive comparison between the federal- and state-level
solutions is much more complicated, and we defer such a comparison for future research.
324
These regulations can be enforced either via ex ante inspection or via ex post
litigation. Our main point is that common law courts should not be setting the standards ex post as a by-product of specific case resolution.

2008]

Making Credit Safer

99

Second, we propose that the ex ante regulations be promulgated
and enforced by an administrative agency with broad rulemaking and
enforcement authority over consumer credit products. Legislation
targeted to specific practices, with narrowly defined authority delegated to administrative agencies, is incapable of effectively responding
to the high rate of innovation in consumer credit markets and the
subtle ways in which creditors can exploit consumer misunderstanding. An administrative agency with a broad mandate could develop
more institutional expertise and quicker responses to new products
325
and practices.
Third, we propose to regulate consumer financial products, much
in the same way that manufactured products—meat, agricultural
products, drugs, cosmetics, and a host of other physical products—are
regulated: regulation follows the product, not the manufacturer. Regardless of who issues the product, a single federal regulator will oversee the design and dissemination of the product. This approach will
eliminate regulatory gaps and contradictions, and it will halt the state
and federal regulatory competition that undercuts consumer safety.
In this respect our proposal has much in common with the Conduct
of Business Regulatory Agency (CBRA) envisioned in Secretary Paul326
son’s “Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure.”
Paulson proposes the establishment of a single federal regulator that
will “be responsible for business conduct regulation across all types of
327
financial firms.”

325

A possible concern about concentrating authority in a single regulator is that it
could exacerbate the problem of political capture. It is not clear that diffuse authority
is less prone to regulatory capture than concentrated authority. For example, consumer groups find it difficult to oppose well-funded banking interests at multiple state
legislatures, and they may be better able to serve as an effective counterweight at a single federal regulator. In any event, minimizing the risk of capture is a main regulatorydesign challenge in implementing our proposal.
326
See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL
REGULATORY STRUCTURE 170-74 (2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/
press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf (proposing a single “business conduct regulator”
to protect customers of financial institutions).
327
Id. at 171. More fully, Paulson suggests that
a new business conduct regulator, CBRA, should be created. CBRA should be
responsible for business conduct regulation across all types of financial firms. As
described above, business conduct regulation in the optimal framework includes the regulation of key aspects of consumer protection such as disclosures, business practices, and chartering and licensing. CBRA should be responsible for implementing uniform national business conduct standards in
these areas.
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We recognize that concentrated, broad authority in itself will not
guarantee adequate protection for consumers. To be effective, authority must be coupled with motivation to exercise that authority. An
agency that views its core mission as ensuring the safety and soundness
of banks might not dedicate sufficient resources to consumer protection even if it has complete authority to regulate the safety of consumer credit products. In implementing our proposal, a central challenge will be the design of enabling legislation that provides this
328
crucial combination of authority and motivation.
CONCLUSION
The market for consumer credit is not operating efficiently. Evidence abounds that consumers are sold credit products that are designed to obscure their risks and to exploit consumer misunderstanding. Ordinary market mechanisms, such as competition and expert
advisers, cannot fully correct these deficiencies. Without regulatory
intervention, market distortions and inefficiencies will continue to
grow, imposing substantial costs on American families and on the
economy.
Minimum product safety standards are carefully regulated for
nearly all physical products. Such standards are, however, noticeably
absent in the regulations of credit products. Ex post regulation by
litigation is a weak tool, and the contradictory patchwork of state and
federal ex ante regulations has proven itself ineffective to protect consumers. The flaws in the current system are not simply the shortcomings of particular legislators or regulators. Instead, the entire framework of credit product regulation is deeply flawed.
The failure of current attempts at regulation of credit-product
safety prompts us to propose the creation of a new federal regulator—
a Financial Product Safety Commission or a new consumer credit diviId. (emphasis added). The Paulson proposal to consolidate authority in CBRA is motivated by the shortcomings of the current regulatory structure—shortcomings that are
similar to those described earlier in Part II.A. Id. at 172 (“The current multi-agency
business conduct oversight structure creates uneven enforcement, potential enforcement gaps, disputes over jurisdiction, and regulatory inconsistency.”).
328
Congressman Frank has raised the possibility of entrusting the FTC with authority over consumer credit products. See Frank Statement, supra note 302. Similarly,
the Center for Responsible Lending, noting the FRB’s failure to exercise its authority
under HOEPA, proposed that Congress give parallel authority to the FTC. See Preserving the American Dream: Predatory Lending Practices and Home Foreclosures: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Development, 110th Cong. (2007) (testimony
of Mark Eakes, CEO, Ctr. for Responsible Lending & Ctr. for Self-Help).
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sion within an existing agency (the FRB or FTC). We do not lay out
every aspect of such a regulatory body—indeed, we invite those more
deeply schooled in administrative law and other disciplines to help fill
in the picture of how such a regulator can be optimally structured.
We can, however, identify three features that will enable this regulator
to make markets function better for consumers: reliance on ex ante
regulation rather than ex post litigation, rulemaking located with a
regulatory agency rather than a legislature, and regulation based on
the product sold rather than the identity of the seller. These three
features would go a long distance toward restoring a functioning market for credit that is based on wealth-enhancing transactions for both
consumer and seller.

